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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a carefully focused philosophical
examination of the ethical arguments about the use of In
Vitro Fertilization with Embryo Transfer {IVF/ET) and
artificial insemination to assist infertile couples to bear
their own genetic children. The dissertation sets the scene
of its argument with a statement of its biological
presuppositions and

a review of the well known arguments

about the morality of IVF/ET. It then examines Thomas
Aquinas' teaching on natural law ethical theory, since some
opponents of IVF/ET appeal to this theory to defend their
position. Then the dissertation provides a detailed
philosophical explanation and critique of an important
document opposing IVF/ET. The author explains and critiques
the best well known philosophical work against IVF/ET,

Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on
the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of
the Day by Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith {CDF,
1987). CDF claims that unity of husband and wife, and
proreation are essentially linked to conjugal act. That is,
the proper nature of conjugal act is to unite husband and
wife and to procreate children. But CDF did not show how the
two aspects of the conjugal act that CDF considers necessary
ri

(unitive meaning and procreative meaning), are necessarily
present together in conjugal act, when very often, they
occur separately. This position of CDF is based on a kind of
natural law (deontological) moral argument which views
!VF/ET and artificial insemination as unnatural, hence
immoral. Then, on the basis of a proportionalist or
consequentialist interpretation of Thomas Aquinas' natural
law ethical theory, in contrast with the deontological
interpretation of this ethical theory by CDF, the author
shows that CDF's deontological ethical argument that !VF/ET
is unnatural and therefore immoral is fundamentally flawed.
Instead !VF/ET is shown to be both natural and morally
justified. Using value assumptions about the two essential
meanings conjugal act, the unitive meaning (love of spouses)
and the procreative meaning (value of the child), which CDF
itself accepts, the dissertation argues on proportionalis or
consequentialist grounds that, in general, !VF/ET yields
more goods than harms for those involved, especially in a
culture like Nigeria. Moreover, a comparison of !VF/ET with
other competing alternatives shows that, in each case,
IVF/ET yields a better balance of good over evil than the
other alternatives.
Therefore opponents of IVF/ET are not justified in
condemning this technology as immoral either on the basis
that 'it is fraught with serious risks/harm for the embryo or
on the basis that it is unnatural.
viii

INTRODUCTION

The new reproductive technologies have opened up yet
another chapter of general moral concern in a world
already fraught with many theoretical and practical moral
issues. While governments, institutions and professional
bodies were locked in theoretical moral debates about the
morality of in vitro fertilization with embryo transfer
(IVF/ET) and artificial insemination, individuals and
groups of individuals were already engaged in the actual
use of this technology to assist infertile couples to
bear their own genetic children, some long before the
debates even began. Presumably these individuals and
groups knew or supposed the moral answer to the issue
being debated was positive. Whatever rule of conduct
these individuals have used for the judgment of their
action, it is the goal of this dissertation to make a
carefully focused philosophical examination about whether
IVF/ET and artificial· insemination can be morally
justified, and under what grounds. The work will then
provide a consequentialist or proportionalist
phi~osophical

framework for a moral justification of

IVF/ET. The author hopes that the findings of this work
1

2
will be a genuine contribution to philosophical
scholarship and that it will provoke more scholarly
discussion about the morality of IVF/ET without an
unexamined religious partisanship.
The dissertation contains Five Chapters. Chapter One
will provide both the biological presuppositions or
setting of the issue of IVF/ET and artificial
insemination as well as a general review of the moral
arguments for and against these procedures. Chapter Two
will give a general sketch of the available ethical
theories that can be used to establish a philosophical
background for the morality of IVF/ET. It will take an
in-depth look at Thomas Aquinas' account of natural law
ethical theory for a proper understanding of arguments
which many def enders and opponents have employed in the
arguments on IVF/ET. In Chapter Three, the author will
provide a more focused and detailed ethical philosophical
foundation for both the critique and the defense of the
morality of IVF/ET; it will then explain the position of
Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF)
arguments, and show that CDF's moral interpretation of
natural law ethical theory is deontological and that its
fundamental argument against IVF/ET is flawed. On the
basis of the account in Chapter Three, Chapter Four will
make a consequentialist examination of the risks/harms
and benefits of IVF/ET, and will show that in general,

3

the benefits of IVF/ET will yield more goods than evil
for all involved, especially for some cultures like
Nigeria where human procreation is for most people the
primary reason for marriage. A consequentialist or
proportionalist comparison of IVF/ET with other competing
alternatives will be the focus of Chapter Five. It will
be shown that in each instance, IVF/ET provides a greater
balance of good over evil than its competing alternatives
{adoption, surgical reconstruction of the oviduct and
other surgical procedures, acceptance of infertility
together with the development of other avenues towards
leading a worthwhile fulfilling life, and polygamy). The
dissertation will end with a general conclusion that
CDF's basic deontological argument against IVF/ET as
unnatural and therefore immoral not only does not hold,
but that IVF/ET is in fact morally justified.

4
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF ISSUES

This philosophical work is primarily focused on ethical
issues. But it has at the same time, biological and
technological foundations which determine to a great extent
the content and range of ethical issues to be examined in
the dissertation. Even though many of the biological facts
of the processes of human reproduction are well known, the
central position of these facts in this project calls for a
brief descriptive account of them. In this way the reader
will be well prepared for the variety and complexity of the
arguments which the reproductive technology of in vitro
fertilization with embryo transfer (IVF/ET) raises.

The biological presuppositions

As this work will show later, human infertility which
occurs in a number of forms has been the most important
motivating factor in the development of the technologies
being discussed here. For the major goal of this
reproductive technology has been the successful treatment of
infertility. When this goal has been achieved, it is hoped
that the attendant negative impact of infertility in the
lives of childless couples will also disappear. For the
moment, the focus will be on the causes of infertility, in
order to then understand the various reproductive
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technologies developed to overcome it, especially IVF/ET.
But it is worth noting that the most general ethical
justification for the development and use of reproductive
technologies has already been identified. It is a
consequentialist or proportionalist justification; namely,
that the cost and other burdens of developing and using
reproductive technologies are outweighed by the benefits of
fertility and of lessening or if possible eliminating the
harms of infertility for the people involved. This
utilitarian or proportionalist defense is necessary because
no better alternative exists for those affected than this.
It will be necessary to return to examine this ethical
position in detail later in chapters three and following.
Why are some of the couples who want children unable to
have them? To appreciate the effects of reproductive
technologies, one must first study the human reproductive
systems.

We need sufficient facts about the human

reproductive system to answer the questions people have
regarding IVF/ET.
The major human reproductive organs are: (a) For the
Male: the testes; the penis; the tubes; and the glands
namely, the epididymis, the vas deferens, and the
ejaculatory ducts;

(b} For the Female: the ovaries; the

fal+opian tubes or oviducts; the uterus; the cervix and the
vagina (Alpern 1992:16-17}. But while all the above organs
are important, each in its specific mode, we need to pay
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particular attention only to the testes and the penis with
regard to the male and the ovaries and the uterus in regard
to the female.

The male reproductive system:

This section does not pretend to give an exhaustive
account of the structures and functions of the male
reproductive system. It focuses on what is of relevance to
this work in a summary fashion.
The testes: The testes are essential organs of the male

reproductive system because the sperm, the male contributor
to conception, develop there. The testes originally develop
within the abdominal cavity and then descend and are
suspended below the abdomen in the scrotum during the last
month or two of fetal development

(Creager 1983:731).

However, it sometimes happens that the testes fail to
descend into the scrotum. When such an abnormality occurs,
then a man will be sterile (Swanson 1974:60). This is one
cause of sterility in the male.
The reason for the special location of the testes in
the scrotum, separated from the main body cavity of the
abdomen, is that normal body temperature seems too high for
the sperm. "The normal temperature of the testes in the
scr9tum is 2 [degrees] C lower than the internal body
temperature - the ideal temperature for developing sperm"
(Creager 1983:732). But the sperm's equal need for
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protection from excessive cold is marked by the fact that
the muscle of the scrotum in which the testes are suspended
contracts during cold weather toward the abdominal cavity in
order to allow "the testes to absorb heat from the rest of
the body so that the sperm cells do not become chilled"
(Creager 1983:732). The testes not only produce sperm but
also the male hormone known as "testosterone", a hormone
that is essential both "for the development and maintenance
of the male secondary characteristics throughout the
reproductive life of a male" (Creager 1983:407).
The penis: This organ is appropriately structured in

addition to its other roles to "deposit sperm into the
reproductive tract of the female during sexual intercourse.
During sexual arousal the penis enlarges and stiff ens and
erection is produced" (Creager 1983:734). But the stiffness
and erection that are necessary requirements for the penis
to deposit sperm into the reproductive tract of the female
are not always accomplished. "Sometimes the man's penis does
not become and remain stiff enough to penetrate the vagina;
in this case he is said to be 'impotent'" (Swanson 1974:91).
This is another cause of infertility in the male.

The female reproductive organs
The ovaries:

The ovaries are reproductive organs that are

located on either side of the uterus and.are responsible for
producing the ovum, the female contribution to conception.
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They also produce the female sex hormones, estrogen and
progesterone, which are highly necessary in human
reproduction, affecting the development of the ovum in the
ovary as well as preparing the uterus to receive the
conceptus if conception takes place.
The ovaries of a woman of child bearing age,
approximately 12 to 47, release one mature ovum once in
approximately every 30 days. Ordinarily fertilization of the
ovum takes place in the oviduct by sperm that have made
their way from the vagina to the oviduct. Some sperm are not
efficient in making their way from the vagina to the
oviduct, which can be another cause of a couple's
infertility. Although it is normal that only one egg is
released (ovulation) by the ovaries in each cycle, it
sometimes happens that more than one ovum is released and
this brings about the possibility for multiple, fraternal
birth (Freiberg 1987:76).
Serious illness and various other circumstances can
prevent a woman once fertile from ovulating. Obviously the
absence of any ovum makes conception impossible for her
(Freiberg 1987:76-77}.
It is important to note that at birth a human female's
ovaries already contain all the ova the female will need for
reproduction for the fertile days of her child-bearing age,
(12 - 47) . At birth a female has "about 2 million primary
oocytes ... and by puberty about 400,000 remain, 200,000 in
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each ovary" (Creager 1983:738). This is unlike the male
whose testes continuously produce sperm from puberty, "at
the

rate of several million every few days" (Freiberg

1987:78). The production of sperm continues throughout life
even though the production of testosterone, a hormone that
is responsible for the production of sperm in the testes,
may decrease in amount as the male progresses in age,
(Creager 1983:730 - 731). Thus a normal male at any age can
produce sperm to fertilize an ovum and a normal female will
produce a fertile ovum once each cycle over her whole childbearing time.
The uterus: The uterus is a muscular organ of the

female reproductive system in which the conceptus implants
and develops after the ovum has been fertilized by the sperm
in the oviduct. The fertilization of an ovum by a sperm
occurs within 24 hours after ovulation and 4 to 6 hours or
even in as little time as 30 minutes after sexual
intercourse depending on how rapidly the sperm moves to the
ovum (Browder 1991:149; Creager 1983:748; Swanson 1974:116).
As we saw above, the penis deposits several million
sperm in the female reproductive tract during sexual
intercourse. Various intricate developments involving
biochemical and biophysical changes take place as the sperm
move to meet the ovum and penetrate it for fertilization.
The initial changes which sperm undergo before they
fertilize an ovum is called "capacitation" and "this

c~n
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normally takes place in the female genital tract" {Bernstein
and Siegel 1991:622), or it can "occur either in the uterus,
the oviduct or both" {Browder 1991:132). The exact mechanism
of capacitation however, remains poorly understood. {Browder
1991:132; Davajan 1991:624).
The fertilization of the ovum by the sperm immediately
commences a complicated process which must take place for
the formation of "all of the cells, tissues, organs and
systems of the human body" {Creager, 1983:80). For this
further growth to proceed normally, the new organism must
come to be stationed at an appropriate place in the female
reproductive organ; that is in the wall of the uterus.
Defects in the structure or chemistry of the oviducts and
uterus can make this implantation of the conceptus
impossible or so inefficient that the conceptus cannot
develop properly. Thus, some forms of infertility involve
inability to conceive; other forms involve inability of the
conceptus to properly implant and develop in the uterus.
Creager,

(1983:759) gives us a description of the

developmental processes of human life leading from
fertilization to implantation:

After fertilization occurs in the uterine tube, the
fertilized ovum, or zygote, undergoes several mitotic
divisions known as cleavage . ... a single cell becomes
two; each of the two divide, making four; each of the
four divides, making eight cells; and so on, until a
solid ball of cells, the morula, is formed. About three
days after fertilization the morula arrives in the
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uterine cavity, where its cells undergo a rearrangement
to form a hollow ball, the blastocyst.
During the second week the blastocyst undergoes
further changes before it implants in the wall of the
uterus. The cells of the inner cell mass continue to
divide by mitosis, and two cavities - the gut cavity
and the amniotic cavity - form. Between these two
cavities is the embryonic disc, from which the
developing embryo will form ....
Toward the end of the second week of development,
the blastocyst enzymatically digests its way into the
decidua basalis, the deepest layer of the endometrium,
and is covered by other uterine tissue called the
decidua capsularis. This is the process called
implantation.

Not all the cells of the fertilized egg which have
developed into the blastocyst stage of early human
development will make up the actual human being who will
eventually be born. It is noteworthy that it is specifically
"only the cells of the embryonic disc" which develop into
the actual human being that is born. The rest of the cells
form external materials, such as "the placenta or membranes
that surround the embryo" (Creager 1983:81).
Therefore, a couple desiring to conceive and bear a
child of their own in the normal way, must have functional
reproductive systems. For as Mbiti has written: "Sexual
organs are the gates of life" (1969:146). We turn now to
consider in more detail what might go wrong with the male or
female reproductive system to cause infertility and
childlessness for a couple.

12

Infertility
Definition:

By the standard, technical definition,

infertility is "the inability of a couple to conceive after
1 year of sexual intercourse without using any type of
contraception" (Mishell and Davajan 1991:557). By this
standard,

about 15 percent of couples (Freiberg 1987:438),

are infertile. Mishell and Davajan distinguish between two
categories of infertile couples. Those with a low rate of
conception who are nevertheless able to conceive without any
medical treatment (but who go longer than a year without
conceiving) are distinguished from those who cannot conceive
at all without medical assistance (1991:557). The later
category is the one that is of interest to this work and the
terms "infertile" and "infertility" will be used henceforth
here to refer specifically to this group. However, because
of the importance of African and especially Nigerian
cultural traditions to certain parts of this study, it is
important to point out that "There is no clear distinction
in much of Africa between barrenness, subfecundity, and
child death" (John C. Caldwell and Pat Caldwell 1987:417).
Various kinds of problems account for the infertility
among couples. Some of these problems are specific to the
males, others are specific to the females. In about 20
per~ent

of cases of infertility, both partners have problems

that need to be addressed (Freiberg 1987:438). These include
"couples who have failed to achieve pregnancy despite
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evaluations that uncover no obvious reasons for their
infertility or to those who remain infertile despite
correction of all detectable causes of infertility" (Foad
Azem et al 1994:1090). This kind of infertility accounts for
"approximately 10% to 15% of infertile couples" (Foad Azem
et al 1994:1090).

Male infertility

Bernstein and Siegel identify several factors
responsible for male infertility. There are anatomic factors
such as congenital anomalies which might interfere with the
male delivery of semen into the vagina, for example, partial
or total absence of the vas def erens through which the sperm
pass to reach the penis and then the vagina. Other
contributing elements to male infertility that could occur
include: endocrine problems, such as pituitary tumor or
testicular failure; genetic factors such as sex chromosome
abnormalities; inflammatory problems whereby ejaculatory
ducts can be blocked. Examples of this last category include
urethritis caused by gonorrhea or external agents such as
ray and radiation (Berstein and Siegel 1991:628).

Female infertility

Female infertility can be caused by: the inability of
women to produce ova (anovulation); pelvic factors such as
tubal blockage;_ abnormalities in the endocrine system such

x-
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as insufficient cervical mucus, which prevents sperm from
traveling to the oviducts in good condition for conception;
and inflammatory diseases such as gonorrhea, chlamydia,
tuberculosis, and polyps which could have the same effects
(Mishell and Davajan 1991:562; Freiberg 1987:439).
Medical technology has been successful in the
treatment of some of these infertility problems through
modern surgical techniques such as laser surgery (Freiberg
1987:439); and some chronic infectious conditions can be
treated medically and cured, although long-standing
infections can do permanent damage to the reproductive
system that can render a woman infertile even after the
infection is cured. But the major concern of this project is
infertility of couples which cannot be alleviated by medical
or surgical techniques. It was 'for infertility of this sort
that the reproductive technologies, including in vitro
fertilization with embryo transfer, were developed. This
essay now turns attention to them.

The reproductive technologies

First, a distinction must be made between contraceptive
and conceptive reproductive technologies. Contraceptive
reproductive technologies are medical and technological
int~rventions

which are designed to interrupt and prevent

pregnancy. They include, diaphragms, intra-uterine devices,
sterilization, abortion, the 'pills', hormone-suppressing
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drugs, spermicides, and barrier techniques such as cervical
cap and condom,

(Stanworth 1987:10, Mishell 1991:827-835,

Oakley 1987:40). Periodic abstinence from sexual
intercourse, following the so-called "natural family
planning" or the "rhythm" method, is another form of
contraceptive technique (Mishell 1991:835-836).
Conceptive technologies are those medical technological
devices which are "directed to the promotion of pregnancy
through techniques for overcoming or bypassing infertility"
(Stanworth 1987:11). They are also called '"artificial
procreation• or •artificial fertilization'" (Congregation
For The Doctrine Of The Faith [CDF] 1987:21). These are "the
different technical procedures directed towards obtaining a
human conception in a manner other than the sexual union of
man and woman" (CDF 1987:21).
According to Fletcher, "The new conceptive technologies
operate all the way from the germ cell through fertilization
and gestation and fetal control to delivery and postnatal
therapy of newborns" (1988:10). By way of specification
then, the variety of conceptive technologies include
•artificial insemination• which may or may not require a
specialized medical intervention, 'in-vitro fertilization•,
which involves very sophisticated medical surgical and
labC?ratory procedures" (Stanworth 1987:11).
Other reproductive technologies include, sex
selection, whereby the sex of an offspring can be determined
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or predetermined and chosen, sperm and zygote banking or
embryo and oocyte cryopreservation, whereby embryos which
are not transferred in a woman's uterus can be preserved for
future use {Largey 1978:1439; Paulson 1991:817). Largey,
however, points out that although an effective technological
means for sex selection has not been developed, its
availability in the future will be inevitable.
This dissertation focuses on the philosophical basis
for an acceptable ethic of in vitro fertilization with
embryo transfer {IVF/ET) and artificial insemination.
Henceforth this work shall simply ref er to all these
procedures as IVF/ET except where otherwise specified. This
means that, surrogate gestation and donor sperm and egg,
will be left out of consideration. In this connection the
primary position of in vitro fertilization among all
existing and emerging reproductive technologies at present
can hardly be overrated; but its factual data needs to be
addressed.
IVF/ET has been developed out of need to alleviate
infertility that is brought about by various kinds of tubal
diseases and abnormalities which could not be cured by other
medical or surgical means {Paulson 1991:807). IVF/ET, then,
"performs the function of the fallopian tube" {Paulson
1991:807), without which fertilization or conception is
impossible. IVF/ET proceduce:
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"begins with drug therapy to produce super-ovulation in
a woman. Through a procedure called laparoscopy, the
resulting eggs are removed from the woman's
reproductive tract and then fertilized. An embryo is
then implanted in the woman's uterus and, if the
implantation is successful, carried to term. The
remaining embryos are stored, either for future
implantation should the first attempt fail, or for use
in scientific or medical experiments (George P. Smith
II 1990:24).
Artificial insemination (AI), as was already noted, is
of two kinds; homologous artificial insemination (AIH) and
heterologous artificial insemination (AID) . The former
occurs when the semen is obtained from the husband of the
woman whose ovum is fertilized while the latter occurs when
the semen is acquired from a donor (see Richard Westley
1989:84). In both cases, semen is obtained by means of
masturbation (Frankel 1978:1444; CDF 1987:32). Throughout
this study, AIH, homologous artificial insemination will be
the focus unless otherwise indicated. When IVF/ET (AID), is
mentioned, it will be for the sake of analogy or comparison.
Specifically then, homologous IVF/ET could be used where
childlessness is due to a husband's insufficient sperm
production ("oligospermia") or "low motility" or
"immobilization of sperm in the cervical mucus" or problems
with the volume of semen (Davajan 1991:605, 607) necessary
for the fertilization of his wife's ovum or insufficient
"viscosity", that is, "incomplete liquefication" (Bernstein
and siege! 1991:622; Davajan 1991:607) ot the semen for
proper motility of sperm and fertilization of ovum.

18
Specific and individual reasons abound for the use of
IVF/ET where the reproductive condition of a wife is the
cause of childlessness in her marriage. The reasons include:
"where a wife suffers from abnonnal cervical mucus or
insufficient amount of essentially nonnal mucus at midcycle"
(Davajan 1991:603-604).
The number of women with infertility problems appears
to be numerous. This author assumes that at worst, what is
true of the United Kingdom and the United States of
America 1 , could be true of another nation, for example,
Nigeria, in the specific frequency of infertility due to
tubal blockage. It is estimated that "in the United Kingdom
approximately 2 percent of all women suffer from tubal
occlusion" (Edwards 1974:10). Of this number only about one
fifth could be helped through an alternative means of "tubal
reconstruction" (Edwards 1974:10). In the United States of
America, the estimate is "that 15%- of all married couples"
are infertile (Blank 1985:14). Of this number it is
estimated "that between 0.5%- and 1%- of all American women
can be helped no other way except by IVF (Blank 1985:14;
LeRoy Walters 1979:26).
But the question of number of women suffering from
infertility is not limited to those suffering from tubal
occ~usion.

There are other forms of infertility. They

. The assumption is made because of lack of accurate statistical record, say for example in Nigeria.
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includes "endocrine disturbances or antibodies against
spermatozoa in men and women, and oligospermia in men"
(Edwards 1974:10). Only a fraction of the men with
oligospermia could be helped by "artificial insemination
using pooled ejaculates." (see Smith II 1990:24). There is
no doubt therefore, that the "most obvious benefit of !VF is
that it circumvents infertility and allows persons with a
strong desire to have children to rear a family" (George P.
Smith II 1990:25; cf. also Westley 1989:85).
The pioneering work on !VF/ET was done by, among other
scientists, a British embryologist, R.G.Edwards. He
describes IVF/ET as the "ability to fertilize human eggs in
culture, grow them for three to four days in the laboratory
and then replace them in the mother to grow to full term"
(Edward and Sharp 1971:87). Or if one prefers, !VF is "the
fertilization in the test tube, of human egg by human sperm,
and the subsequent laboratory culture of the young embryo"
(Kass 1972:23).
This technology involves considerable technical and
ethical difficulties which both proponents and opponents of
the procedure seek to overcome. One of the major technical
difficulties which this procedure involves is to "obtain
mature, functional eggs." In order to overcome this
dif~iculty,

"Edwards and his obstetrician colleague, Dr. P.

C. Steptoe, have devised a surgical method, known as
laparoscopy, to obtain matured eggs directly from the
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ovaries prior to ovulation" (Kass 1972:23). More recently,
the woman's ovaries are now stimulated with drugs to produce
multiple ova (superovulation) to increase the chance that
laparoscopy will obtain (several) healthy ova for
insemination. But it is the ethical problems relating to
this technology that interest us most here.

Some challenges to IVF.
The debate which this work is concerned about, is
captured by the following:

The use of new biotechnology in medicine has become an
everyday experience, but many people still express
concern about biotechnology. Concerns are evoked
particularly by the phrases genetic engineering and in
vitro fertilization(IVF), and these concerns persist
despite more than a decade of their use in medicine
(Darryl R. J. Macer 1994:23).

The promise of IVF/ET to alleviate infertility has been
challenged on more than one front. For example it has been
confronted on medical grounds; and so questions have been
asked: "is infertility really a medical need" (Walters
1979:26)? Is it is a "disease" or a "desire" to have one's
own child (Kass 1972; Kass 1974:138-139; Kass 1985:55;), and
so is a warrant or justification of the roles played by
medical researchers to satisfy this need?
Some of these thinkers raise philosophical questions.
For example Walters, highlights the philosophical concept of
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"the nature of infertility as a disease" on which some
authors take a position when they turn to IVF/ET as the
medical answer to the physical problem of infertility.
Whether or not infertility is a medical need, a disease or
desire, depends on the meaning one attaches to it.
Still other opponents have challenged this technology
on more specific philosophical grounds - purely metaphysical
and ethical reasons. For example, some have said that "The
process of IVF and ET must be judged in itself and cannot
borrow its definitive moral quality from the totality of
conjugal life of which it becomes part nor from the conjugal
acts which may precede or follow it" CDF (1987:29}. More
precisely CDF believes the procedure is inherently unethical
because it severs a necessary relationship between marital
sexual intercourse and human reproduction as well as the
unity between spouses (cf. CDF 1987:26-29; Smith II
1990:25} . 2 For CDF "Fertilization achieved outside the
bodies of the couple remains by this very fact deprived of
the meanings and the values which are expressed in the
language of the body and in the union of human persons"
(1987:28}.
On other ethical grounds especially harm, the procedure
is :viewed as immoral. For example, it is claimed that "IVF

. George P. Smith does not necessarily share CDF's views about the severance between marital sexual
intercourse and human procreation. But this author believes that Smith correctly interpretes CDF's'
philosophical thinking about the issue being discussed.
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and ET involves the destruction of human beings" {CDF
1987:29; Smith II 1990:26). Or as it is said: "Methods of
observation or experimentation which damage or impose grave
and disproportionate risks upon embryos obtained in vitro
are morally illicit for the same reason" {CDF 1987:18).
Still further ethical objection are raised against IVF/ET
because it is used for experimentation on fetuses which
causes them pain {Smith II 1990:25).
On the other side the proponents of IVF research hold
that "the desire to have children must be among the most
basic of human instincts and denying it can lead to
considerable psychological and social difficulties" {Edwards
and Sharp 1971:87; Lappe 1974:143;). For these authors,
infertility seems to be "clinical defect to be remedied if
possible by medical attention" {Edwards and Sharp 1971:87).
It is a kind of unhealthiness to be corrected by available
appropriate medical means if the patient chooses it.
Some of the opponents of the IVF/ET who argue that
infertility is not a disease, propose that a resort to
IVF/ET to alleviate infertility is not a resort to medicine
for the cure of a disease, but a resort to medical technique
to satisfy the desire of an infertile couple for a genetic
offspring. Thus the procedure does not cure the infertility
since the woman "remains as infertile as before" {Kass
1971:1176-77).
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Kass' argument seems to carry little or no force at all
when placed side by side with other human ailments which are
treated by artificial means without permanently curing them.
For instance "insulin, false teeth, and spectacles" (Edwards
1974:11) are meant to bring temporal relief to some health
problems. It is argued that, in these three examples, the
physician is also treating the desire of a patient "to be
nondiabetic or to see and eat properly" (Edwards 1974:11),
just as the physician is using IVF to respond to the desire
of a childless couple to have their own child.
At the root of this debate is the issue of the meaning
of the concept "health" and, more narrowly, the categories
of human functioning that are to be considered normal, not
just in the sense of a statistical average, but in the sense
that they are normative, they are the functions that mature
humans should have and should keep and should be helped to
maintain. We will have to explore some fundamental
philosophical questions about what it is to be a human
person, to study the ethics of using IVF/ET to assist the
infertile.
Furthermore, the benefit-oriented argument for IVF/ET
has also been challenged by Kass. Against the view that
IVF/ET is the only method to help many women who are
infertile due to tubal occlusion, "surgical reconstruction
of the oviduct" (Kass 1972:26; Kass 1985:56) is suggested as
an alternative means as a safeguard against potential
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hazards of the procedures and their unacceptable ethical
implications. Kass says that this is a preferred therapeutic
procedure which avoids unnecessary manipulation of
reproductive method and the risks of the loss of embryos.
Although Kass thus argues that IVF experiments involve
great risk of harm of unknown nature, he also adopts at some
stage the mediating view which is essentially
consequentialistic in character; namely, that caution should
be exercised to see that the risks be comparatively as low
as those found in natural method of human reproduction. In
this direction, he seems to argue against some authors who
advocate total prohibition of the technology of IVF/ET
because of the many unknown risks it embodies for the child
in the making, as when he says: "But I do not think that the
risk of harm must be positively excluded ... It would suffice
if those risks were roughly equivalent to the risks to the
child from normal procreation" (Kass 1985:55).
Other alternatives to IVF/ET, have been proposed. For
example "acceptance of childlessness together with the
development of other avenues towards leading a worthwhile
fulfilled life" (Susan Uniacke 1987:243; CDF 1987:34) 3 is
said to be a better answer than IVF/ET to the problem of
infertility. As Uniacke has observed, "whether acceptance of
childlessness is a satisfactory alternative to IVF will have
. Susan Uniacke does not necessarily endorse this proposal. She simply cites it as one of the proposed
alternatives to NF/Ef.
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bearing on what type of problem infertility is and how
seriously it should be regarded" (1987:243). Uniacke's
observation is fittingly forceful in the face of the
question, whether infertility is "really a medical need", "a
disease" or whether it is simply a desire to have one's own
Child.

II

Still other alternatives as old as marriage itself in
some cultures have been in use to combat infertility. For
example, it must be noted with some emphasis that long
before IVF/ET, Africans contained infertility by "polygamy"
(cf. John S. Mbiti 1969; M Angulu Onwuejeogwu 191975; J. F.
A. Ajayi 1965; Nicholas N. Obi 1987; Elizabeth Isichei
1995) . But others still have proposed "adoption" (CDF
1987:34). Also, divorce or separation of spouses is another
alternative to answering the problem of infertility in
African cultures. According to some authorities, infertility
is probably the greatest single cause of divorce "since
inability to bear children blocks the stream of life" (Mbiti
1969:145).
On the other hand, R.G. Edwards, one of the foremost of
the exponents and innovators of IVF who made the procedure a
reality of our time, argues in favor of IVF/ET on the basis
of foreseen benefits of the technology. He notes that
h~nkind

will benefit irmnensely and in various ways from

the medical breakthrough of IVF/ET: (1) "Some forms of
infertility (blockage of the oviduct) could pos·sibly be

26
cured; (2) knowledge useful for contraceptive 4 technology
could be gained; and (3) knowledge and methods could be
obtained leading to the alleviation of genetic disorders and
even other deformities" {Edwards 1974; Hirschhorn 1974:6869) .
Other thinkers have argued that risk of harm to the
embryo does not support a strong criticism of the morality
of IVF. For it is claimed, that the danger the embryo is
exposed to in terms of risk of deformity {mental or
physical), or even total destruction, is not different from
the risk it experiences under ordinary process of human
conception {Lappe 1972:105; CDF 1987;14).
In fact it is well known that as much as "50 percent of
eggs successfully fertilized during unprotected sexual
intercourse fail to implant ... and are shed soon
thereafter" {Lappe 1974:144; Kass 1985:107). Some authors
contend even a higher rate of loss of fertilized eggs based
on scientific evidence - about 75% loss {cf. Jeffrey Reiman
1993:174).
However, this technology of IVF/ET has helped thousands
of barren married couples to bear their own genetic children
throughout the world. For example, available report confirm

. But contraception itself raises some independent ethical questions.
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that "more than 150,000 children have been born worldwide
through IVF-ET" (Francois Olivennes, et al 1997:284) . 5

Psychological or social harm

There is yet another set of benefits/harms-based
arguments brought to bear against IVF/ET. This set concerns
itself with the end product of IVF with regard to the
identity of the child in the society. It is argued that the
child of IVF/ET will suffer psychologically about the image
of himself or herself given the fact that he or she is a
direct product of artificial means of reproduction (Cynthia
B. Cohen 1996:20; Smith 1990:25; CDF 1987:32; McCormick
1978:1462).
Some other serious objections of demographic kind have
been brought against IVF/ET. For example, it has been argued
that the selection of sex through the perfection of IVF/ET
could cause a major imbalance in the world's population.
In every instance, arguments of this sort need to be
developed with both a full evaluation of the feared outcome,
and evidence of its likelihood, together with a careful
value-comparison of that set of future events (including the
benefits of IVF/ET for parents and offspring who benefit
from the procedure) with the alternative set of future
. Cf. "Follow-up of a cohort of 422 children aged 6 to 13 years conceived by in vitro fertilization" by
Francois Olivennes, et al; in: Fertility and Sterility: Official Journal of The American Fertility Society, The
American Fertility Society, 1209 Montgomery Highway, Birmingham, Alabama, Vol. 67, No. 2,-February
1997, pp. 284-289.
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events in which IVF/ET is not practiced. Rarely do critics
of IVF/ET work out the details of such an argument with any
care. But those who support IVF/ET on the basis of its
benefits rarely do so either. Attempts will be made to
supply that lack in chapters three, four and five; where the
benefits and harms/risks/burdens of IVF/ET will be treated
at length.

Informed consent.
Medically, "Informed Consent" may be defined as the
willingness of a patient to accept without force or any form .
of manipulation, a medical intervention, after sufficient
explanation has been made of the given medical intervention
by a health care-giver. Usually the information about the
medical intervention includes: "its risks, and benefits, as
well as of alternatives with their risks and benefits"
(Jansen, Siegler and Winslade 1982:62).
The sufficiency of informed consent is measured by two
criteria, namely: "(1) information that is commonly provided
by competent practitioners in the community or the
specialty; (2) information that would allow reasonable
persons to make prudent choices in their own behalf".
(Jansen, Siegler and Winslade 1982:62).
Both opponents and proponents of IVF/ET see the
relevance of informed consent as a criterion of ethical use
of IVF/ET. Watson stresses the importance of informed
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consent when he says that "as many people as possible be
informed about the new ways of human reproduction and their
potential consequences, both good and bad" (1974:75). Some
writers however, think that not enough information is
ordinarily given to the participants of IVF/ET

in order to

elicit their full consent before subjecting them to any
experimentation. Kass, for example, says that "most of the
scientific reports on human embryo transfer were strangely
silent on the nature of the egg donors, on their
understanding of what was to be done with their eggs, and on
the manner of obtaining their consent (1985:56). Kass
rightly believes that this kind of medical experiment should
be condemned as "cruel and unethical" because it falsely
generates the participants' hope "by telling the women that
they themselves, rather than future infertile women, might
be helped to have a child, in order to secure their
participation in experiments" (Kass 1972:31; Kass 1985:56).
Kass' observation seems proper, especially as the heightened
desire of infertile women to have children may unduly lead
them to give in to possible uncritical promises of the
researchers.
It is quite obvious however, that most of the exponents
of the technology of artificial human reproduction, fully
recognize the significance of informed consent. They do
ordinarily guard against any unwitting exploitation of the
infertile condition of the couples desperately desiring to
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have genetic children of their own. Contrary to Kass'
argument just above, they argue that many infertile couples
are willing to cooperate with the experimental work on
fertilization and embryo transfer. They claim that their
patients are well informed about the procedures. In
addition, the patients are aware that "the methods might not
work, their infertility remain uncured, and that other women
may be the ultimate beneficiaries of the developing methods"
(Edwards 1974:11).
Kass also raises an important question about the desire
to have children in the first place. Do we have children
primarily for ourselves or for our children? Kass argues
that "if having children is regarded primarily as the
satisfaction of parental desires, to attain our own
fulfillment and happiness" (1985:55), then one cannot
ethically choose for an unborn child, especially the
unconceived, "the unknown hazards he must face and
simultaneously choose to give him life in which to face
them" (Kass 1985:54).
If on the other hand "we have children not primarily
for ourselves but for our children, if procreation means to
pass on the gift of life to the next generation ... then
this clear benefit to a child to be, even to a child at
ris~,

as all our children are, could justify the risks taken

because they are taken in the child's behalf- provided, of
course, that the risks are not excessive" (Kass 1985:55).
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Obviously these considerations bear on benefits-based
. arguments for IVF/ET as well as on the conditions that need
to be met for proper informed consent by participants in
IVF/ET.
The proponents of IVF/ET are also equally concerned as
their opponents about the psychological and other well
beings of the product of IVF, as when they note for example
that:

If there is no undue risk of deformity additional to
those in natural conception, and publicity is avoided,
the children should grow and develop normally and be no
more misfits than other children born today after some
form of medical help (Edwards 1974:12).

But some opponents of the IVF technology appear
resolute to the demand for absolute safety from risk of
harm, given the fact that the unconceived is intentionally
being brought into a possible harmful existence without its
consent. On this score the objection is expressed that: To
manipulate a patient into being requires at least the far
more stringent requirement that to do this we must know that
every possibility of damage from the procedure itself has
surely been foreclosed (Ramsey 1972:1349).
But not all would agree with Ramsey's stipulation for
the obvious reason that none of us in our present states was
consulted prior to our conception and birth. With this sort
of reasoning, Fletcher rejoins that "the absurdity of" any
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objection such as Ramsey's above,

i~

appreciated simply by

remembering that babies produced in the coital-gestational
or natural way could not have given their consent either
(1988:95).
Still some other advocates of the IVF/ET process argue
that the demand for consent from the child to be born
necessarily "leads to total negation - even to denying a
mother a sleeping pill, a cesarean section or an
amniocentesis for fear of disturbing the child (Edwards
1974:14). John A. Robertson argues along these lines when he
writes that "preventing harm would mean preventing the birth
of the child ... " (1994:75-76).
This argument is more forceful given the fact that,
"every medical treatment from eating aspirin to open-heart
surgery, carries a risk for each patient, and fetuses are
not asked before hand about their own conception" (1974:14).
The arguments of Fletcher and Edwards on the consent
issue with reference to various deformities a child from
natural method of conception seem to justify at least
similar risks of possible deformities that may arise from
IVF/ET.
For the purposes of this dissertation, it will be
assumed that in every instance of IVF/ET the parents of the
emb~o

are fully informed of all important medical facts

about their own condition, the nature of the IVF/ET
procedure and the possible outcomes of the procedure and
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their respective likelihood. It also will be assumed that
the parents consent to the procedure voluntarily and for the
sake of their own and their future child's benefits. In this
way, we can focus specifically on the morality of the IVF/ET
procedure itself, rather than being distracted by the
important, but distinct issues of informed consent

in

medical decision-making.

What the technology is likely to lead to.

Aside from the direct potential benefits and harms of
IVF/ET itself there is another kind of objection to the use
of this technology. This objection derives from a fear of
what the technology of IVF/ET will lead humankind to. At the
core of this argument are certain negative projections about
the effects of medical advances involving IVF/ET.
These projections seek to alert the public of the
latent dangers of the new reproductive technology and if
possible ask for a ban on the intervention. In these
arguments, there is a shift in the direction of the
arguments against IVF/ET from considering the "uses" of the
technology to considering its possible "abuses."
It is feared that IVF/ET technology, even if good in
itself for the treatment of infertility, nevertheless might
act as a stepping stone to more dangerous technological
innovations. For example, there is no guarantee that an
embryo fertilized in vitro, will "be implanted in the same
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woman from whom the egg was obtained" {Kass 1985:59;
McCormick 1978:1462; Watson 1974:73), and this obviously
raises an independent ethical question {McCormick
1978:1462).
There may be "women with uterine abnormalities that
preclude normal pregnancy" who "may seek surrogate
gestational mothers" {Kass 1985:60). Similarly, there may be
women who seek surrogate motherhood because they "don't want
pregnancy to interfere with " their favorite sports" "enough
poor women

available to fonn a caste of childbearers,

especially for good pay" {Kass 1985:60; Watson 1974:73).
Both the proponents and opponents of artificial
insemination agree that surrogate motherhood, which the
procedure sometimes employs, can bring conflict of interest
between the biological mother and the gestational mother,
about the child. For example, for one reason or another,
either the surrogate mother or the biological mother could
be disenchanted with the pregnancy and so seeks an abortion
{McCormick 1978:1462 ;Edwards 1974:12). But these are
distinct ethical questions from those at the center of this
essay.
It is also feared that the technology will lead to a
weakening of the marriage bond between husband and wife, or
eve~

encourage adulterous practices {Ramsey 1970:50;

McCormick 1978:1462-1463; Westley 1989:85). Some critics
fear that the technology will lead to two sharply
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distinguished kinds of humans beings. Others fear its
effects on people's sense of their genealogy or on such
important social practices as inheritance (Jacobvits 248249}.
Other extensions of the technology beyond an infertile
marriage exist. For example, single women such as widows,
lesbians, homosexuals, could use the technology for their
own purposes; and others might even use it for personal
comfort and economic gain. These cases not only exemplify
the many possible abuses of the reproductive intervention
they also "raise the fear of directed breeding programs
under a totalitarian regime" which may culminate in cloning
(Kass 1985:61; Watson 1974:73; McCormick 1978:1462}.
Nevertheless, these arguments carry little or no force in
relation to the ethics of IVF/ET procedures themselves. Some
commentators in fact argue that pointing to these fears in
order to call for total ban on the technology is simply
refusing to look at hard questions of reproductive reality.
The new reproductive technology is here with us for good,
they optimistically claim. But in any case there are
separate ethical questions here to be asked.
Against such fears that IVF/ET will lead to undesirable
ends, however, the proponents of the technology debunk the
fallacy of inevitability inherent in the arguments of their
opponents. Thus they ask: has "nuclear physics led
inevitably to the atom bomb,

electr~city

to the electric
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chair, air transport to bombers and hijackers, civil
engineering to the gas chambers" (Edwards 1974:11)? Each of
these developments depended on numerous choices along the
way on which moral agents could have judged and chosen
otherwise. There is nothing inevitable about it.
Another commentator words the same idea somewhat
differently; "Should the cure of malaria have been withheld
- because it has led to overpopulation? Should the
development of penicillin have been stopped - because it
kept alive soldiers 'fighting unjust wars" (Beatty 1974:62}?
Supporters of IVF/ET are claiming here that the
successful introduction of IVF/ET technology does not
necessarily mean that it will lead to unwelcome
consequences. The fact that the technology may be misused,
by people who make bad judgments or have evil ends in view,
should not stop us from embarking on the good project that
the procedure is meant to achieve.
Yet, at the same time, neither side of this debate
defends a strong position. All the alternative possible
futures they are envisioning must be carefully and plausibly
articulated and evaluated, and then compared - both in terms
of the benefits and of the harms they involve and in terms
of their likelihood of occurring - and then those futures
mus~

be compared with the future likely to occur if IVF/ET

is not developed. Ouly then will solid arguments about the
future uses of this technology be available for study.
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Cloning, another of the new reproductive technologies,
is another example, and one of the most radical, of what the
reproductive technology of IVF/ET might lead to. It has
become a widespread belief among many scientis that not too
far into the future, human reproduction will be possible by
cloning. This knowledge has upset some thinkers while
gladdening the hearts of others. Those who welcome this
scientific development do so not only on the basis of its
purported inunediate benefit of helping childless couples to
have children of their own (Watson 1974:73), but also on the
general ethical ground that it "provides more good than
harm" ( Watson 1974:74).
On a wider scale, cloning of humans would be welcome
because the technique, it is

claimed, would offer one of

the best avenues yet of unraveling the genetic and
biochemical origins of certain killer diseases such as
cancer (Watson 1974:75). The detection of serious recessive
hereditary defects in the carriers (Glass 1971:28) is
another of the many promises that have added prominence to
the development of IVF/ET, and to cloning or other
reproductive techniques. But at the present time, research
on cloning is almost completely independent of the
scientifically established methods of IVF/ET treatment for
inf~rtility.

So supporting IVF/ET treatment will add little

to the impetus for cloning research. Again, while cloning
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raises many ethical questions, the link of necessity to
IVF/ET is absent.

Need for appropriate laboratory research.
One other aspect of the benefits-based ethical debate
about IVF/ET concerns its experimental or research side. The
basic elements of the procedure are now commonplace, but
research and reproductive innovations continue on today and
raise some ethical questions in their own right. Central to
the arguments on clinical IVF research is the possibility of
unforeseen risks which this experimentation involves,
particularly in regard to the human embryo.
Two kinds of research on human subjects can be
distinguished. They are: "Laboratory" or "non-therapeutic
research" and "Clinical" or "Therapeutic research" (Walters
1977:193). (1) Laboratory (non-therapeutic) IVF research is
one in which the medical scientists "have no intention of
transferring any embryo to the uterus of a woman for
implantation, gestation and eventual birth" (Walters
1979:23). Commentators say that this type of research is
purely for experimental purposes designed either for
perfecting IVF technique or to gain improved knowledge about
other medical problems involving the human embryo. What is
most important ethically is that it will not necessarily be
of any benefit to the embryo that is the subject of the
research,

(Walters 1977:193).
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There are very complex ethical issues about research
that is not expected to benefit a human research subject
especially if any risk is involved. For present purposes,
however, the focus will be on therapeutic IVF research
because the issues parallel issues in IVF/ET itself.
(2) Clinical (therapeutic) IVF research "refers to the
use of IVF and embryo transfer in an attempt to initiate a
pregnancy and produce a child" (Walters 1979:23). This is
therefore therapeutic research, conducted "primarily for the
benefit of a patient-subject whether by prevention,
diagnosis, or treatment" (Walters 1977:193).
Kass contends that the technology has not been
subjected to serious questioning about the possible risks of
harm to the conceptus, even before any clinical application
of the technology to assist an infertile patient. For
instance, Kass argues that very limited research had been
carried out on animals. But even if sufficient and
successful research have been carried out on animals, he
argues, there still remains the probability that animal
"experiments could neither rule out nor establish the risk
of mental retardation for children resulting from
experiments in humans" (Kass 1985:53). For there are
differences between animal species. What works well in a
pri~te

or monkey might not work equally well in humans.

Kass claims that laboratory testing of animal embryos does
not give enough information about normality and that the
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information it does reveal is too crude to assure safety for
human embryos (Kass:53}. Kass claims that the success so far
achieved on animals without deformities lacks "systematic
investigation" of various questions about serious or less
serious abnormalities which could arise at birth or later
after birth.
Kass points out a number of harms that the human embryo
could suffer in IVF/ET experimentations. (1) Not only does
"laboratory testing of human embryo" prior to their transfer
not provide enough information about normality, it is
possible that testing in and of itself can damage the
embryos.

(2} Not only do genetic tests on the embryos have

the possibility of damaging it; but "there are few genetic
tests ... available for the doing" (3) Kass also notes that
damage could be done to the embryo in the very process of
transferring it into its mother's uterus (Kass 1985:52-53;
Westley 1989:89}.
Still some other authors point out that "using IVF as a
means to produce embryos for experiments or as sources of
tissues and organs subjects the· embryos to pain" (Smith II
1990:25}. Smith argues that this objection to IVF on the
basis of the pain it will inflict on the embryos "would have
considerable merit where experiments were conducted on
sub~tantially

developed fetuses" (1990:25}. On this issue,

Smith points out that other writers contend that "conducting
such scientific interventions with embryos in the first
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several weeks of their development, such embryos probably do
not experience pain, owing to the absence of a critical
nervous system"

(Smith 1990:25; Robertson 1988).

On the other hand, it is argued that medical progress
is virtually impossible without experimentations that
involves both human beings and animals (Edwards and Graber
1988:180). The implication of this claim is that the
potential benefits of medical progress outweigh the
potential harms to embryos, that will accompany the
necessary research. Crucial to this claim, but rarely
spelled out carefully by the disputants, are views about the
moral status of the embryo itself. These will be discussed
shortly.
In practice, the discussion of these issues takes place
in relation to accepted ethical guidelines about biomedical
research. For any experimentation involving human subjects
to be morally justified, that experiment must fall within
the following established ethical norms:

The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful
results for the good of society, unprocurable by other
methods or means of study, and not random and
unnecessary in nature. [Nuremberg Code, 1947,RULE 2] .
... It is essential that the result of laboratory
experiments be applied to human beings to further
scientific knowledge and to help suffering humanity ...
In the field of scientific research a fundamental
distinction must be recognized between clinical
·research in which the aim is essentially therapeutic
for a patient and clinical research the aim of which is
purely scientific and without therapeutic value to the
person subjected to the research. [Declaration of
Helsinki,1964].
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This review shall determine ... whether the risks
to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the
benefit to the subject and the importance of the
knowledge to be gained as to warrant a decision to
allow the subject to accept those risks. [Protection of
human subjects, DREW, May 30, 1974.] (Walters
1977:194).
As Walters explains, the important and recurrent themes
of these ethical guidelines are "risk-benefit and informed
consent." Consequently, IVF research has been approached
from the perspective of the "need" of individuals concerned.
The risk-benefit or need question and the consent issues,
however, would be without any real import, if there were not
many infertile women who may benefit from the IVF research
directly, and by extension society; or if there are other
ways of relieving the infertility problem without recourse
to research involving human embryos or as noted above, if
the desire to have one's own biological child, were not
considered a medical need (Walters 1979:25-26).
Based on the risk-benefit and need evaluations, it is
now a common view, as has been noted that IVF research may
be justified on the basis that "re-implantation of cleaving
embryos into the uterus is the only method to help many
patients who are infertile through tubal occlusion"

(Edwards

1974"10). There is no doubt about the successes of applying
IVF/ET on humans. As already noted, the number of successful
live·births speaks for the merits of this technology. From
July 1978, when the first IVF baby was born, to present the
technology has helped many infertile couples to reproduce as
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many as over 150,000 children throughout the world (see
Francois Olivennes et al 1997:284). But according to the
Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society the
success rate for artificial insemination is not as certain
as that of IVF/ET only "because lack of reliable data"
(1986: 34S) .
To this kind of data Kass responds that the basis of
the claim of success is that "the experience to date has
been so encouraging with no ... reports of severe
abnormalities"

(Kass 1985:53). This encouraging experience

notwithstanding, however, Kass still wants to suggest that
the success is only partial, because (1) The number of
children so far produced by in vitro and embryo transfer
method is relatively "small" {although it is much larger in
1997 than it was in 1985 when Kass first wrote) and (2) the
time within which the technology has produced some children
is too short to make any conclusive statement on the issue
and therefore the ethical, risk-benefit question should
still be considered open (Kass 1985:53)
Thus the ethical argument about the justifiability of
IVF/ET research rages on. It has been summarized here for
the sake of completeness, but it will not be an independent
topic of importance for the rest of this dissertation.
Obviously, however, many of the positions to be examined
later in the dissertation would also have important
implications for the ethical debate about IVF/ET research.
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Presuppositions: the status of the embryo.

As was noted above, fertilization is the fusion of
sperm and ovum in the female genital tract .. When this union
of sperm and egg occurs outside the female reproductive
tract, that is "within a glass" it is referred to as "in
vitro fertilization"

(Mastroianni 1978: 1448; Caplan:

1990:100). But regardless of its location, in a petri dish
or working its way down the mother's fallopian tube towards
her womb, the embryo is a living member of the human
species; and the moral implications of this fact will be
crucial for any ethical argument regarding it in connection
with IVF/ET. So its moral status needs attention at this
point before a detailed philosophical work of this
dissertation begins.
The ethical issues involved in this topic are numerous
and varied. It raises above all a fundamental question that
is often worded as "when does human life begin?" But
presumably what this question is trying to determine is the
moral status that should be accorded to the embryo at its
nascent stage. Some opponents of IVF technology claim that
the full moral reality of human life begins at conception,
"from the time the ovum is fertilized"

(CDF 1987:14; Kass

1985:104-104; Ramsey 1972:1347; Smith II 1990:22).
Accordingly, they hold that IVF, in and of itself; is
immoral because of the loss and risks of loss of human
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embryonic life which this technology sometimes involves.
Ramsey words the idea as follows:

Persons who believe that an individual human life
begins with conception, or after the time of
segmentation, or at implantation, or with the
morphologically human fetus, or with heartbeat or ECG
readings, or self-movement (or any time before birth)
must regard experiments in vitro fertilization and
artificial implantation as ab initio inherently
immoral, because the physician must be willing to
discard mishaps at any point in that span of time which
do not come to the standard of an acceptable human
being (1972:1347).

Thus, regardless of the stage of development of the
embryo, the fact of its humanity, which recognizable from
fertilization on, "ought to elicit our feelings of woe and
respect" (Kass 1985:105). Since the embryo is a human being
from fertilization, it is also "a person" from that moment
of fertilization; that is, it is to be accorded the same
moral status in our moral reflections as a fully functioning
adult human being. "From that same moment his right as a
person must be recognized" (CDF 1987:14).
Other commentators do not accept the idea that the
embryo is a human being with full moral status. Some argue
and challenge, on biological grounds, the view that morally
significant human life begins at fertilization. For example,
Edwards contends that fertilization of the ovum is simply
incidental to the beginning of morally significant life
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because various processes which are essential to the
development of human life begin not at fertilization but
long before ovulation. He concludes that "the potentiality
for life must therefore reside in the unfertilized egg and
all of its precursors"

(1974:13). The process of the

development of a human being up to fertilization and beyond
it is progressively sequential, and the moment of
fertilization is not exempt from this process as an
especially privileged stage of human development. In the
light of this therefore, there is an opposition to "the
tendency to define absolutes such as giving full human
rights to a fertilized egg"

(Edwards 1974:14).

One of the major concerns of the pro-fetal-moral-status
commentators is the deliberate creation and wastage of human
life which !VF/ET processes appear to involve. Thus, arguing
from a biological fact, Kass, points out that the embryo is
alive and has stages of development which may guarantee its
viability. Given this fact, the remaining human embryo after
in vitro fertilization, rather than being respected and
protected because of its humanity, is now being used for
experimentation, and then discarded (1985:57-58). That is,
some embryos are subjected to risks of serious harm and even
death. This is morally inconsistent, Kass believes, with the
embryo's moral status.
Other commentators explicitly assign neither "respect"
nor "protection" to the embryo because on their view, it is
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not a "person". In this connection, the issue of, when the
biologically human fetus becomes a person is given another
view. Three different criteria have been suggested as
essential in assigning personhood to a being. They are:
"life" (2)

"soul" and (3)

(1)

"reason" (Fletcher 1988:135-136).

Discounting elements 1 and 2, Fletcher appraises rational
intelligence as the essential criterion without which the
human embryo cannot qualify as a person. In this connection
he says:

Humans without some minimum of intelligence or
mental capacity are not persons, no matter how many of
their organs are active, no matter how spontaneous
their living process are. If the cerebrum is gone, due
to disease or accident, and only the midbrain or
brainstem is keeping 'autonomic' functions going, they
are only objects, not subjects - they are its, not
thous. Just because hearts, lungs, and the neurologic
and vascular systems persist we cannot say a person
exists. Noncerebral organisms are not personal.
Something like a score of 20 on the Binet scale of I.Q.
would be roughly but realistically a minimum or base
line for personal status. Obviously a fetus cannot meet
this test, no matter what its stage of growth (Fletcher
1988: 137) .
It will not be possible to fully resolve this issue of
the status of the embryo in this essay. Instead, each of the
views discussed will have its corresponding answer to this
question.
Walters identifies another approach closely related to
this issue, on the "naturalness" of !VF/ET: "namely whether
the acts of !VF with ET themselves violate a natural order
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or structure for human procreation"

(1979:25). In response

to this question some commentators have attacked IVF/ET as
an artificialization, "rationalization and
depersonalization" as well as a "dehumanization of the
natural process of procreation, it is a degradation and an
assault to parenthood and family life, all in an attempt to
"manufacture ... wanted, willed and flawless babies"

(Kass

1985:71-73; 1974:48-50). For Kass therefore, the natural
process of procreation is morally superior to in vitro
fertilization and embryo transfer precisely because it is
"natural" and embodies the mysterious (Kass 1985:72). Kass'
claim may incline some people at least intuitively to
sympathize with his position. However, his position is
dismissed as question begging by Callahan because it fails
to provide an acceptable rationale argument about what it is
to be human - "an essential human nature"

(Callahan

1971:98) . 6 Callahan also points out that an act can remain
personal to be human act and can be depersonalized without
leading to dehumanization (Callahan 1971:99-100).
In addition to Callahan's challenge to Kass, one might
point out that Kass' claim that IVF/ET is an artificialized
and rationalized attempt to manufacture wanted babies
appears not to take into consideration the fact that
children are not like property that one could simply

. This response is to Kass' 1971 writing on IVF/ET, not to that of 1985.

~
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own. Instead children are indispensable human values that
are needed not just wanted for the continuation of future
human generations. Kass therefore should not ignores the
difference some philosophers make between "want" and "need".
One thinker for instance writes:

There is a difference between wants and needs . . . . The
difference between them can, perhaps, best be put like
this. Anything can (logically) be wanted for its own
sake; but nothing can (logically) be needed for its own
sake. To the question "what do you want that for?" it
is possible to reply "I don't want it for anything. I
just want it." But to the question "what do you need
that for" it would never make sense to reply "I don't
need it for anything. I just need it" (Duane Willard,
1987:50).
In opposition to the above views on the unnaturalness of
!VF/ET, some other commentators think that it is not
necessarily the case that the new technological method of
manipulating human reproduction, is dehumanizing and
depersonalizing. Nor would they think it is "inherently"
inferior to natural means of human procreation. Instead they
claim that the artificial or the technological may sometimes
be superior to the natural. For example, sometimes medicine
"'interferes' with nature's business; it 'manipulates'
natural forces and tries to save our lives when

natur~

left

alone would finish us off with disease or deformity. In fact
mortality is a natural process - so is pernicious anemia"
(Fletcher 1988:34-35).
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Against the views that IVF is an assault on natural
parenthood and family, Edwards sees no reason why IVF should
be condemned as unnatural and therefore immoral, if one
bears in mind the aim of the technology which, is the
transference of an embryo at its early stage of development
into the womb of its mother, in an attempt to avoid
incurable infertility which in turn can be seen as something
unnatural in an important sense.

Responsibility for decision-making and the how.

So far, it is clear that both the natural and
artificial means of human reproduction involves some risk of
harm or deformity to the child to be, some important
questions remain to be asked. Some of those questions are:
Is the decision to reproduce children the sole
responsibility of married couples? Is it an issue to be
regulated by law and society?
Many thinkers have pointed out that "right" is a
complex concept to define philosophically. For example, some
authors say: "No simple definition of the form "a right is a
... can adequately explain this complex concept"

(David T.

Ozar 1986:4); because "the concept of a right is a 'simple
undefinable, unanalyzable primitive"'

(Joel Feinberg

1980:149). The difficulty in exercising one's rights to make
decision to reproduce becomes very obvious in the ethical
issues which arise from IVF/ET method of reproduction.
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In cases of using IVF/ET to alleviate infertility the
difficulty of assigning rights arises because more than one
party is involved in the decision of couples to have
children who may be harmed by this decision.
Some of the advocates of IVF/ET believe that "the law
should not be used to decide the value or hinder the
progress of work on curing infertility. This should
especially be so where it concerns husband and wife (Edwards
1974:16); nor should it be used to challenge the right of
couples to have children of their own,

"provided there is no

conflict with accepted restriction on marriage, such as
incest (Edwards:1974;16). Nor should any law be used to
restrict couples with serious recessive genetic diseases
from having children of their own (Lappe 1974:145). If this
law is generally enforced then it simply will conflict with
the right and interests of the infertile couple and
therefore their desire to have a genetic child of their own.
More importantly it will scare doctors as third parties away
from helping infertile couples to have children (Edwards
1974:16).
On the other hand, those who believe that use of IVF/ET
technology is profoundly immoral have proposed that laws be
enacted to prevent it. For example CDF says:

"the new technological possibilities which have opened
up in the field of biomedicine require the intervention
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of the political authorities and of the legislator,
since the uncontrolled application of such techniques
could lead to unforeseeable and damaging consequences
for civil society (1987:35).

Still another aspect of this topic arises from the fact
that more legal rights are now being given to fetuses which
allow them "to bring actions while still in utero for the
death of the father or where parents or agents acting for
stillborn fetuses receiving fetal injuries while in utero,
were actions against those causing the injuries (Edwards
1974:12). This parttern certainly complicates the moral
issue of the right of couples and their unborn or
unconceived fetuses. Walters gives a short list of
pregnancies which in some form,

jeopardizes with the future

life of the unborn in varying ways and which upon careful
reflection could attract the use of law to protect the right
of the unborn to a normal healthy life:

The wife in an infertile marriage takes hormones
treatments in an effort to become pregnant .
• An infertile couple requests the use of artificial
insemination with the husband's sperm in the hope of
having a child.
A couple in which the wife is over 40 decides to
conceive an additional child, knowing that the risk
of chromosome abnormalities increases with the
advancing natural age.
A couple in which both members carry a recessive
genetic trait for a serious disease decides
nonetheless to conceive a child .
. A couple living in abje_ct poverty with inadequate
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food and housing decides ·to have a child (LeRoy
1979:29).

Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a good reason
to identify an advocate at law for every embryo, since in
the ordinary case both parents and health care providers
have the well-being of the child conceived through !VF/ET
technology well in mind. In any case this issue is not the
focus of this study.
For the purposes of this dissertation, in order to
focus specifically on the morality of !VF/ET technology
itself, it will be assumed that the proper responsibility
for decision-making about the use of this technology rests
with the husband and wife together with the physician or
medical team who would provide it. It will also be assumed
that no regulation of this procedure by law - except insofar
as laws already ensure the safety of ordinary medical
treatment, protect contracts between parents and doctors
etc., should be considered until the issues under
consideration in this dissertation have been resolved,
namely the morality of the !VF/ET procedure itself.

A philosophical analysis

Finally, although the ethical considerations of !VF/ET
has been argued for or against from many theological
perspectives especially "of marriage, parenthood, and the
family"

(McCormick 1978:1458), it is nevertheless as a
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philosophical issue that ethical implications of !VF/ET will
be discussed here. In the light of this, this essay will now
turn a brief attention to the main philosophical theories of
ethical reasoning which underlie and accentuate the various
positions in the debate about this specific technically
assisted means of human reproduction.

CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF RELATED ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

Introduction

From the dawn of philosophy to the

pre~ent,

Plato,

Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Jeremy
Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, stand out among other
philosophers as some of the most gifted intellectuals the
history has ever known in ethical philosophy. The question
about the foundation of moral actions was central in their
individual philosophies, and succeeded in dividing "them
into sects and schools carrying on a vigorous warfare
against one another" (Oskar Piest, 1957:3). This work will
therefore be inadequate without an examination of some of
the ethical principles of human actions which def enders and
opponents of IVF/ET have variously employed in their
writings on the issue. Three distinctive ethical theories
can be identified as resonating through the review of the
literature above. They are:
theory,

(1) the natural law ethical

(2) consequentialism/utilitarianism or

proportionalism (3) deontologism. Other ethical approaches,
some of which are variations of the above three, will also
be reviewed briefly.
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In this chapter, the author will first sketch out the
basic tenets of the ethical approaches. Then he will see how
they have been applied in the arguments about IVF/ET. Their
individual relevance to this project will determine the
extent which any of the theories will be made use of.

The natural law ethical principle

What is Natural Law? An investigation into natural
law ethical theory would imply first an inquiry into the
philosophical meaning of

the term, "nature". Thus rather

than ask what is natural law?, our question should first be,
what is "nature". This step of inquiry is taken because some·
authors have pointed out that a great deal of the
ambiguities one finds in the theory of "natural law" is due
to the failure among authors to clearly delineate the
meaning of the term "nature", from which natural law ethics
takes it origin (Punzo 1983:22; Vacek 1992: 330}.
Nature in its most general sense can be seen on the one
hand as the totality of the universe. On the other hand it
can also "refer to the laws and principles of structure by
which the behavior of things may be explained" (Paul Edwards
1976:454}. In the first of these two senses, everything in
the universe whether animate or inanimate, including the
law~

which keep them in existence is subsumed under the term

nature. This implies that particular things in the universe
not only are aspects of nature as a whole, but also have
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their individual laws by which they operate and remain in
existence. It is "nature" in the second sense that concerns
us more here. But nature in the first sense will will also
be relevant. "Nature" as the term is used in natural law
theory

"refers to the intrinsic principles of human growth

including our biological, psychological, intellectual and
religious dimensions" (Edward Vacek 1989:330).
In an attempt to illuminate the meaning of the term
"nature", the "natural" is contrasted further with the
"supernatural", which is a belief in an other worldly
reality,

(Philip Goetz 1991:400). Belief in an other worldly

reality, has come about from experiences of miraculous
events which happened and "which it is claimed the power and
laws of nature could not bring about" (Paul Edwards
1967:454). It is also contrasted with the "artificial"
literally that which is "made by (human) art." That is,
insofar as the characteristics and principles of functioning
of anything are the product of human purposes and human
creation, it belongs to a third category in addition to the
natural and the supernatural. The things which affect human
life therefore include the artificial, the natural and the
supernatural.

Aristotle on nature.

A more complicated meaning of "nature"

seems to have

been expounded by Aristotle. "Nature", Aristotle says, has
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many senses. In order to grasp the philosophical sense of
this term, Aristotle also contrasts it with what is
"artificial". The natural is that which embodies within
itself an innate principle by which it has the ability to
move itself or keep itself at rest. The artificial on the
other hand is that which lacks an innate power by which to
move itself or put itself at rest. For example, artificial
things cannot reproduce themselves (Aristotle, phy. 192a 1227) . In every natural thing that exists then, there is an
underlying principle or power called its "nature" which
determines the process of and brings it to its maturity, and
thus affects everything else it does and everything that
happens to it. "We also speak of a thing's nature as being
exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is
attained" (Aristotle phy. 193b14).
This sense of nature could be seen as teleological; that is,
the end towards which a thing is aimed as its goal.
Aristotle, gives other accounts of the term "nature".
First nature is conceived as "the immediate material
substance of things which have in themselves a principle of
motion or change. The second conception of nature is that
nature is "the shape or form which is specified in the
definition of the thing" According to some authors (W.D.
Ross 1923), the latter account is held by Aristotle as a
more accurate account of what nature is, than the former
materialistic account or conception of nature.
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Ross said that Aristotle takes this position because he
thought that a thing can only be known as this or that thing
if it has a form by which it can be defined. And this can
only be so if the thing in question is actually in existence
not in potency. This is to say that no one knows the nature
of a thing as it is in potentiality but only as it is
actually. "The form indeed is •nature' rather than the
matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is
when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists
potentially" (Aristotle, phy.193b7-8).
Aristotle raises two other noteworthy notions, "means"
and "end" as objects of knowledge in relation to the nature
of a thing. He notes analogically that what "means" is to an
end, is what "matter" is to "form. 11 ·What is of special
importance here is that "means" is not separated from the
end towards which this means is aimed at. Ross points out
that, nature as form of a thing is the end towards which its
development moves; while nature as matter is the means by
which this end is to be realized (1923:71).
From this, one can draw the general conclusion that
everything which has an end necessarily has a means towards
that end and without which that end cannot be realized. In
this sense one can conceive "nature" as final and formal
cause, or nature as an end on the one hand; on the other
hand one can also see "nature as means (Aristotle 194a27-28;
1044a35) .

.i . .
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Ross explains why Aristotle gives the foregoing highly
abstract account of "nature." According to Ross, Aristotle's
aim is to distinguish physics, the science of the study of
nature as matter and form, from the study of nature as pure
form or as matter alone (1923:71). In the interpretation of
Ross, God, the intelligences and the rational element in
human soul are pure forms of nature which are the objects of
metaphysics (1923:71), not physics for Aristotle.
Aristotle's idea of God as pure form will culminate in
his idea of God as the first mover, eternal unmovable
substance (Aristotle 1073a25-30). Some authors have noted
that "Aristotle's Unmoved Mover stands to nature as its
final or teleological cause, inspiring nature to imitate the
divine activity as far as its various constituents are able"
(Paul Edwards 1967:455).
Elsewhere Aristotle clearly indicates that "nature"
has its own law, when he says that "universal law is the law
of nature. For there is as everyone to some extent divines,
a natural justice and injustice that, is binding on all men,
even on those who have no association or covenant with each
other" (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1373b6-9). This law of nature,
besides being universal, it is also "permanent and
unchangeless" (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1375a31-32).
Does the above exposition of Aristotle's notion of
nature give us any clear knowledge or understanding

o~

nature of reality as it is in and of itself and of the

the
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nature of moral action? Can the "Unmoved Mover." which is
identified with "Final Cause" or teleological cause be known
objectively? These questions are important because they seem
to underscore the contents of moral action; and in the case
of this work, the morality of IVF/ET. They call for a study
of human knowledge about what "is", and therefore what
humans do with, or about the "is".
According to Aristotle, the condition for knowledge of
anything is if we know the primary condition, of what he
calls "first principle" (Aristotle 184all-14) . The grasp of
this first principle of any existent reality, or what "is",
is the preserve of "intuitive reason" (Aristotle Nie. Ethics
114la7) . Aristotle contends then that anything that has a
cause outside of itself can be known by demonstration;
however, the cause of its being what.it is itself (in other
words, its substance or nature), cannot be demonstrated
(PoAquinas Analytics 93b15-20).
Elsewhere in his moral account Aristotle says that the
essential nature, that is the first principle of human
action is known only through intuitive reason (Nie. Ethics
114la7), rather than by demonstration, or logical proof.
This is to say that first principle of human action, which
is crucial for judging an action as good or bad,
praiseworthy or blameworthy, right or wrong cannot be known
by any physical observation or logical proof, but only by
"intuitive reason." It will be interesting to know whether
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"nature" as the first principle of human action is, in and
of itself, "good" and "right" and for this reason can be
called "the good and the chief good ... what is right"
(1094a20-24} .
For a clue to the issues just raised this author turns
to Aquinas, a philosopher whose ethical thought is rooted in
"nature" as having a "law".

Thomas Aquinas on natural law.

The attempt to understand the philosophical meaning of
the term "nature", was necessary for an excursus into
Aristotle's treatment of that term. In a similar vein, it
seems necessary to know what Thomas Aquinas thought of
"Law", since some authors claim that he is the father of
natural law (Boyle 1992:4}. Furthermore, Aquinas has a
specific treatment of the essence of law. An understanding
of the essence of law will help to illuminate its
relationship with the essence of "nature". When this is done
then we can combine "nature" and "law" into the notion of
natural law and illuminate Aquinas' development and
application of "natural law" philosophical theory to human
actions.
Aquinas' joining of nature and law would be arbitrary,
if Aquinas was not in agreement with Aristotle's
:understanding of "nature" in its various denotations. On
this condition therefore, it is the opinion of this author
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that in general, except with some Christian qualifications,
Aquinas is in conformity with Aristotelian view of the
nature of reality and of the role of nature {Aquinas,

Qn

Being and Essence 29-72).
To the question, what is law? Aquinas first
distinguishes the different kinds of law namely, eternal
law, natural law, human law, divine law, {Aquinas Ia IIae,
q. 91: art. 1-6), and gives a descriptive definition of law
in its most general meaning. He says that "law is a kind of
direction or measure for human activity through which a
person is led to do something or held back" (Aquinas Ia
IIae, q. 90: art. 1). Aquinas then notes that both
"direction and measure come to human, act from reason".
Citing Aristotle's notation that the function of reason is
to plan for an end, Aquinas concludes in consonance with
Aristotle, that reason is the originating source of human
actions; and that "law is something that belongs to reason"
(Aquinas Ia IIae., q. 90: art. 1).
More particularly, taking the effect of law into
account, he says: "law is nothing but a dictate of practical
reason, issued by a sovereign who governs a complete
community" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 90: art. 1 and 2 ) . Aquinas
took it for granted that "the world is ruled by a divine
pro~idence"

{Aquinas Ia IIae, q.

22~

art. 1 and 2), and that

"it is evident that the whole community of the universe is
governed by God's mind" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 91: art. 1).
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Hence by virtue of the universal rule of things by divine
reason, this divine reason "has the nature of law" (Aquinas
Ia IIae, q. 91: art. 1), and has "eternal" conception
because, God's mind or reason, pre-exists time or the
temporal (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 91: art. 91). This explains
why divine reason, which is tantamount to law, "should be
called eternal" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q·. 91, art. 1).
Having established divine reason as the eternal and
universal law or principle, which directs everything,
Aquinas proceeded to show that there is also law in the
natural world, a "natural law". The following is Aquinas'
derivation of natural law:

Law is a rule and measure, ... and therefore can
exist in two manners, first as in the thing which is
the rule and measure, second as in the thing that is
ruled and measured, and the closer the second to the
first the more regular and measured it will be. Since
all things are regulated and measured by Eternal Law,
... , it is evident that all somehow share in it, in
that their tendencies to their own proper acts and ends
are from its impression.
Among them intelligent creatures are ranked
under divine Providence the more nobly because they
take part in Providence by their own providing for
themselves and others. Thus they join in and make their
own the Eternal Reason through which they have their
natural aptitudes for their due activity and purpose.
Now this sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent
creatures is what we call 'natural Law. 1 • • • the light of
natural reason by which we discern what is good and
what evil, is nothing but the impression of divine
light on us (S.T.Ia IIae, q.91, art. 2).
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Natural law, therefore is the means through which all
existent is ruled by eternal law; that is by divine mind or
reason. On the one hand it is eternal law as a principle of
action, as nature, in every natural being. On the other hand
natural law is the understanding by which humans
intellectually comprehend eternal law and guide their own
actions accordingly, giving them rational order (law)
according to human nature.
Aquinas then asks whether, this eternal law, as God's
"wisdom", or "reason", or "idea" is known by everyone. His
answer to this question is qualified.· "No one, except God
himself and the blessed who see him in his essence, can know
the Eternal Law as it is in itself, but every rational
creature can know about it according to some dawning,
greater or lesser, of its light" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 93,
art. 2). One notes also that, the eternal law as God's
reason or idea is seen as an "unchangeable truth" (Aquinas
Ia IIae, q. 93 art. 2).
From the point of view of the above, there is no doubt
in Aquinas' view that every human being, one way or another,
with his or her reason which is a share in divine reason,
knows something that is true solely by its participation in
eternal mind or reason, which is an "unchangeable truth" and
"law". This is what Aquinas refers to as the "general
principle of natural

l~w"

(Aquinas, Ia .IIae, q. 93, art. 2).

But what must not be forgotten among the interpreters and
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users of natural law theory is that "people share in the
truth in varying degrees, and accordingly know the Eternal
Law, some more, some less" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 93 art. 2).
It is of special interest and importance to note that
Aquinas distinguishes the way irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, from the way rational creatures
are subject to it. Irrational creatures obey the eternal law
by being moved by the power of the law itself as it is
impressed upon them by God in a given and fixed manner
(their nature) . Rational creatures are al.s.Q subject to the
eternal law but in a different way. They obey this law
through the means of "understanding," that is by
intellection or reason.
With this Aquinas asks whether natural law has many or
only one principle by which creatures act (Aquinas Ia IIae,
q. 94, art. 2). Due to the relevance of his answer to this
important question, in relation to the ongoing discourse
about IVF and artificial insemination, some of the details
of his long reply need attention here.
(A) He says that there is only one precept of the
natural· law

(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2), because

firstly, law of itself is a precept. Secondly he says that
law as a natural consequence of human nature, must have a
sin~le

precept because man though he is a unity, is complex

because he has many parts. This seems to imply as Aquinas
suggests that the single precept of law in the unity of a

67

person is represented in the many parts of the human nature,
including man's sensuous parts. In this way natural law may

se.em to have many precepts. Thirdly, Aquinas argues that
natural law has only one precept because, law is derived
from reason which is only one {Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art.
2) •

(B) Aquinas also has an answer from the point of view
that natural law has many precepts. It is widely accepted
that it is Aquinas• position that natural law has many
precepts (Grisez Germain, 1969:343).
Aquinas then addresses the point that natural law has
many precepts by drawing an analogy between the principles
of natural law and the first or self-evident principles of
demonstration. For him, what the principles of natural law
are to practical reason, are what the axioms of science are
to theoretical reason because both are kinds of self-evident
principles (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). For Aquinas
certain things are self-evident to everyone, while others
are not self-evident to everyone.
What is meant by "self-evidence"? As Aquinas sees it, a
thing can be self-evident in two senses, namely
"objectively" that is, in and of itself, and "relatively to
us", that is as it presents itself to us or as individuals
see it. For him a thing is self-evident if and only if, that
which is said of a subject, belongs essentially or
inseparably to the subject. In this sense whenever a
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statement about what is self-evident is made, that which is
said of the thing is immediately understood by anyone who
has the understanding of that which is said of the thing or
subject.
In another sense he says that, to anyone who does not
have the understanding of that which is said of a thing, it
is not self-evident to him (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2).
It is only objective in relation to the one who knows what
is said of the subject. He judges for example that, "man is
a rational animal" in itself, "is a self-evident
proposition" because, "to say 'man' is to say, rational".
Yet to someone who does not know what "man" is, this
proposition would not be self-evident (Aquinas Ia IIae Q.
94, art. 2) .
Aquinas distinguishes this kind of self-evident
principle which is only known to some, from those that are
known by everyone. For example, that "every whole is greater
than its parts" is a self-evident principle which is known
by everyone. Broadening his differentiation, he sets apart
this type of self-evident principle from those known only to
the highly educated. For instance to anybody who knows that
an angel has no body, "it is self-evident that an angel is
not circumscribed in a place". However this is not the case
with those who do not understand the philosophical point
about the relation of body .and place (Aquinas Ia IIae, q.
94, art. 2).
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In consideration of the class of things which are selfevident to everyone, Aquinas says that the first is "being",
because being is an idea which is included in every
statement about an existent thing; and human beings know
automatically. It therefore needs no proof to show that such
a thing exists. In other words, being itself is
indemonstrable, it is not demonstrated by way of proof.
Humans grasp it in another way.
Aquinas resonates with Aristotle by saying that the
first self-evident principle in the realm of theoretical
knowledge is that the same person at the same time can
believe the same thing to be and not to be; hence this is
naturally the starting point for all other theoretical
principles (Aristotle Met. 1005b29; Aquinas, Ia IIae, q. 94,
art. 2). The notion about self-evident principle plays a
similar important role in Aquinas' natural law theory, and
so it will in the ongoing discourse about IVF/ET. Aquinas
holds that the first self-evident principle in thinking
about how to act (practical thinking as opposed to
theoretical thinking) is "do good and avoid evil" (Aquinas
Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2).
Aquinas draws a parallel between "being" in relation to
"theoretical reason" and "good" in relation to "practical
rea~on".

He says that just as "being" is the first thing the

human mind can grasp when it beholds a thing,

(first

principle of theoretical reason), so too "good" is the first
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thing which "practical reason" inclines to in its activity.
"Reason" is here called "practical" because it produces
action, it does something. Moreover, like every agent it
acts towards an "end", and the meaning of an end is
precisely to be "good."
Aquinas concludes that the first principle of
practical reason is based on the meaning of "good" namely
that it is that which all things seek after {Aquinas, Ia
IIae, Q. 94, art. 2). This establishes what Aquinas calls
"the first command of the law, namely "that good is to be
sought and done, evil to be avoided'; all commands of
natural laws are based on this" {Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94 art.
2). Aquinas. adds "Accordingly, then natural law commands
extends to all doing or avoiding of things recognized .by the
practical reason itself as human good {Aquinas, Ia IIae, q.
94, art. 2); and to the avoidance and shunning of the
apprehension of their contraries as bad (Aquinas q. 94, art.
2). On this rests the central contentions of the defenders
of the natural law theory in its application to human
reproduction, a contention which will be addressed much more
fully later.
One may still ask the following question. From where
does the notion of evil come into play, since reason in its
theqretical functions can only behold·"being" and "good"
respectively; "good" being the corollary of "being"? At this
point the age old question resurfaces, namely: from whence
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came evil into the world? Given Aristotle's and Aquinas'
notion of "being" as that which is the first principle of
;

.

any existence, and its opposite as non-being or
nonexistence, it seems problematic to establish the origin
of evil. But this important question is well beyond the
scope of this project.
The first reality which theoretical reason grasps is
"being itself" "good" is the first thing which practical
reason apprehends, in its natural inclination to do
something (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). Of necessity
these coincide in the end of every agent (Aquinas Ia IIae,
q. 94, art. 2), an end which "carries the meaning of to be
good" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). That is, the "good"
to which man is inclined through being apprehended by
practical reason (in this author's deduction), coexists with
the first reality of theoretical reason. For as Aquinas said
earlier, before reason does something, it must first know
what it does; and since what it is inclined to do is good,
it must first be, in order for it to be known and be done.
This is "reason" in necessary coincidence and cooperation
with itself in its theoretical and practical self.
"Necessary coincidence" is here comparable to that
inseparable unity between the Aristotelian "matter" and
"form", or "means" and "end". It is not a mechanical
cooperation between two independent,beings. Instead it is
the way to be of a being, what this author calls, being-in

72

goodness. This coincidence of being and goodness will prove
to be important when one particular natural law argument
about IVF/ET is examined later.
Now Aquinas observes a three tiered hierarchical order
in the law of nature which corresponds with the order in
creaturely natural tendencies. First, there is the human
tendency towards the good of the nature which humanity
shares in common with every creature, ·for instance,
everything has the basic natural tendency to preserve its
own being. In accordance with this law, those tendencies by
which humans preserve their lives and defend them when they
are under threat fall under this natural law. Secondly,
there is in humans a certain inclination towards certain
goods which are in accordance with their nature, but which
they share only with other animals, for instance sexual
intercourse, education of their offspring and so forth.
Thirdly there is in humans, the special inclination towards
the good of his nature which is proper or specific to them
as rational beings. For instance, humans have the natural
inclination to know the truth about God and creation and
about their own natural ends and about living in society.
Thus it is natural, in a very strong sense, for humans to
shun ignorance and avoid offending those with whom they live
in

~heir

society (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2}.

Aquinas' excursus into the question whether natural law
contains many precepts or only one, ends with the following
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conclusion: Although there are many precepts of the natural
law, there is a convergence of the precepts into one precept
which counts as one natural law. His explanation of this
answer is that, the many precepts represent different
emotional or irrational drives of human nature, which are
then controlled by a single precept, reason, through its
understanding of this threefold hierarchy of natural
inclinations. In this way, all that is controlled by reason
falls under the single control of the law of reason, hence,
it can be said that natural law has only one precept
(Aquinas, Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2). When the many
inclinations or directives to action (precepts) are in
conflict, unity is established by reason, according to the
natural hierarchy just mentioned.
One of the principal arguments against IVF and
artificial insemination has been that the practice is
unnatural and therefore inunoral, according to some
interpretations of the natural law ethical theory. This is
why the work of the father of natural law theory needs to be
examined here. Aquinas held that man acting according to his
reason acts according to natural law and so according to his
natural tendencies. The process by which reason does this is
to go from the general to the particular, that is from what
is

~nown

to everybody to individual details or particulars

which are not known by everybody (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. -94,
art. 4.; Aristotle Physics 184al-25). However as was pointed

74

out above, theoretical reason and practical reason function
differently in relation to reason's natural tendency, namely
to know being or truth on the one hand and to do the good on
the other.
As Aquinas saw it, theoretical reason concerns itself
with natural truths which cannot be other than they are, and
about which theoretical reason will always say the same
thing either in general or in particular. To the contrary,
practical reason which deals with human acts can come to
different correct judgments in matters of particulars or
detail, the universal general principles notwithstanding
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 4).
Aquinas said that truth is the same for everybody both
in general and in particular in terms of theoretical
rational knowledge even though it is to be recognized that
not everybody recognizes truth in the conclusions, that is
in general. But with respect to practical reason which deals
with human acts, he said that practical truth and rightness
are not the same for everybody with respect to particular
decisions. Furthermore "even those who are equally in the
right on some particular course of action are not equally
aware of how right they are" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art.
4). Aquinas' sununarizes these points in this way:

So then it is evident that with respect to general
principles of both theory and practice what is true or
right is the same for all and is equally recognized.
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With respect to specific conclusions of theory the
truth is the same for all, though all do not equally
recognize it, for instance some are not aware that the
angles of a triangle together equal two right angles.
With respect to particular conclusions come to by the
practical reason there is no general unanimity about
what is true or right, and even when there is agreement
there is not the same degree of recognition (Aquinas Ia
IIae, q. 94, art. 4).
As will be demonstrated below, those who conclude that
IVF/ET is irmnoral on the basis of natural law reasoning have
failed to take adequate account of this difference between
theoretical and practical reason within natural law theory.
They have also mistakenly held that, within natural law
theory, every possible act is either prescribed or
forbidden.
Now it is> true that, for Aquinas, every act of reason
is responsive to natural inclination, and so every rational
act is virtuous (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 3). But
virtuous acts considered in themselves are not all
prescribed by the natural law because there are many
virtuous acts to which humans are not naturally inclined
directly, but which upon the examination of reason "have
been found by men to be conducive to human well-living"
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 3).
Some of such acts Aquinas cites are: temperance in
relation to food, drink, and sexual intercourse, and all of
"which are indeed ordained to the natural cormnon good, just
as other matters of law are ordained to the moral cormnon
good" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. ·94 art. 3). What this means is
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that a sound natural law judgment about a particular act of
IVF/ET or about a specific social policy of supporting
IVF/ET as an available treatment for infertility will depend
on factors in the lives of the particular persons and in the
life of their society that cannot be deduced from general
theoretical principles.
What message does this analysis of human reason in its
theoretical and practical functions, hold for those who
apply the natural law ethical theory attributed to Aquinas
to the ongoing ethical debate about IVF and artificial
insemination? In particular, is what is true and right and
good something relative for Aquinas? This question about
relativism or subjectivism, is obviously of some interest in
relation to the topic of this study. But before these
questions are answered in detail, an examination into a
second main ethical theory which is prominent in the current
arguments about IVF and artificial insemination seems
appropriate.

Deontological ethical theory

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, defines
Deontological ethics as "the branch of ethics dealing with
right action and the nature of duty without regard to the
goo~ness

or value of motives or the desirability of the ends

of any act" (1983). A review of this branch of ethics
reveals more than one kind of theory. There is "act-
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deontological theory"; "Rule deontology"; "the divine
command theory"; and "the Kantian theory" (William K.
Frankena 1973). The contents, similarities and differences
between these components of deontological ethics can be
shown by a brief survey of each.

Act-deontologism

The thesis of act-deontological theory is that "the
basic judgments of obligation are all purely particular ones
such as, "In this situation I should do so and so," and that
general ones such as, "We ought always to keep our promises"
are unavailable, unless, or at best derivative from
particular judgments" (Frankena, 1973:17).
Act-deontologists hold the general position that there
is indeed a duty to do what is right and to abstain from
what is wrong. However, they maintain that each act or
situation must be decided according to its own individual
merit without any general rule to guide us to action,
because "each situation is different and even unique"
(Frankena, 1973:16, 24-25).
According to Frankena, its method for the determination
of the morally right or wrong is to be "clear about the
facts in the case and then" form a judgment about what is to
be

~one,

either by some kind of "intuition" or "decision"

(1973:23), depending on one's choice.
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Intuitionism is the epistemological philosophical view
that our basic moral principles for the evaluation of human
actions as right or wrong are both "self-evident" and "selfjustifying" (Frankena, 1973:102). As one might expect,
objections are raised to this view.
According to Frankena, intuition as a principle for
moral judgment has serious difficulties. One difficulty he
says is based on the findings of human physical and
psychological sciences. Frankena, says that anthropological
and psychological evidence run counter to the intuitionists'
position, because there is no special faculty which
perceives what is right or wrong as it is in itself. Another
argument against act-deontological ethical theory has been
advanced by R. M. Hare:

... to learn to do anything is never to learn to do an
individual act; it is always to learn to do acts of a
certain kind in a certain kind of situation; and this
is to learn a principle . . . . without principles we
could not learn anything whatever from our elders . . . .
every generation would have to start from scratch and
teach itself. But ... self-teaching like all other
teaching is the teaching of principles (R. M. Hare,
1952:60-61).

On the basis of the foregoing objections actdeontologism is declared untenable by its opponents. It
would, in any case, provide no general guidance to
individuals or societies regarding IVF/ET. Therefore, it
will receive no further consideration here.
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Rule-deontologism

This kind of deontological ethical theory maintains
that understanding a "rule" is a necessary condition for the
determination of the rightness or wrongness of any given
moral action. One of the usual examples cited for this kind
of deontologism is "we ought always to tell the truth" or
"keep your promises" (Frankena 1973:17). Unlike the actdeontologists, rule-deontologists insist that rules are the
foundation and reference points for the judgment of the
rightness or wrongness of an individual action.
A very similar form of moral reflection employs rights
as the foundation of moral judgments rather than rules. Some
important issues regarding IVF/ET are currently debated in
terms of rights; for instance, a couple's proposed right to
have children by any means they choose. In the present
general context of discussing ethical theories, however, it
seems best to consider rights-theories as a sub-class of
rule-deontological theories.
One general objection to this theory, argues that there
can be no rule or right which does not admit of exceptions,
nor is there any set of rules or right which does not admit
of conflicts between the rules (Frankena, 1973:25). To this
difficulty, according to Frankena,
out.. He distinguishes between

11

w.

D. Ross suggests a way

actual" duty and

11

prima

facie" duty, between what is "prima facie" right and what is
"actually" right (Frankena, 1973:26). It is contended that
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what is actually right and obligatory is what we actually
ought to do in a particular situation while prima facie
rightness will identify what might :Pe called "candidates"
for rightness, which must then be reflected on further to
determine which of them is actually right.
According to Frankena, "something is a prima facie duty
if it is a duty other things being equal, that is if it
would be an actual duty if other moral considerations did
not intervene" (1973:26). So discussions of what ought to be
done or what social policy, for example, regarding IVF/ET
ought to be supported would have two parts: (i) determine
what prima facie rules or rights are involved; (ii) address
their conflicting requirements if any.
But now we must ask if the distinction between actual
and prima f acie rules and rights has gained us any insight
into how these conflicts, when they occur, are to be
resolved. One possibility is that the rules or rights are
weighed or ranked in some way;

anoth~r

is that the

foundation of moral thinking is in fact one master rule or
one supreme right. The approach of Kant, to be discussed in
a moment, is one example of the latter. The most common way
of ranking rules is in terms of their consequences, or the
good that they do. The consequentialist approach will be
examined after Kant.
It seems that little or no explicit attention at all
has been paid to this notion of prima facie duty in the
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current debate about the possibility of helping infertile
couples to have children of their own through the
technological intervention of IVF and artificial
insemination. What rules of duty or right might guide
infertile couples who desire to have children of their own
genes? Are there rules constraining them from using the new
inventions of human technology or rules requiring their use?
What moral considerations about the status of the human
embryo might intervene on their prima f acie duties to
require or to prevent a couple from making use of the only
means of reproduction available to them? Are there prima
facie rights of the human embryo or.prima facie rights of
its parents? For the parents have means for the choice of
the possibility of the life of the child. Some of the prima
facie rights of the embryo might include: the right not to
be deformed, the right to enjoy full dignity due to a human
embryo, or as some would claim the dignity of the human
person. But it is not generally in these terms only that
opponents or defenders of IVF/ET have formulated their
arguments, so this approach will be mentioned only in
passing in this essay.

The divine command theory

. The divine command theory also called "theological
voluntarism" is another form of deontological ethics. As the
name suggests, the tenet of this theory is that "the
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standard for right or ·wrong is the will or law of God" or in
other words that "an action is right or wrong if and only if
... it is conunanded or forbidden by God and nothing else"
(Frankena, 1973:28).
It is not hard to see that this theory will meet with
serious challenge particularly from the point of view of an
atheist or agnostic; nor is it hard even for a believer to
see some of the difficulties it involves. One of such
problems, is as old as ancient Greek philosophy, and has
been associated with Socrates in Plato's dialogue,
Euthyphro. It is: "How can we know what God conunands or
forbids (Frankena 1973:29)?" Recall also another question
attributed to Socrates; "Is something right because God
conunands it or does He conunand it because it is right
(Frankena, 1973:29)?" The Socratic reply to this question
was that "God conunands something because it is right." The
important point which is to be noted here is the implication
of this answer, which is that "what:

~s

right is so,

independently of whether God conunands it or not, or, in
other words, that God only reveals what is right and does
not make it right or create its rightness merely by willing
it" (Frankena, 1973:29). So the divine conunand theory
actually does not get us very far. Even if God does reveal
what is right, what is right is so, whether or not God
commands it.
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So, the question persists: How does anyone know what is
right where what is right can presumably be known, both by
believers and unbelievers in God? Therefore, the divine
conunand theory will provide little assistance to this
project, and will not be pursued further. Many proponents of
natural law ethical theory have also seen a theological
grounding for human moral life. The best of these have seen
the inadequacies of the divine conunand theory and offered
other explanations of the relation between human morality
and the divine. But since this is a philosophical analysis
of the morality of IVF/ET, these religious and theological
accounts will be left out of consigeration.
" .

Kantian deontological ethical theory:

No short summary of the highly complicated and
monumental work of Kant's ethics can capture its
philosophical content in its entirety. But this is not to
say that nothing worthwhile can ever be said about it
succinctly. An

a~tempt

will be made to extract and present

here those ideas in Kant's moral philosophy which are
commonly regarded as central to his ethical theory and which
may shed light on the issues under discussion here.
According to Kant,

(1) . "Nothing in the world-indeed nothing even
beyond the world-can possibly be conceived which could
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be called good without qualification except a good will ....
The good will is not good because of what it
effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to
achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of
its willing, i.e., it is good of itself .... it would
sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something
that had its full worth in itself. Usefulness or
fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment this
worth ([Kant] Lewis W. Beck, 1959:9-10).
Simply put, the good will is the absolute condition for the
good. This reminds one of the biblical injunction which says
that from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. A
good will therefore is the sole condition for the
qualification of any human action as good or morally right.
Also, in Kant, one reads:

(2). [Thus the first proposition of morality is that to
have moral worth an action must be done from duty.]
•.• An action performed from duty does not have its
moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved
through it but in the maxim by which it is determined .
... Duty is the necessity of an.action executed from
respect for law . . . . To duty every other motive must
give place, because duty is the condition of a will
good itself, whose worth transcends everything ([Kant]
Beck, 1959:16-20).

How can we know that a will to act in a certain way is a
good will? Kant believed that there is a single law of
morality which ought to guide humans in their actions. This
law.he called the "Categorical imperative" because it is not
based on any condition or desires.
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{3}. There is therefore only one categorical
imperative. It is: Act only according to that maxim by
which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law . . . . The universality of law
according to which effects are produced constitutes
what is properly called nature in the most general
sense ... then the universal imperative of duty can be
expressed as follows: Act as though the maxim of your
action were by your will to become a universal law of
nature {[Kant] Beck, 1959:39}.

Kant however recognizes that there are different kinds
of duties: "duties to ourselves" as distinguishable from
duties "to others," and that all of our duties do not hold
equal value, hence he distinguishes also "perfect and
imperfect duties" {[Kant] Beck 1959:39}.
Kant also argued that other imperatives for duty can be
derived from the categorical imperative hence the following
two other imperatives:

{a}. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in that of another, always as an end
and never as a means only [Kant] Beck, 1959:47).
{b} Every rational being must act as if he, by his
maxims were at all times a legislative member in the
universal realm of ends {[Kant] Beck, 1990:57}.

Since H. J. Paton's interpretation ..and analysis of Kant's
moral philosophy is widely respected {Frank, N. 1990:343)
the use which will be made of Kant's ethical theory in this
section shall be based on Paton's view of Kant's moral
philosophy.
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For the purposes of this work, the essay limits self to
the use which both proponents and opponents of IVF/ET have
made of the Kantian or deontological ethical theory in
general. First, these technologies are under focus as a
"means" to the achievement of an "end"; a child. What is the
moral value of these reproductive technologies in a nonconsequentialist theory of morality?
One may be skillfully "a good doctor or a poisoner"
(Paton 1951:162). This is to say that one can be skillfully
good or skillfully bad. As Kant sees it, actions are only
good for the realization of the law as such (1951:169). This
is to say that even if an action as skill is the means with
which a good end is realized, this does not necessarily mean
that the action is good per se.
Following the foregoing line of .thought, however,
opponents of the new means of

human,~.

r,eproduction could

therefore conclude that the new means of human reproduction
may not necessarily be right or good just because it
produces a good end. However, proponents of the technology
in question may revamp the argument in another way. In
accordance with Kant's moral theory, what is important is
that an action is good and right on the basis of the
principle with which it is willed; "a principle of
univ~rsality

and so of impartiality between myself and

others" (Paton 1951:168).
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On this view therefore one stands in the best position
for a moral evaluation of in vitro fertilization and
artificial insemination in specific relation to infertility
among married couples and the medical scientists who are
engaged in the progress of the technology. This specificity
is re-enforced in a culture such as in Nigeria where child
bearing is one of the primary reasons for marriage and
therefore the indispensable "form" and "value" of marriage.
This value of marriage (children as the end of marriage in
the Nigerian culture} among other values will therefore play
an important role in the evaluation of the morality of the
use of IVF/ET as the best available.means for infertile
couples to bear their own genetic children.

The role of culture

Can one presume that what is right is relative to
individuals or a community of people?

The pertinence of the

foregoing questions takes its propriety and importance
within this author's examination of the human experiences of
the problem of infertility and the new reproductive
technology of IVF/ET, which seeks to.alleviate this problem.
In other words, how does one know what is "good" or "right",
"bad" or "wrong", in and of itself?
How .can one distinguish good laws of nature from bad laws of
nature when both laws produce the same thing?
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It seems that the ethics of the new reproductive
technology is first and foremost the question of human
knowledge. The question, what do we know? comes before the
question, is what we know right or-wrong, good or bad?

To

what do humans attribute what they know, and therefore what
they do?

How does humanity grasp the laws of which it has

no concept? How can we ever say or represent anything if we
have no idea of what we are saying or representing? Thus to
obey a law, we must have the concept of the law and its
properties.
Aristotle and Aquinas argue that, what the first
principle of theoretical reason grasps first is being while
what the first principle of practical reason has the first
tendency to do is good. If this thinking is correct, there
follows then a logical question: where in the first timebound place, does the individual or a cormnunity of people
behold being, with their own eyes, grasp what it is or means
with their own mind, determine what to do in relation to
this being or good with their own mind and will and carry
out their own determinations with their own hands; guided by
their own reason, the reason of which they shared with other
members of the human race from "eternal reason" or "law of
nature"?
It is the belief of this author that it is no place
other than in the individual's or cormnunity's own "birth
home", his or her first environment,_ that is the environment
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into which the individual was born, in which he or she has
grown, and developed all the recognized faculties that
qualify a human being as a human person, yes, the
individual's habitat or as it is commonly called, the
individual's or community's culture. It is in this
environment that the cultivation and sharing of primary
concepts of "right" and "wrong", "good" and "right", "bad"
or "evil" and "wrong", takes its meaningful inception. It is
therefore, this culture, that will determine for itself the
appropriateness or otherwise of the use of IVF/ET. But
first, we must ask: is there a need for this technology?
Opponents to this general idea will be quick to spot
that it sounds like relativism. Yes, it sounds like one; but
is it one? The reply to this question is suspended to a
later time in this work. Before then here is a required
home-work for the opposers to position. It is this: Why is
the history of philosophy laden with more than one ethical
theory, and which do you accept without condemning the other
or others and for what reasons?
In the face of the multiplicity_of deontological
ethical theories, the task of applying deontological ethical
theory to IVF/ET becomes even more problematic. With this,
it is time to review the last important deontological
ethical theory, the Kantian version.
It is time then to examine the "objectivity" or
"absoluteness" of an action or the "subjectivity" or
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"relativity" of an action. The first question that thrusts
itself upon us in this inquiry is: Can an action be said to
be good and therefore morally right' only from one point of
view? Or put in another way, can a human action derive a
positive moral meaning only from one perspective? It appears
that an obvious reply to these questions is not in the
affirmative. There are many different ways of viewing and
accomplishing a task rightly.
If the above is true then one may ask, can a single
action be both good relatively and universally; or both
right relatively and universally? In what ways can one's
action be said to be subjectively good and right and
objectively good and right? The foregoing questions are very
Kantian and are derived from the following: "Can I will the
proposed action, not only as falling under a subjective
principle valid merely for myself, but also as falling under
a law valid for everyone in a similar situation?" (Paton
1951:170). In Kant's view, according to Paton, one must
start with the maxims which are good for the person, that is
with the subjective principle which "are concerned with the
good for me" (1951:170).
In willing an end one is at the same time willing all
the known and yet unknown means towards the attainment of
the end which is willed. The series is like a succession of
events. A thing while following

fro~.one

preceding event,

necessarily leads to another, until the desired end is
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attained.

As

J. H. Paton has said, "Man does not will one

thing as a means and another as an .end" (1951:125). This
view parallels that of Aquinas which holds that a means
necessarily is connected to its end. That is, means and end
involves not two separate actions but only one integrated
whole - a view that will be crucial in evaluating the
morality of IVF/ET in the next chapter.
The means and ends argument could be pursued from
another perspective. It is here assumed that if the
necessary end of a desired good is to be achieved, the
necessary rules or laws which holds these series of things
in place must be respected. For nothing exists without
following a rule of its own nature either in its actual
existence or in process to it. Similarly the IVF/ET
processes have their own laws which must be obeyed
rationally if a child is desired as an end in itself rather
than as a means. For human reason cannot judge the various
important components of IVF/ET as means wrongly and still
expect to achieve a proper end - the biological and rational
laws must be in proper order to achieve a desired child
through the means of IVF/ET. This is to say that the medical
engineering that brings about the fetus must grasp the
concept of the entire enterprise in actuality and in process
or

~n

theory and practice. The laws must be known if they

must be respected to do their dutiful work for Kantians or
for the naturalists, in the so-called natural way.
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However, this is not to say that the medical scientists
are the creators of the laws in question from nowhere.
Rather, it is to say that the concept which they are
grasping or knowing, and respecting are the same laws of
nature which, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant talked about, and
which are in the various natures of things, including human
beings.
The means and end connection provokes thoughts of every
day experience. Some times people bite their own tongues,
while chewing food that will nourish them. Some times too,
people have in the process of eating food, swallowed bones
which landed them on surgical tables for medical
intervention. Experiences have shown that such untoward
events do happen and that they are part of the risks we take
in daily living of eating food. We cannot stop eating food
because of the possible hazard of biting our tongue and
cause pain to ourselves or swallowing bone that will result
in going to the hospital for surgery. Or, when one is faced
with the prospect of undergoing an operation, one does not
forego the surgery because of the possible risks of loosing
one's life, the ultimate of all the side effects or dangers
of any serious surgery. The real ethical issue is whether
the reason for eating is right, which in Kantian terms means
acc9rding to the Categorical Imperative.
Instead of judging the matter by the means, on one
hand, we have learned what to do when we must eat some foods
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that contain bones, so that we don't end up in the hospital
for surgery. We become more intentionally careful. Still,
even when all care precaution is taken, some mishaps happen.
On the other hand, medical scientists are constantly
perfecting their knowledge of medical surgery to minimize
risks and prevent lose of lives. In spite of their efforsts
some mishaps still occur. So the physical harms which the
children born of the new technological means of reproduction
may suffer could simply be sufficient reason for the medical
scientist to be more intentionally careful in their skills.
But they will not, in and of themselves, be sufficient
reason to stop helping the needy infertile couples. The
reason for that helping must be judged directly.
In certain cultures, as in the Nigerian, in most cases,
the SQl.e reason for any marriage is the reproduction of
children. Marriage is about children. Marriage does not
attain its full value and recognition, either in the eyes of
the couple or in those of their community, if no child has
been born from it. In many instances, one child is
considered insufficient. In such examples, other means such
as polygamy are sought to increase the number of children in
the family. This is because the value of children in the
Nigerian society, is immeasurable and irreplacable by other
impQrtant values in marriage and life. The desire to bear
children is a desire to do what one must do in order to be
whole and happy in a culture where children are the
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foundation stone, pillar and main "wealth" of any marriage
and of the whole culture. Other reasons, such as having a
companion of one's own to help one in one's daily, many and
varied needs, especially in one's old age, are simply a
corollary to having children. The joy which attends the
birth of a child in this culture has other corollaries as
well. One thing gives rise to another. But the end of
marriage in this culture is to have children.
This means that a marriage partner is being used as a
mere means in a childless marriage, that a childless
marriage is, in a real sense, no

~rriage

at all, a

contradiction that cannot be willed.as a universal law.
The reader is left to judge for himself or herself,
whether the end of marriage in the reader's culture is to
have children. The reader is also left to determine whetper
having children is obligatory once one decides to marry. If
it is not obligatory, then one may conclude that having
children in the reader's culture depends on one's choice, or
desire. In other words, it is relative to the individual's
disposition or choice.
But in the Nigerian society, it is expected that all
men and women ought to marry and they,ought to bear children
in the usual manner when they marrY., all things being equal.
In the absence of all things being equal, then the
individual and community have to do what they can do, as a
duty, to meet what is deemed an obligation for all, namely
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to marry and reproduce children. Therefore it is a thesis of
this dissertation that IVF/ET as one of the results of human
effort that can help the helpless is a genuine duty. But the
Nigerian cultural view of marriage as a mere means to an end
instead of being an end in itself makes the Kantian view of
morality or the Categorical Imperative vulnerable.
Most of those in favor of IVF/ET have supported the
mo.rality of these reproductive interventions on the bases of
their positive consequences rather than using the Kantian
line of argument just sununarized. An examination of the main
tenets of the ethical theory of Utility, variously called
Utilitarianism or Consequentialism is therefore in order.

Utilitarianism

Jeremy Bentham (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1863) are
the two best known proposers of utilitarianism in moral
theory. As in Kant's case, the attempt for the moment is to
expose the key points in the ethical theories of these
authors. Later, in the next chapter, more of the relevance
of their application to the ethical debate concerning IVF
and artificial insemination will be seen.

Jeremy Bentham

Frank N. Magill has advanced the following as the
"principal ideas" in the ethical philosophy of Bentham:
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The first principle of moral philosophy is the
principle of utility which states.that every man is
morally obligated to promote the greatest happiness of
the greatest number of persons.
The principle of utility takes account of the fact
that all men are governed by an interest in securing
pleasure and avoiding pain.
Only the consequences of acts are good or bad;
intentions are good or evil only insofar as they lead
to pleasure or pain.
Since suffering is always bad, all punishment is
bad; but punishment must sometimes be administered in
order to avoid the greater suffering that an off ender
against society might bring to others (1990:344).

John Stuart Mill

Frank N. Magill, presents the following abstract of the
central concepts of John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory of
moral action:

Those acts are right and good which produce the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons.
An act derives its moral worth not from its form but
from its utility.
Although it is the intrinsic worth of pleasure which
gives value to acts conducive to pleasure, some
pleasures are better than others in quality.
The proof of the value of pleasure is that it is
desired, and the proof of the claim that some pleasures
are better than others is that experienced, rational
men prefer some pleasures to others.
Justice is the appropriate name for certain
social utilities by which the general good is realized
(1990:401).

It needs to be clarified that the idea of maximizing
good is the central idea in the utilitarian concept. The
expression, "greatest number of persons" can be misleading;
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Bentham's and Mill's moral theory does not reduce to a
"head-count." The main tenet of utilitarianism, according to
these authors, is the maximization of values or what is
valuable and the minimization of the painful or harmful for
eye:r:::yone as much as possible. 1 As in the deontological
ethical theory, there are different types of utilitarianism,
even though "utility" remains the basic motivating force to
human actions. For the purposes of this work the author
highlights two of those which Frankena identifies. "Act
utilitarianism" and "Rule Utilitarianism."

Act utilitarianism

According to Frankena, "act utilitarian" hold that

one

can tell what is right in any given situation by direct
appeal to the principle of utility and find out which of the
actions open to him or her is likely to produce the greatest
amount of good and least amount of evil. The emphasis is on
the general effect which the doing of a particular action by
an individual will have in a particular situation, rather
than the effect which everyone's doing of an action will
have in any situation (Frankena 1973) .

. On the basis of the main tenets of coosequentialism/utilitariaoism, that is the maximization of ~alues
or what is beneficial and the minimization of disvalues or what is harmful to the individual or society,
proportionalism will be treated as the same with this theory in the next and subsequent chapter.
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Rule utilitarianism

Unlike act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism
emphasizes the greatest benefit which the utility of rules
will have in any given moral action, rather than the
greatest benefit of an action in a particular situation. In
other words, which of the rules open to one or a group of
people will yield the greatest amount of advantages rather
than disadvantages for the people affected (Frankena,
1973:39)? In its emphasis on rules for morality, it is
similar to rule-deontologism; but here the rules are
selected because of their utility. As indicated the last
footnote there is a deep connection between Aquinas theory
of natural law (proportionality) and consequentialism or
utilitarianism. The connection will become obvious in the
application of Aquina's teaching on how to evaluate the
morality of any human action to IVF/ET in the chapters that
follow. Therefore the 'immediate issues raised by the
utilitarian/consequentialist ethical theory as applied to
IVF/ET are fully discussed in these chapters.

Conclusion

The survey of the foregoing ethical principles of human
action brings a single undeniable fact to a glaring light.
Tha~

fact is the enormous difference among them. The various

strands of deontological and utilitarian principles are an
obvious validation of the scientific and philosophical claim
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that "no theory ever agrees with all the facts in its
domain" {Paul Feyerabend, 1975:55).
A common factor among them is the recognition that there
is "right" and "wrong", "good" and "bad"; but as to what
these are in themselves or in relation to matters of human
action, is a case of deep division of opinions. All the
ethical theories under inquiry have had their share of
criticisms, but it is not the intention of this essay to go
into those criticisms. The consequentialist/proportionalist
theory applied in this work is not intended to claim to
capture all the important moral points raised by IVF/ET.
Instead, in view of the complexity of issues raised by this
technology and the array of people it involves,
consequentialism/proportionalism is the most appropriate
moral theory suited for the moral evaluation of IVF/ET. This
claim will become clearer as this essay progresses.

CHAPTER THREE
THE MORALITY OF IVF/ET: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF CDF

One of the most systematic and best known works on the
issue of IVF/ET has already been mentioned. It is:
Instruction On Respect For Human Life In Its Origin And On
The Dignity of Procreation: Replies To Certain Questions Of
The Day (Congregation For The Doctrine Of the Faith 1987,
henceforth CDF) . 1 For reasons which this essay will show
shortly, CDF argues that the only morally acceptable avenue
to married couples to reproduce their own kind, even in the
extraordinary circumstance of infertility, is through the
"conjugal act" (CDF 1987:27). This position, as will be
explained, is based on a kind of natural law (deontological)
moral argument which views !VF/ET and artificial
insemination as unnatural, hence immoral.

This chapter will

show that the arguments of CDF are mistaken in their
application of the natural law ethical theory to the
morality of IVF/ET. It will also show that IVF/ET is
demonstrably consistent with the natural law

All· references to this work will be from the official English translation of the Latin Original. Another
source of this document is: Origins 16:no. 40, Mar. 19, 1987, pp. 698-711.
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{proportionalist) ethics as expounded by Aquinas with regard
to the morality of human action. To this end, it will be
necessary to ask and re-examine: what does it mean for anact
to be natural? The argument here will show that the
contention that !VF/ET is unnatural, in the sense intended
by CDF in its natural law ethical argument against IVF/ET,
is false, and that instead IVF/ET is natural because the
actions of human reason that are operative both in these
processes and in judging the appropriateness of !VF/ET are
natural. For reason is precisely the condition of moral acts
and the moral human person.
From this it will follow that acts proceeding from
properly judging human reason, like !VF/ET in the proper
circumstances, are therefore natural in the relevant sense,
and so morally justified.
Two lines of reasoning will be offered in support of this
view:

{1) To be unnatural in the sense in which !VF/ET is

viewed by CDF, does not necessarily mean an act {in itself
or by nature) is immoral;

{2) The values, achievable by

!VF/ET outweigh on balance any disvalues of !VF/ET in
sufficient measure that having IVF/ET available and
acceptable for married couples yields more total good than
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of not having
!VF/ET.
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This second line of reasoning is built on the basis of
the first line of reasoning. For if one concedes to the view
that an act can be judged by itself or is immoral by nature,
then any argument based on benefits and burdens, or
proportionality, becomes meaningless. This complicated
wording is necessary to show that haying and not haying
IVF/ET are the courses of action being compared, and that,
for each of them, the relevant values/disvalues
dvantages/disadvantages) need to be compared. That is, both
positives and negatives have to be weighed for .e,acii
alternative before these alternatives (having and not
having) are compared with one another.
To carry out these tasks, this chapter will first
summarize Janssens' concept of "ontic evil". 2 Secondly, it
will summarize Aquinas' view of the structure of Moral law,
examined in detail in chapter two.
Thirdly, there will be a detailed analysis of Janssens'
interpretation of Aquinas' teaching on the structure and
morality of

.Qlll!

human act, since CDF, bases its natural law

arguments against IVF/ET, on "fundamental principles, of an
anthropological and moral character" which, according to it,
"are necessary for a proper evaluation of the problems"
(1987:3) and which are purportedly derived from Aquinas'

. Explaining Janssens' concept of ontic evil first is necessary because this notion is already proniinent in
Janssens' understanding and interpretation of Aquinas' teaching on debita proponio (due proportion).
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teaching. This detailed exposition is necessary because CDF
fails to see what Janssens correctly sees in Aquinas'
teaching on the subject just mentioned; namely, that an act
cannot be judged by itself without reference to the human
subject who wills the act in relation to a desired end.
My own natural law reasoning based on this analysis will
support the claim that !VF/ET is natural in the relevant
sense and, more importantly, therefore not immoral in view
of Aquinas' conception of the structure and morality of
human action. Also my reasoning will draw from Janssens'
notion of ontic eyil which is sometimes inevitable in many
human actions.
Fourth, there will be an outline or summary of CDF's
document 3 on !VF/ET. Fifth will be a critique of the
weaknesses of this document's reasoning on !VF/ET while at
the same time offering an alternative (proportionalist or
consequentialist) view of natural law ethics which supports
!VF/ET in general, and in particular, in Nigeria, as against
CDF's deontological interpretation of it.
As already indicated, in these arguments about the
morality of IVF/ET, the chapter will for the most part rely
on the work of Louis Janssens 4 who is one of the most

Instruction On Respect For Human life In Its Origin And On The Dignity Of Procreation: Replies To
Certain Question O/The Day, by Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith, Vatican City. 1987 .
.Louis Janssens' work "Ontic Evil and Moral Evir, in, Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1,: Moral
Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. by Charles Curran and Rihard McCormick. S.J. 1979, will be our main
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respected authorities in Thomistic moral thinking. Janssens'
idea of ontic eyil, in conjunction with Aquinas's concept of
debita proportio (adequate, due, or commensurate

proportion) , will be crucial in addressing the issue of
conflict of moral values encountered in this chapter.

Concept of ontic evil

According to Janssens, modern day moralists employ the
concept "Ontic evil" 5 instead of "physical evil" because
·"the contemporary meaning of 'physical' corresponds more to
the meaning of •material'" (1979:60). What then is ontic

.e..Yi.l? "Ontic evil" is "any lack of perfection at which we
aim, any lack of fulfillment which frustrates our natural
urges and makes us suffer" (Janssens 1979:60). Janssens,
sees this kind of evil as being "essentially the natural
consequence of our limitation" (1979:60), because we humans
are, obviously, very limited beings in many ways.
However, Janssens warns that:

our limitation itself is not an evil - to be created to
be limited - but, because we are thinking, willing,
feeling and acting beings, we can be painfully hampered

guide .

. Some moral thinkers, use the term •pre-moral evil" interchangeablly with •ontic evil". See Richard
Westley, Guidelines For Contemporary Catholics: life, Death and Science, The Thomas More Press,
Chicago, Illinois, p.62, 1989.
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by the limits of our possibilities in a plurality of
realities that are both aids and handicaps" (1979:60).
Janssens expresses these limits of human possibilities in
the midst of realities that are both aids and handicaps in
one word: "ambiguity" (1979:60). Our ambiguity is operative
in all human actions in which "the concrete act [is] made up
of the material and the formal element (means and end)"
(1979:60).
Janssens cautions readers not to confuse moral evil
with ontic evil because, "ontic evil and moral evil are not
the same" (Janssens 1979:67). There is, however, "a
connection between ontic evil and moral evil" (Janssens
1979:67). As already noted, ontic evil hampers the
development of the human person or group of persons and
therefore is harmful to human beings. Sometimes human
actions involve moral evil which are harmful to the human
individual. This means that moral evil can constitute ontic
evil in that it impedes the development of the individual
human being of group of community of persons (see Janssens
1987:67). More specifically, the relationship between ontic
evil and moral evil is seen in the moral interactions
between human persons. In Janssens words,

since morality is chiefly concerned with the human
relationships and the well-being of human beings, it
cannot remain unconcerned about the ontic evil which in
all its forms handicaps and harms the development of
individuals and communities (1979:67).
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Summary of the structure of moral law as taught by Aquinas

This topic was discussed in chapter two, so only the gist
of that chapter needs to be recapitulated here. Aquinas
viewed_ morality, or "natural law," as having a single
precept in one way, but multiple precepts in another sense.
For Aquinas, law must have a single precept because man,
though he is a unity, is complex because he has many parts.
This is to say that the single precept of law in the unity
of a person is represented in the many parts of the human
nature, including man's sensuous parts. But natural law has
only one precept because law is derived from reason which is
only one (Aquinas S.T. Ia IIae., Q. 94, art. 2; emphasis
mine) . The complexity of a person in his/her composite
reality or material nature includes that persons have
desires (irrational appetites) that come under the proper
guardianship of reason. This proper rule of reason over the
bodily nature is necessary to avoid

conflict in the unity

of the human person in his/her several

material, social,

emotional, spiritual and other needs. One can say, because
there are multiple precepts (laws), then there are multiple
means to achieve an end; but reason is the sole judge of
which means to use (though it sometimes judges rightly and
sometimes wrongly) .
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(B) But Aquinas also offered reasons for saying that
natural law has many precepts. He did this by drawing an
analogy between the principles of natural law and the first
or self-evident principles of demonstration. Aquinas held
that the principles of natural law are to practical reason,
what the axioms of science are to theoretical reason. In
each realm of reason's search for understanding, there are
self-evident first principles (Aquinas Ia IIae, q.94, art.
2) . For Aquinas, the first self-evident principle in
inquiring about how to act

~practical

thinking as opposed to

theoretical thinking) is "do good and avoid evil'

(Aquinas

Ia IIae, q.94, art. 2).
He then drew a parallel between "being" in relation to
"theoretical reason" and "good" in relation to "practical
reason". As he saw it, just as "being" is the

fi~st

the human mind can grasp when it beholds a thing,

thing

(first

principle of theoretical reason), so too "good" is the first
thing which "practical reason" inclines to in its activity.
When "reason" is focused on action and doing something, it
is called "practical" reason. Practical reason, that is,
reason seen as the reason of an agent, acts like every agent
towards an "end"; and the general meaning of any end for
reason is precisely in terms of "good." Thus Aquinas
concluded that the first principle or origin of the activity
of practical reason is that which all things seek after,
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which is the general meaning of "good" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q.
94, art. 2) .
With this understanding, Aquinas identified what he
called the first command of all law, namely 'that good is to
be sought and done, evil to be avoided'; all commands of
natural laws are based on this" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94,
art. 2). This then at the most general level is what is
called moral law. Next, in order to clarify what he means by
"natural law", Aquinas adds, "Accordingly, then natural law
command extends to all doing or avoiding of things
recognized by the practical·reason itself as human good"
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 2); and "to the avoidance and
shunning of the apprehension of their contraries as bad"
(Aquinas q. 94, art. 2). This is to say that, with regard to
rational human actions, Aquinas used the phrase "natural
law" and "moral law" equivalently. For Aquinas reason ia. the
natural law - the guiding principle, without which no human
action receives any specification. It is this natural law
theory that CDF intends to apply in its Instruction. But
this chapter will argue that CDF misapplies this theory in
concluding that the human reproductive technology of !VF/ET
is unnatural and therefore is inherently immoral.
Before that argument begins, an issue relevant to that
argument needs to be examined in order to show how an acting
person is necessarily related to his activity.
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The structure of human action

A proper analysis of the morality of IVF/ET, especially
in relation to CDF's arguments, also depends on
understanding Aquinas' exposition of the structure of human
action and of his systematic division of the characteristics
of the human person. According to Louis Janssens, "Thomas
Aquinas, approaches the topic of the structure of the human
action in the light of his views of the acting subject, the
inner act of the will" (1979)41). In other words, a theory
about the eyaluation of any strictly human action should not
precede a correct understanding of the moral character of
the human subject. One of the arguments of this chapter, as
will be shown when Aquinas' teaching on the morality of any
given human action will be explained, is that the proper end
of an action is determined solely by its relation to human
nature.
As Janssens, explains: Aquinas calls the will, "an
essential condition of any explanation of strictly human
actions because the will, as rational appetite, is
specifically characteristic of the human being and
consequently, only the acts which emanate from the will are
properly speaking human acts" (1979:41), as contrasted with
mere activities of humans. Following this, Aquinas first
considers "the act of the will" before he turns "his
attention to the external aptions which are also acts of the
will itself ... although they depend on other faculties for
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their realization'.' (Janssens 1979:41). In doing so, Aquinas
says: "Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a
power, are caused by that power in accordance with nature of

.it.a object. But the object of the will is the .end and the
gQQd. Therefore all human actions must be for an end"
(Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 1, art. 1; emphasis mine).
Therefore, in talking about the morality of !VF/ET, one
is talking, first and foremost, about the structure and
characteristics of human beings on which the morality of
!VF/ET depends. As Aquinas says:

"Now man is master of his actions through his reason
and his liil..l.; whence, too, the free-will is defined as
the faculty and will of reason. Therefore those actions
are properly called human which proceed from a
deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in
man, they can be called actions of a man, but not
properly human actions, since they are not proper to
man as man" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 1 art. 1; emphasis
mine) .

So !VF/ET does not derive its meaning or moral significance
just from itself as a set of material events and in
isolation. Instead it takes its meaning and moral
significance from the human beings and their ends who
willfully carry out the act for specific purposes for
themselves.
The reader should note that one aim of this

exposit~on

to show that the human "agent, consequently, is so

is
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essentially related to the structure of the activity that
his activity can only be called human to the extent that it
originates within a thinking and willing subject who is
therefore capable of a free act of the will" (1979:41;
emphasis mine) .
As has been noted, although there is only one precept
of the natural law in the unity of a human person, that law
is represented in different ways in the different parts of
the human person, because of the complexity of the structure
of the human person. So, the human will must have its own
precept, inherent to itself,' that moves it into willing
something. This precept is only powerful and useful to the
extent it Qlll.y moves the will, pure and simple. This precept
is human reason as judge of ends. Therefore just as it is
true to say that a rational being cannot do anything without
the will; so it is true to assert that he/she cannot do
anything independent of reason. This is not, however, to
argue that every action in which reason involves itself, is
morally good, properly considered.
But human reason as a judge of .e.rui.e., is not all that
"nature" or "natural law" amounts to. Thus, the reader is
again reminded that in chapter two, Paul Edwards and Vacek
Edward, respectively referred to "nature" as "the laws and
principles of structure by which the behavior of things may
be explained"; or "the intrinsic principles of human growth
including our biological, psychological, intellectual and
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religious dimensions." As noted earlier, this implies that
since there are many laws, there are also many means to an
end. But reason decides which means to adopt in relation to
the human person's end. The fact that there are several
possible means of pursuing a particular end in view means
that, this end in view is not the only important element in
the consideration of the acting subject. That is, the means
is also important, not only the end in view in the person's
consideration. In order words neither means nor end can be
omitted in any moral reflection; both must be considered.
For example, in order for a couple to bear a genetic
child, their sexual organs and hormonal or chemical
substances must be in good condition, and they must be able
to perform the sexual act for the desired child to come into
existence. Without these material and organic elements and
the performance of the sexual act itself, the desired child
can never come into being. This means that although the
couple's ultimate end of having a genetic child is valuable
in itself, the couple cannot rule out the fact that having
the normal means, the normal sexual organs and hormonal or
chemical bodily substances, is also very important. Bearing
a genetic child necessarily implies having the required
means, normally the biological materials and the ability to
perform the sexual act itself. Moreover, if any of the
required material organs or chemical substances are in
irremediable dysfunctional condition, proper attention must
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be paid to the question of means in order for the ultimate
goal of a genetic child to be attained. Necessarily, the
material elements (means) to bearing one's own genetic child
must be well cared for.
Similarly the material elements and activities involved
in IVF/ET, as alternate means designed to reproduce a child,
must be well considered to be in the appropriate condition,
in order for a child .to be properly, morally conceived. This
material means of IVF/ET may be of special value and
necessary for an infertil~ couple to conceive; but it cannot
be treated just anyhow by those involved for the sake of
their ultimate end. The material elements in both the
traditional means of human reproduction and in IVF/ET are,
in each instance, indispensable elements in human
reproduction. But they must still be carefully judged for
their use to be morally appropriate.
Reason must examine these means in the light of the
will's orientation to the (human) good. For the good in
general and even the good in more specific goods like human
reproduction is not available without the material elements
(means) used to attain them. Without material means in any
human action, the will would be merely analogous to
theoretical reason, bereft, as it were, of its other side,
practical reason in that it produces no action. Material
elements are needed if the will is to attain its end. For
although the "will" may, will what theoretical reason
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beholds as its goal, the will can do nothing except willing
that something actual happens. So it is practical reason
which, as it were, translates the will into reality, by
engaging other human faculties' necessary organs into
action. It does this by devising a proper means towards the
attainment of what is willed by the faculty of the will or
what is beheld and named by theoretical reason - the "good".
Now the specific good of reproduction requires in the
ordinary case material acts including sexual intercourse,
gestation, bearing a child, caring for it and educating it
in order for that end of reproduction to be achieved. But
for some couples who cannot reproduce by ordinary sexual
intercourse, another set of material acts, including acts of
organs, and other bodily products or parts, namely, IVF/ET,
is available. The fact that some means may be more commonly
used than others is not morally significant, and in any
case, both need moral examination as means to the good end.
Therefore, the fact that IVF/ET in the circumstances of
infertility of couple is the sole possible means for childbearing does not imply that IVF/ET is automatically a good
means, even if we assume for now that child-bearing as an
end-in-view is a good, a point that will later be
demonstrated carefully.
Making this point clearly is necessary because sometimes the
only possible means to a good end is itself morally
unacceptable.
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It has in fact been argued by CDF that, even though
IVF/ET is the sole means of achieving human conception in
some situations, this means is not well ordered in its
practical reality and so the use of IVF/ET is immoral.
Sometimes people intentionally set out to achieve ends they
know to be morally wrong, as when someone voluntarily and
willfully, kills another human being simply to end his/her
life. In those cases, the end in view is immoral. But at
other times a person does moral wrong while having a good
end by choosing a means to that end which is moraly
unacceptable; and sometimes this occurs when the means
chosen was the only possible means to the end. In such
cases, the moral person must forego the worthy end in order
to avoid the morally unacceptable means.
Part of the present inquiry is to determine if IVF/ET
is a morally acceptable means to reproduction, given that
CDF has argued that it is morally unacceptable. Of course,
people sometimes unintentionally engage in immoral actions.
For it is sometimes difficult to separate a good means from
a bad one and a person may mistakenly use an unacceptable
means to a worthy end. Louis Janssens clarifies this point
by saying that even when morally bad means are chosen,
humans are so structured that they are chosen for the sake
of human good as long as the action being performed by the
subject is from the will to achieve the good end. He

s~ys:
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"this principle can be applied to each human act, even
a sinful act, since in any sinful act, man still
intends to reach for something which is apprehended as
something good, at least for some particular
tendencies, although it is not in accord with the true
good of the whole person contra naturam rationalem
secundum rei veritatem (1979:42)
Aquinas describes what is going on in such a situation in
these words:

That to which the will tends by sinning, although in
reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature,
nevertheless is apprehended as something good ~nd
suitable to nature,
in so far as it is suitable to man
by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious
habit (Ia IIae, q. 6, art. 4)

That is, it is falsely apprehended as a morally acceptable
means to something that is a genuine part of possible human
good. But the complication which arises from the fact that
both moral and immoral action originate from the same
principle of the human will, does not by that very fact
destroy the basic fact that the end in view of the acting
subject, determines the culpability

or commendability of

the actor, because the human subject in his/her action seeks
"to realize that which is good - the proper object of the
will - means that we aim at this good as the end of our
action"

(Janssens 1979:42).

Viewed in this light, Janssens, says that, "the .e..il.d is
the primordial element of the structure of an action,
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because it is the proper object of the act of the will"; and
that "the subject or the inner act of the will is involved
in the definition of the end" (1979:42; emphasis mine). In
Aquinas's words, "every end of an action, therefore, is to
be taken as an end of the subject, of the inner act of the
will" (Aquinas Ia IIae, q. 18. art. 6). However, this does
IlQ.t.

demonstrate that the end in view is simply the

determiner of the morality of an act; it only indicates that
the end in view is structurally essential, and therefore an
essential component of the moral judgment.
It would seem that the problematic or intertwined
nature of means and ends question, involved in human action,
is unavoidable. In Janssens' opinion, Aquinas wanted to
avoid two extreme views - one is a subjectivistic
interpretation, the other is an objectivistic (i.e. without
reference to the human subject) explication view of human
action. Because of the complicated nature of what is
involved, a full rendering of Janssens' understanding of the
issue at stake seems appropriate:

It is clear now that the end is the primordial element
of the structure of an action, because it is the proper
object of the act of the will. But it is equally clear
that the subject or the inner act of the will is
involved in the definition of the end. St. Thomas
considers this thought over and again. "Voluntas
proprie est ipsius finis." "Finis propries est objectum
interioris actus voluntatis." Every end of an action,
therefore, is to be taken as an end of the subject, of
the inner act of the will, viz., a finis operantis
Thomas does not give this principle the
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sense of a subjectiyistic interpretation of human
activity. He will emphasize that a definite good, as
object and end of an inner act of the will, cannot be
pursued by the subject by any kind of action (Janssens
1979:42-43; emphasis mine).
That is, moral judgment must attend to the means, the
material actions needed to achieve an end, as surely as it
must attend to the end. But equally, moral judgment must not
focus solely on the ·material actions involved without
reference to the end of the subject pursuing them; for these
material actions are not considered as properly human
actions save in relation to the willed pursuit of an end in
which they are grounded.
According Janssens, although Aquinas wanted to avoid a
subjectivistic account of human action, focused solely on
willed ends, he nevertheless maintained his position as well
that no human activity can be morally evaluated without
reference to human subject who, is the origin of the
activity. With this, Janssens goes on to say that Aquinas,

... will not abandon the position that the subject or
the inner act of the will must be considered as the
starting point; on the contrary, he will always stress
that the end of the inner act of the will (or the finis
operantis) determines the concrete structure of the
action which fits this end (finis dat speciem actui
humano) (Janssens 1979:43) .
. It is at this intellectual juncture that Janssens,
points out that a major error on the part of certain authors
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or traditions 6 is the presupposition that an human action
can be morally evaluated independent of the acting subject.
Building on his understanding of Aquinas, Janssens explains
the error of these authors or tradition in these words:

Our textbooks distinguish between finis operis and
finis operantis. The intention of the authors is
evident; it is an attempt to secure a moral eyaluation
of the action itself (in eel, as related to the acting
subject. Now it is to be noted that Thomas never uses
this distinction in his De Actibus Humanis, although he
knows it. He mentions it in his commentary on Petrus
Lombardus. But he accentuates immediately that the
finis operis is always converted into a finis
operantis: finis operis semper reduncitur in finem
operantis. His reason for this teaching is clear: he
draws it from the very definition of end. To the mind
of Thomas there is no end without the inner act of the
will of the subject and yice-yersa. The end is in the
strictest sense of the word the peculiar object of the
inner act of the will. In other words, the good, which
is the appropriate object of the will, can only be
termed an end insofar as it is aimed at by the subject
in and through his action; it is always a finis
operantis (Janssens 1979:43; emphasis mine).

That is, in any actual human act, whether performed or
still only potential and under consideration, there can be
no end-of-the-act other than the end-of-the-act-asconsidered-by-the-actor. The act in the abstract does not
exist in relation to any end. The act, as a class for
theoretical analysis, can be said to have some abstract

While Janssens gives J. Mangan as his example, this chapter will focus on a similar error in the
document on reproductive technologies of Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith.
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existence, as a set of observable or mechanical behaviors,
for example. But as an act-for-an-end, the act can only be
considered as an act-of-an-actor-considering-it-for-an-end.
There is no relation of act to end save by and by reference
to an actor, no finis operis without a finis operantis.

From this it is clear that, first, an human act cannot
be morally evaluated independent of the human agent.
Therefore, secondly, and in view of the first, an act has a
moral meaning because of the end of the agent; but this does
not mean it has meaning solely because of the end. Thirdly,
because an human actor must always employ a means to a
desired end, he or she is practically (in terms of practical
reason) involved in that means, at least if the agent
actually wishes to attain his/her desired end; that is, the
means itself is in a sense indispensable (or several means
are if several are possible) . This is to say that just as
the end is desired for its value or for itself, so is the
means desired in order to achieve that end. It is in this
light that Aquinas could say that the end "is aimed at

~

the subject in and through his action".
This is also why Aquinas taught that what is true of
the means is also true of the end in terms of morally
evaluating an human action; but again this does not imply
that an act can be morally evaluated solely from the point
of view of the end. Janssens explains:
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According to Thomas ... "The finis operis is that to
which the action is directed by the acting subject (ab
agente); for this reason it is called the cause of the
action (ratio operis) . The finis operantis is the goal
at which the agent in the end (principaliter) aims,"
(Janssens 1978:42-43; emphasis mine).

That is, the finis operis is always a finis operantis in
Aquinas' view. Now this inseparable 7 or necessary connection
between means and the end of human action warrants Janssens
to say that:

This view of Thomas is of far-reaching importance
because the determining situation of the subject in the
activity makes it possible to consider our actions Il.Qt.
as a succession of separate and disjointed actions but
as the integrated moments of a life history in which
unity and wholeness can be ·realized by virtue of the
ends of the agent (1979:43; emphasis mine).

This analysis of the structure of human act, will still be
incomplete without an examination of how the human will,
strives towards its end; that is, the good to be achieved.
Here again Aquinas guides us. According to Janssens,
Aquinas, believed that an agent's will can strive to its end
"either in an absolute way when it wills the end in itself

.'The terms "inseparable" or "necessary", here mean that an end always has a means, not vice-versa.
For, there are things which exist as mean to something else, but are not always used for those ends. Or even
when they are used, they do not always yield the inteded end. But when an end is achieved, then it always
has a means.
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and by itself (absolute secundum se), or when it wills the
end as the reason that it wills the means to the end (in
ratione volendi ea quae sunt ad finem)"

(1979 :44;) 8 •

This

means that in the first of the two ways, a good can be
striven for, or valued for its own sake abstractly, that is,
without being connected with an action; for example, when
one wills to have good health without doing anything to gain
it (Janssens 1979:44) 9 •
Aquinas' exemplifies the first of the two ways by
contrasting it with the second way:

Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and
the same movement,-to the end, as the reason for
willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it
is another [that is, distinct] act whereby the will is
moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act
precedes the other in time; for example when a man
first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating
by what means to be healed, wills to send for the
doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the
intellect: for at first a man understands the
principles in themselves; but afterwards understands
them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the
conclusions on account of the principles (Ia IIae, q.
8. art. 3) .
A correct understanding of the above text will show
that there is no way the will can accomplish the end which
it wills or desires absolutely in itself and for its own

, Aquinas, S.T. Ia Ilae, q. 8, art. 3.

, Aquinas S.T. Ia Ilae, q. 8 art.

3~

S.T. Ia llae, q. 12, art. 1.
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sake, without devising and willing a particular means to
attain that absolute end. This means that, if the end is to
be attained, then a particular means must be chosen if
already in existence; or a particular means must be devised
if not in existence, in order to achieve the end that is
willed. Thus, without some particular means, the agent's aim
and valuing of that kind of good in general will be
frustrated. This is not to overlook the possibility that the
aim of the agent may still not be attained even with the
consideration of a means toward the end because even a means
that is often effective can still fail sometimes and some
things initially considered effective means are in fact not
effective. For example, it is true that neither conjugal act
nor IVF/ET always produces children even when those means
are available. Sometimes, neither of these two means of
human reproduction is free from the mishaps which make the
end unattainable.
According to Janssens Aquinas, distinguished these two
elements of a human act: "The intentio (intention) is the
striving toward the .end to the extent that it is within the
range of the means.' 'The electio (or the choice or
selection of the means) is the concentration of the will on
the means to the extent that they bear upon the attainment
of the end"' (1979:45; emphasis and parenthesis mine). There
is in this account an obvious interrelationship between
intentio and electio. Although the intention concentrates on
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the end, it is at the same time mindful of the means which
is in turn the focus of electio, and vice-versa. For without
means to achieve an end, intention is empty and all that is
possible is valuing the end absolutely, as in the first way
mentioned above.
The relevance of these concepts in the evaluation of
the structure of IVF/ET, can hardly be exaggerated, because
they describe the essential structure of an action, such as
the action awaiting moral approval or disapproval here. For
the human,

"will" and "reason" cannot aim at a goal

effectively (that is other than abstractly, in general),
without aiming at a particular choice (electio) of means for
achieving that goal. As Janssens points out, the material
sense of intentio and electio "are the same since they
contain the idea of the whole act, end and means", although
"they are formally quite distinct"

(Janssens 1979:45). This

is not to imply that there is an unbreachable, necessary
connection between the intention and the choice of a
particular means, because

there can be other and possibly

better means which may in the end yield greater and better
results; but in all activities of practical reason, intentio
and electio are inextricably bound together. Janssens
distinguishes between the formal structure of intentio and
the electio, by specifying clearly their foci and intent:
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The intentio is directly aimed at the absolute element
of the structure of the action, that is, the end itself
which is the reason that the means are willed and
consequently is the principle of the act ... , the
electio signifies the relative element of the act,
viz., the means {by its own definition means indicates
a relation to the end which is only useful until the
end has been attained} ... {Janssens 1979:45; emphasis
mine} .
But it needs to be acknowledged that the above still
does not tell us how one is to distinguish a morally good
act from an immoral one, given that the nature of the human
being means that humans are capable of willing both moral
and immoral acts. Before this important issue of how to
distinguish a morally good action from an immoral one, is
examined, however, Aquinas' teaching about the morality of
the voluntas (the will), because of its essential relation
to the issue to be discussed, needs to be explained first.

The morality of the voluntas (the will) .

By way of summary, so far,

it is clear that according

to Janssens' interpretation of Aquinas's position on the
morality of human action,

"the good which is the proper

object of the will is also its end." Accordingly that end is
also "a moral good (vere bonum) when it corresponds to
reason"

(1979:47-48}. Surprisingly too, even if a particular

good "is not within the realm of reason, it is still a good
(apparens bonum), as far as it is consonant with a

particular appetite, in spite of the fact that it is morally
vitiated" {Janssens 1979:48).
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In order to unravel this apparent contradiction,
Aquinas introduces his readers yet into another concept,
before giving the conditions by which to know a morally good
from morally vitiated will, from which in turn we can
distinguish a morally good action from a bad one. This new
concept, is inner disposition in connection with the
virtues. For in order to understand Aquinas's teaching on
Voluntas (the will), we need to study his teaching on
virtue, which he claims is condition si

ne

qua non for an

human agent to perform a morally good action. As Janssens
affirms: "Whether or not the subject is taking the moral
good as the end of his action depends on his inner
disposition" (1978:48; emphasis mine). The virtues he says

are acquired dispositions (habits) which direct us
toward the moral good as the end, even when we do not
act . . . . A virtuous person is directed toward the moral
good because he loves and wills it as an end by virtue
of an inner disposition (Janssens 1978:48).
Janssens supplies us with an example of what is meant by
virtue as disposition in our actions. He says, for example,
when a person acquires the virtue of Justice, a person would
by this disposition be in a suitable or proper state to
and

~

~

the social relation and conditions that fit the

dignity of man, even in circumstances when the person finds
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it impossible to overcome certain obstacles in his/her own
actions (cf. Janssens 1978:48) . 10
It is in this regard that virtue becomes the primary
subject of interest for Aquinas as regards the morality of
the will. For if a person is always disposed to act justly,
or to love, the person will never in any circumstance

~

otherwise because by habit (that is, through a series of
intentional and practical repetitive efforts) it has become
his/her nature (his/her character/personal human condition)
to act justly or to love. The overall result is (along with
other virtues) that the person becomes a good person who
always wills to act morally even though, under certain
circumstances, he/she is unable to do good even when he/she
wills it. Janssens words the idea in this way:

... virtue makes the subject who possesses it a good
subject. It is the source of the morally good simplex
actus voluntatis which enables us to set our will on
the moral good in an absolute sense and for its own
sake. So the first moral qualification [of a good
person] does not concern the particular acts but the
subject himself who by virtue of his virtuous
dispositions is turned towards the moral good as his
end (1978:48).

See Thomas Aquinas Ia llae, q. 20, art 3; or as Aristotle says: ... "the work of man is achieved only in
accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark,
and practical wisdom makes us take the right means." Nicomachean Ethics 1144a 7-10
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or as Aristotle, from whom Aquinas derived his idea of
virtue in connection with a morally good will, words it:

Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions
there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom,
so too in the moral part there are two types, natural
virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the
latter involves practical wisdom {Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics 1144b 13-17).
This concept of virtue will be returned to later, where it
plays a complementary role in aiding the human subject to
make a prudent judgment because a prudent person is always
inclined to right reason.

Exterior act (actus exterior)
As has already been indicated, the will does not operate in
a vacuum nor does it operate alone in any activity. That is,
an action that is to be done in pursuance of a goal must be
performed both with something intangible as the activity of
mind or {practical) reason and with something tangible or
sensible in a physical sense as the means to the goal. Or as
Janssens puts it,

"Our will must rely on the medium of other faculties
and our bodiliness as agencies which enable it to
·effect a real contact with reality. For this reason our
action is not only an inner act of the will {interior
actus voluntatis) but also an exterior event {actus
exterior) {Janssens 1979:46).
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The morality of the human action

By way of recapitulation Janssens says that, it was
Aquinas's conviction that "the inner act of the will (end)
and the exterior act (means) are one and the same concrete
act"

(1979:49); or in Aquinas own words: "internal and

external actions are

different in the physical order: yet

... they combine to form one thing in the moral order"

(Ia

IIae, q.19, art. 3). This led Aquinas to come to the
conclusion that both means and end "must also be treated as
.QD.e

from moral view point"

(Janssens 1979:49), that is, the

whole package. Nevertheless,

"Thomas chooses as his starting

point the acting subject, the end which is the proper object
of the inner act of the will and which impresses the
qualities of good or evil on the action: finis enim dat

speciem in moralibus" (Janssens 1979:50). But this quotation
must not be misunderstood: it does not reduce morality to a
question about the end in view; the means must also be
subjected to careful reflection.
In this regard, Janssens points out something in the
above statement of Aquinas' moral teaching that has created
confusion for some moralists in interpreting Aquinas'
natural law moral theory. On the one hand Aquinas "says that
the species moris - the goodness or the malice of the act is determined by the end, the object of the inner act of the
will"

(Janssens 1979:50}. But on the other hand

Aquina~

"writes that the si;>ecies moris of the exterior act depends
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on the fact whether or not its object is in keeping with
reason (secundum rationem or praeter rationem)"

(Janssens

1979:50). Or Aquinas says: "good, inasmuch as it is in
accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against
reason, diversify the moral species"

(Ia IIae q. 18, art.

5) •

Some Thomists have therefore, held that, making these
two seemingly contradictory statements, Aquinas was
acutually indicating that "the morality of the exterior
action can be evaluated by itself and as an element which is
disconnected from the subject or the end of the inner act of
the will"

(Janssens 1979:50). But Janssens quotes Aquinas to

show that,

"primacy of the end, the formal element ... must

be the starting point of the search for the insight into the
morality of the action"

(Janssens 1979:50). Thus he quotes

Aquinas:

"Nevertheless, the inner act of the will is the formal
element of the exterior action, because the will itself
acts through the medium of the body and because the
exterior actions concern morality only insofar as they
emanate from the will ... From this follows that the
species moris is formally dependent on the end (of the
inner act of the will) and materially dependent on the
object of the exterior action" (Janssens 1979:50) . 11

. Janssens cites Ia Ilae, q. 18, art. 6 ad 2, for this quotation that he makes of Aquinas.
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There are two ways in which this act can be morally
defective:

(1) the end may be disordered. That is for

Aquinas, the end of the inner act of the will may not
necessarily be always good; for "the end itself may be good
or bad"

(1979: SO). Or (2), the means may be defective. As

Aquinas says, "Although external things are good in
themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due
proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they
are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the
quality of goodness"

(Ia IIae, q. 18, art. 2). On one hand

therefore, when "the end is bad, the whole action is fruit
of a mala voluntas and because the action is only human as
far as it emanates from the will (voluntarius)
entirely bad"

it is

(Janssens 1978:50). But, if on the other hand

the end of the agent is good, then:

"the entire action is necessarily good if it is not a
mere velleitas but rather the very will to bring about
an end, or in other words, if it concerns a real
intentio finis which involves the effective will to
realize an end for its own sake and also as reason and
cause of the action (ratio et causa volendi) (Janssens
1978:51).
This last clause assumes that the material means towards the
end in view is also good. But the morality of an act remains
problematic when the end in view is good but the means is
bad or involves some evil consequences. Here, one needs to

132

consider the fact that for Aquinas, evil is not an absolute
in itself. For as Aquinas says:

Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting
some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in
its species, not because it has no object at all; but
because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for
instance, to appropriate another's property (Aquinas Ia
I Iae, q. 18, art. 5) .

This means that evil is always in relation to something, not
an absolute in itself; it is a privation of or deprivation
of some value. It is something that affects another thing
that is good in itself.
Now, how does one know that the exterior act (the
means) that involves evil is or is not in keeping with the
good/end of an action, or reason which is the measure of
good/ends, that is; of morality? Aquinas answers this
question as follows:

although the goodness of an action is not caused by the
goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be
good from the fact that it can produce a good effect.
Consequently the very proportion of an action to its
effect is the measure of its goodness (Aquinas Ia IIae,
q. 18, art. 2) .
The guiding principle here is to keep in mind that, for
Aquinas, an action is immoral if it is

disproportionat~

or

incommensurate to reason on one hand, that is, to the ends
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reason affirms and chooses. It is moral if it is adeguately
proportionate or commensurate to good ends, that is reason.
Put in another way "The means of the exterior acts
participate in this moral goodness when they not only serve
the purpose of effecting the end but moreover, when they are
in the correct proportion to the end according to reason"
(Janssens·1978:54). According to Janssens, this principle
for moral action has some rational cognitive implication in
Aquinas's thinking. Thus Aquinas writes:

... it is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent, together with some
knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is
twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of
the end consists in not only apprehending the thing
which is the end, but also in knowing it under the
aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to
that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the
rational nature (Ia IIae, q. 6, art. 2).
It should be clear from all of the above that according
to the dictates of human reason, an action is morally good,
"when it is directed toward the end in keeping with the
order determined by the reason and eternal law" (Janssens
1979:54); but the act is immoral when it deviates from the
rule of reason whether with reference to the specific end in
view or in relation to the overall good (see Janssens
1979:54).
But there is still a question of how to determine
whether the means involved in an action are proportionate or
disproportionate to the end in view, that is, how we can
'
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objectively determine a good or bad means, without falling
into the error of ethical subjectivism or relativism.
Aquinas was well aware of, and so avoided the seeming
subjectivism involved in his reasonings as Janssens pointed
out. Thus Janssens would say that since end and means as
constituent parts of an action both "must in Aquinas's
thought be judged morally in the light of the objective
measure of morality" (1979:55); then just as the subject's
"intention must aim at an end which is morally good
according to reason" (Janssens 1978:55) so also must the
subject's exterior action "be materia debita proportio). In
addition, the material object or means must be in due
proportion to that end ... if there is to be no
contradiction between end and means" (Janssens 1979:55;
emphasis mine) . The last clause adds a further test beyond
proportionality of the morality of an act.
Janssens translates this doctrine about the morality of
an action into four descriptive conditions for an act to be
moral.
per se.

(i) The ontic evil should not be intended or willed
(ii) There should be no intrinsic contradiction

between means and end or the whole action. This is not to
imply that Aquinas is deontological when the term
"intrinsic" contradiction between means and end is employed
here; because for Aquinas there is no such thing as good or
evil in itself without reference to a human will and
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intention/end. 12 (iii) Human subjects have the moral
obligation to reduce as much as possible the ontic evil
which comes about when we act".

(iv) Humans must also

consider the place of the end of the action in the totality
of human life. The fulfillment of these conditions requires
the presence of the virtues, especially prudence. The
virtues, especially prudence enables the acting person to
judge the whole action according to good reason.
Janssens expands our understanding of these four
conditions. The first condition: (i) The requirement of a
debita proportio. We need to ask, when may we allow ontic

evil in our acts? (1) If ontic evil is per se intended, the
end itself (the object of the inner act of the will) is
morally bad and since this is the formal element in the act
and therefore the reason and cause of the exterior action,
violation of this condition vitiates the entire action. In
doing this a person would allow ontic evil precisely as a
deficiency that frustrates human inclination to do good and
avoid evil; moreover doing so is harmful to the long term
development of the virtuous and so of human individual and
common good. Therefore, one should never will ontic evil as
the end of our action or human good. As Janssens puts it:
"the entire set of moral laws and principles exists for the

. For a comparative view of traditional concept and use of the principle of double effect, to judge the
morality of human action, and the proportionalist understanding of this principle, cf. Richard Westley, Life,
Death and Science, The Thomas More Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1989, pp. 47-71.
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real well-being and the true development of man and society"
[so] it is obvious that we would fall into immorality if
we should strive for ontic evil itself and for its own sake,
because ontic evil necessarily impedes and precludes the
development of man and society" (Janssens 1979:69}. In this
sense, Aquinas says the individual is never justified, not
even in the case of self defense, in willing the death of a
human subject as an end, for example, because this would
make his act per se an act of murder" (Janssens 1979:69}.
However, there can be situations in which intending a
(partial} ontic evil as the end of our actions is
justifiable, namely, when it is for the sake of a greater
common good which supersedes the individual good.
The second condition (ii) : There should be no intrinsic
contradiction between means and ends. This

condition

demands that "When the single and composite act is viewed
from the point of view of reason (secundum rationem}, it
must be found without an intrinsic contradiction between the
means (exterior act as material element} and the morally
good end of the inner act of the will (formal element)"
Janssens 1979:71}. Or as Janssens differently words the
idea: "Put into terms of the philosophy of values, this
means that the means must be consistent with the value of
the end" 1979:71}. As Janssens indicates, the goodness of an
end alone is not a justification of a bad means or the
action. He writes:
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"However essential this condition [good end] may be, it
is not yet sufficient, because "the moral end as formal
element only deserves to be labelled as the reason and
the cause of the exterior action if this action is a
means which, in conformity with reason (secundum
rationem), has a debita prgportio to the end, which
only in these conditions puts the stamp of its moral
goodness on the totality of the act" (Janssens
1979:71).
What is meant by saying that there should be no intrinsic
contradiction between the means and the morally good end of
the inner act of the will, is that "no intrinsic
contradiction between the means and the end may be found in
the total act when the act is placed in the light of reason"
(Janssens 1979:71).
The problem here is in acknowledging that a means is
inconsistent with an end that is good; for as a means to
that good, one has at least some evidence that what reason
sees as a means is good. But in such a case, Janssens says
of the inconsistency that "I cannot but register this
evidence cognitively even when it concerns a truth which
displeases me or which interferes with my own prof it or
pleasure" (1979:71).
According to Janssens, when reason finds itself in this
situation, it is said to be "disinterested" because it is
functioning as free will facultas liberlis (see Janssens
1979:71-72). That is, though the means is seen as a means to
a good end, the will is not necessarily determined to will
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that means. In recognizing the inconsistency with the end,
this freedom of the will makes the will submit

"itself necessarily and gratuitously to the truth which
it embraces as evidence or as something which has all
the appearance of evidence. It affixes to the truth the
strictest connotation of necessity, absoluteness and
universality so that it rejects any suggestion of a
negation of itself (Janssens 1979:72).

The idea of reason not negating itself, is central to
judging the consistency of means to the end of the action.
For the human subject who is involved in the action, which
is a united whole event, a single package involving means
and end, is also himself/herself a united whole constituted
of rational and corporeal elements - a single unified being
who wills and is rational, emotional, temporal, spatial,
social, and above all limited, so that one element of
his/her being is necessarily affected by his/her action or
judgment of means to the action (see Janssens 1979:60-66).
Janssens expresses what is involved here forcefully in the
following words:

When it is obvious to me that I, the subject of the
whole action, use a means which is the negation of the
value (or the principle) I am affirming in my idea of
the end, I am forced to be aware of th.is contradiction.
This contradiction is the source of my feeling guilty:
the awareness of the inner disunity of the subject
which has turned its free will against its rational
understanding when it aimed at an end it could not
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rationally sanction or when it used a means by which it
negated the value it affirmed by the end. My self is a
united self, a subject which is undivided, and I
preserve this unity only when I apply my will to use
the means and to realize the end to my reason
(1979:72).

In view of this undivided unity in both human action as a
whole, and the human subject himself/herself, it is
important not to disassociate oneself from the good which
the human reason (person) sees if an action is to be to the
well-being of the person. Hence Janssens says:

My reason is necessarily ordered to the truth. It is
like a pivot on which everything hinges. My power to
will is free. Hence, there is only one way to preserve
myself as a united subject: I must order all the
aspects of the act of my will to the disinterested
understanding of my reason. That is the fundamental
axiom of morality (1979:72).
But ontic evil is sometimes inevitable in our acts.
That inevitable reality is the focus of the third and fourth
conditions. That is, sometime we must act even when there is
ontic evil because it is unavoidable. As Janssens says:

"We cannot do away with ontic evil in our act without
depriving our actions of their effectiveness and
without sooner or later endangering the realization of
our morally good ends. Within these restrictions, the
implication of ontic evil in our actions does not mean
that no attention should be given to the debita
proportio of the mean to the end" (1979: 79) .
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In giving attention to debita proportio the human
subject is then left to consider correctly how the ontic
evil properly fits into the whole good end. In other words
the ontic evil must be examined in relation to the goods
both in particular (and in general. As Janssens has
unambiguously remarked:

The question to which we refer here is known as the
problem of the relation of the debita praportio and ontic
evil. If the presence of ontic evil as such would always
endanger the debita praportio of our action, it would be
impossible to act morally, because it is impossible to
prevent ontic evil. The danger lies in the fact that moral
evil is mentioned too soon. This happens every time a moral
judgment of an exterior act does not include a judgment of
the end and of the agent. This is taking ontic evil for
moral evil (1979:73}.
Condition (iii} : "We have the moral obligation to
reduce as much as possible the ontic evil which comes about
when we act" (Janssens 1979:79}. This thesis is already
implied in the first condition that ontic evil should never
be the ultimate goal of our intention: but the focus of this
condition is that we must preserve the proper proportion of
the means to the end. It is immoral to will ontic evil which
disproportionately obstructs the growth of the individual
and society because the object of morality is to promote the
individual and the society (see Janssens 1979:79-80). Humans
have the moral obligation to lessen or prevent ontic evil
where it must be prevented or lessened.
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Janssens offers two reason for this aspect of our moral
obligation:

The first one follows from the definition of morality:
moral activity fundamentally concerns the truly human
development of man and society and the struggle against
ontic evil which impedes this development. The secondly
reason follows from the meaning of our activity in the
world: by our activity we must turn the world of nature
into a world of culture. In other words, our activity
is ordered to the realization of the objective culture
for the promotion of the subjective culture of each and
everyone. In this respect ontic evil is anything which
impedes the progress of objective culture and the
increase of the share of each and everyone in the
resources of objective culture (Janssens 1979:81).

Condition (iv): "In the actualization of a good end and
the deliberation about the means to this end, the genuinely
important question is what place this end has in the
totality of human existence" (Janssens 1979:81). Asking this
question enables the acting subject to assess the relation
of the end to other important elements of the action and
therefore helps the acting subject not to look at his/her
action as something isolated from other things or events. As
Janssens puts the idea:

To act, consequently, means that a subject actualizes
his intentions in and by an active contact with
reality. If we begin this way from the acting and
willing subject, it is possible to look at our actions
as something more than a succession of isolated,
diversified and scattered acts (Janssens 1979:81).
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As was mentioned earlier, the fulfillment of these four
conditions depends on a person's aquisition of the virtues.
Thus, Janssens reminds us of Aquinas' use of the virtues and
their role in shaping a morally good action. Prudence, he
points out, holds a special place among the virtues which
dispose human subject to will and perform morally good
action. This is to say that human reason which directs every
act, must have within itself the virtue of prudence whose,
"function is to safeguard the debita prqportio of the means
to morally good ends" (Janssens 1979:55; emphasis mine).
Aquinas's own words on this issue are as follows:

a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that
virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that
virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is
ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason
various virtues are necessary. But right reason in
regard to the very end of a virtue has no other
goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as
the goodness of the reason is participated in each
virtue (Ia IIae, q. 20, art. 3; emphasis mine) . 13

This means that for a person who has acquired the moral
goodness of justice, or truthfulness, for instance, through

See also Aquinas' theory of the mean; "The Philosopher says ... that moral virtue is a habit of choosing
the means" (la llae, q. 64, art. 3). This reference to the philosopher, is to Aristotle. "There are three kinds
of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz.
the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all ;... " (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, book II, 1108b 8-10).
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intentional repetitive practices so that being just or
telling the truth has become an habit of the person, he/she
would be more prone to act towards the good, because a
prudent person acts according to right reason.
The practical problem therefore seems to be how we can
train ourselves to be virtuous, especially to be prudent.
That is, being good habitual judgers of means proportioned
to our ends in-view (condition iii) and to the whole of
human good (condition iv) that is their fundamental context
so that in every instance of one's action, the agent is able
to strike a

mean

between two extremes of excess and

deficiency. Of course, it is possible that in some
particular instances a virtuous person, that is, a person
with habits of right reason, can sometimes misjudge this
balance between two extremes, and fall into one of them
because of his/her imperfect condition as a rational being.
But he/she cannot nonetheless be termed a vicious or an
immoral person on the basis of a particular instance of
misjudgment. For in general, when all the particular
instances of his/her actions/behavior are looked at, if
he/she is virtuous he/she judges proportionate means.
Now that this work has examined what the father of
natural law ethical theory has to say about the morality of
human action, it is now well situated to examine how one
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tradition 14 of interpretation of this theory has applied it
to question of the morality of IVF/ET technology. A

textual

exposition of one such work will be made first; and then its
analysis of the morality of IVF/ET will be examined and
criticized.

Textual exposition
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on
the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of
the Day.
This document has an introduction, three parts, and a
conclusion. This work will make a summary exposition of this
document accordingly.

Introduction
From the start, CDF acknowledges that a proper
evaluation of the morality of !VF/ET and artificial
insemination "presupposes a proper idea of the nature of the
human person

[because] it is only in keeping with his

true nature that the human person can achieve selfrealization as a 'unified totality': and this nature is at
the same time corporal and spiritual" {1987:8; emphasis
mine). Moreover, the "natural moral law expresses and lays
down the purposes, rights and duties which are based upon
the bodily and spiritual nature of the human person"

See footnote 8 above, Congregation.
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(1987:8; emphasis mine). It then emphasized that this moral
law "must be defined as the rational order whereby man is
called by the Creator to direct and regulate his life and
actions and in particular to make use of his own body"

(CDF

1987:8; emphasis mine}.
CDF points out that while the biological and medical
sciences are resources for good, in that "they might
constitute progress in the service of man," they may also be
sources of evil since they "involve serious risks"

(CDF

1987:5}. CDF argues that "what is technically possible is
not for that very reason morally admissible"

(1987:10}. In

all these basic claims, CDF parallels views of Aquinas
already explained more fully above.

Part :r
Respect for human embryos

The effort of CDF in this section is "to respond to the
numerous moral problems posed by the technical interventions
upon the human being in the first phases of his life and
upon the processes of conception"

(1987:12}. Regarding this,

it states that the "human being must be respected-as a
person-from the yezy first instant of bis existence"

(CDF

1987:12; emphasis mine} because "from fertilization the
biological identity of a new human individual is already
constituted"
argues,

(CDF 1987:13). This status of the embryo it

"demands the unconditional respect that is morally
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due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality"
{CDF 1987:13-14).
Relying on the moral principle of proportionality, CDF
argues that therapeutic medical procedures on the human
embryo are morally right, if they do "not involve
disprqportianate risks for it but are directed towards its
healing,

the improvement of its condition of health, or its

individual survival {CDF 1987:15; italics original; emphasis

mine) .
In that connection, CDF entrusts the responsibility of
ensuring the well-being of the fetus to its parents in these
words. "Whatever the type of ·medical, surgical or other
therapy, the free and informed consent of the parents is
required, according to the deontological rules followed in
the case of children" {CDF 1987:15; emphasis mine). It is
quite clear that the basic moral standard CDF is applying on
this issue is deontological, not one of proportionality. As
will be shown, CDF's arguments against IVF/ET are also
deontological in structure, rather than being based on
proportionality issues. At the same time, however, CDF does
offer some proportionalist thinking about IVF/ET in its
worries about harm to embryos and about technological
domination of human reproduction in the IVF/ET procedure.
Based on parental autonomy to assume medical
responsibility towards the well-being of their embryonic
offsprings CDF does use a proportionality argument as ·
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already noted, regarding therapeutic interventions for
embryos or fetuses:

strictly therapeutic intervention whose explicit
objective is the healing of various maladies such as
those stemming from chromosomal defects will, in
principle, be considered desirable, provided it is
directed to the true promotion of the personal wellbeing of the individual without doing harm to his
integrity or worsening his conditions of life (1987;1516; emphasis mine).

Other methods such as experimentation or research also need
to be immoral because they "damage or impose grave and
disproportionate risks upon embryos obtained in vitro" (CDF
1987:18).
In agreement with Janssens first condition, discussed
above, CDF argues that: "It is therefore not in conformity

with the moral law deliberately to expose to death human
embryos obtained 'in vitro' (CDF 1987:18-19).

Part I I
Interventions upon human procreation.
Homologous artificial fertilization: IVF/ET and artificial
insemination between husband and wife.
CDF begins this section with a definition of the
subject matter and a clarification of its area of concern:
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By "artificial procreation" or "artificial
fertilization" are understood here the different
technical procedures directed towards obtaining a human
conception in a manner other than the sexual union of
man and woman. This Instruction deals with
fertilization of an ovum in a test-tube (in vitro
fertilization) and artificial insemination through
transfer into the woman's genital tracts of previously
collected sperm (CDF 1987:21).

CDF begins its analysis by stating that "every human
being is always to be accepted as a gift and blessing of
God" (1987:23). CDF immediately adds a statement of the
conclusion it will defend: "However, from the moral point of
view a truly responsible procreation vis-a-vis the unborn
child must be the fruit of marriage" (1987:23).
The reasoning to this conclusion begins with the
premise that in CDF's view, there is a necessary connection
between marital sexual intercourse and human reproduction,
on one hand; and on the other hand, a necessary link between
sexual intercourse of married couples and unity between
them. Given this starting point, CDF poses the question:
"What connection is required from the moral point of view
between procreation and the conjugal act" (CDF 1987:26)? It
then responds to this question with three related claims.
The first of these claims is this:
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(a) The Church's teaching on marriage and human·
procreation, affirms the "inseparable connection,
willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own
initiative, between two meanings of the conjugal act:
the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning.
Indeed, by its intimate structure, the conjugal act,
while most closely uniting husband and wife,
capacitates them for the generation of new lives,
according to laws inscribed in the very being of man
and of woman" ... "By safeguarding both these essential
aspects, the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal
act preserves in its fullness the sense of true mutual
love and its ordination towards man's exalted vocation
to parenthood (1987:26; emphasis mine).
On the basis of the "inseparable connection" which CDF
sees between the conjugal act and human reproduction, CDF
argues that, "it is never permitted to separate these
different aspects to such a degree as positively to exclude
either the procreative intention or the conjugal relation"
(1987: 26-27) .
In this light, CDF states that: "homologous artificial
fertilization, in seeking a procreation which is not the
fruit of a specific act of conjugal union, objectively
effects"

(1987:27) an end similar to that of "contraception"

which "deliberately deprives the conjugal act of its
openness to procreation and in this way brings about a
voluntary dissociation of the ends of marriage"

(CDF

1987:27). Therefore,

fertilization is licitly sought when it is the result
of a "conjugal act which is per se suitable for the
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generation of children to which marriage is ordered bx
its nature and by which the spouses become one flesh".
But from the moral point of view procreation is
deprived of its proper perfection when it is not
desired as the fruit of the conjugal act, that is to
say of the specific act of the spouses' union (CDF
1987:27; italics original, emphasis mine).
(b.) The second claim in response to CDF's question
about the implications of its premise is the following: CDF
holds that the "moral value of the intimate link between the
goods of marriage and between the meanings of the conjugal
act is based upon the unity of the human being, a unity
involving body and spiritual soul"

(1987:27). In this

connection, CDF contends that the conjugal act is a
"'language of the body'" involving "'spousal meanings' and
parental ones"

(1987:27); and that it "is an act that is

inseparably corporal and spiritual"

(CDF 1978:27). For it

"is in their bodies and through their bodies that the
spouses consummate their marriage and are able to become
father and mother"

(CDF 1987:27).

CDF then argues that this language of the bodies of
married couples must be respected. This means that "the
conjugal union must take place with respect for its openness
to procreation; and the procreation of a person must be the
fruit and the result of married love"

(CDF 1987:27-28). From

this, CDF concludes that "Fertilization achieved outside the
bodies of the couple remains by this very fact deprived of
the meanings and the values which are expressed in the
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language of the body and in the union of human persons"

(1987) .

(c) Thirdly, CDF asserts that "Only respect for the
link between the meanings of the conjugal act and respect
for the unity of the human being make possible procreation
in conformity with the dignity of the person"

(1987:28). For

this reason CDF argues that a child must be the product of
his/her parents' love; and therefore he/she "cannot be
desired or conceived as the product of an intervention of
medical or biological techniques; that would be equivalent
to reducing

him/he~

to an object of scientific·technology"

(1987:28). For, CDF argues,

The moral relevance of the link between the
meanings of the conjugal act and between the goods of
marriage, as well as the unity of the human being and
the dignity of his origin, demand that the procreation
of a human person be brought about as the fruit of the
conjugal act specific to the love between spouses (CDF
1987:28; emphasis mine).
The above having been said, CDF's asks: "Is homologous
in vitro fertilization morally licit?" CDF has developed
several arguments that are negative this question. Although
it admits that for some couples,

"recourse to homologous IVF

and ET appears to be the only way of fulfilling their
sincere desire for a child"

(CDF 1987:29), CDF nevertheless

insists that "IVF and ET certainly cannot be preferred to
the acts of conjugal union, given the risks involved for the
child and the difficulties of the procedure"

(1987:29). Here
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for a moment, it should be noted, CDF offers a
proportionalist reasoning. But the basic structure of CDF's
argument is deontological ·, holding that IVF /ET is immoral
because it is unnatural.
CDF affirms that the "desire for a child - at the very
least openness to" conceiving a child, "is a necessary
prerequisite from the moral point of view for responsible
human procreation"

(CDF 1987:29); but CDF argues further, as

Aquinas/Janssens have been seen to do, that having "good
intention is not sufficient for making a positive moral
evaluation of in vitro fertilization between spouses"
(1987:29). At this point, however, CDF departs from the
Aquinas/Janssens interpretation of natural law reasoning.
For CDF now continues: "The process of IVF and ET must be
judged in itself and cannot borrow its definitive moral
quality from the totality of conjugal life of which it
becomes part nor from the conjugal acts which may precede or
follow it"

(1987:29; emphasis mine).

Nor, CDF holds, would IVF/ET be permitted "even in a
situation in which every precaution were taken to avoid the
death of human embryos"

(CDF 1987:30), because human

fertilization outside the body of a woman "entrusts the life·
and identity of the embryos into the power of doctors and
biologists and establishes the domination of technology over
the origin and destiny of the human person"
emphasis mine) .

(1987:30;
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In CDF's perspective, then, even with the technical
aspect of IVF/ET set aside, when the morality of the
procedure is considered from rational point of view, it is
still impermissible because IVF/ET "is neither in fact
achieved nor positively willed as the expression and fruit
of a specific act of the conjugal union" (1987:30; emphasis
mine).
Homologous artificial insemination is evaluated, and
morally condemned by CDF for the same basic nonproportionalist, deontological reasons it declares IVF/ET
immoral, namely that such an act disassociates the two
necessary meanings of the conjugal act. The following
explanation may provide more light:

Artificial insemination as a substitute for the
conjugal act is prohibited by reason of the voluntarily
achieved dissociation of the two meanings of the
conjugal action. Masturbation, through which the sperm
is normally obtained, is another sign of this
dissociation: even when it is done for the purpose of
procreation, the act remains deprived of its unitive
meaning (CDF 1987:32).
At this point CDF mentions two general criteria by which
medical intervention in human reproduction, can be morally
evaluated. The medical art is to be evaluated "with
reference to its technical dimension" and "in relation to
its goal which is the good of persons and their bodily and
psychological health" (CDF 1987:32).
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CDF also considers the suffering of married couples pn
account of infertility. It acknowledges that, on the part of
these couples, "the desire for a child is natural"; and even
affirms that "This desire can be even stronger if the couple
is affected by sterility which appears incurable"

(1987:33-

34) . Nevertheless, it claims that "marriage does not confer
upon the spouses the right to have a child, but only the
right to perform those natural acts which are per se ordered
to procreation"

(CDF 1987:34). Here the expression "per se

ordered to creation" means acts in which the unitive and
procreative meanings the CDF sees as necessarily connected
have not been separated.
As an alternative to IVF/ET and artificial insemination
CDF suggests "adoption, various forms of educational work
and assistance to other families and to poor or handicapped
children"

(CDF 1987:34).

Part I I I
Moral and civil law
In this section CDF states that the right to life of
every individual human being, the family, and marriage are
basic human values, which form the foundation of an orderly
civil society. It then calls on political and legislative
authorities to intervene to limit immoral reproductive
technologies "since an uncontrolled application of such
techniques could lead to unforeseeable and damaging
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consequences for civil society"

(1987:35). Such an

intervention would be necessary "to ensure the common good
of people through the recognition of and the defense of
fundamental rights and through the promotion of peace and of
public morality"

(CDF 1987:35). CDF acknowledges that there

is "no sphere of life" in which the civil law can "take the
place of conscience or dictate norms concerning things which
are outside its competence"

(1987:35-36). So civil law "must

sometimes tolerate, for the sake of public order, things
which it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting"
(CDF 1987:36). In this connection CDF identifies two sets of
rights that must be protected by civil or political and
legislative authorities:

(a) "every human being's right to life and
physical integrity from the moment of conception until
death; (b) the rights of the family and of marriage as
an institution and, in this area, the child's right to
be conceived, brought into the world and brought up by
his parents" (CDF 1987:36).

CDF concludes its document by saying that: "In the
light of the truth about the gift of human life and in the
light of the moral principles which flow from that truth,
everyone is invited to act in the area of responsibility
proper to each ... " (1987:40).
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A critique Of CDP's version of natural law morality on
IVP/ET and artificial insemination.

The exposition of CDF's argument above shows that at
least two 15 major lines of argument are developed in its
non-proportionalist arguments that !VF/ET, is fundamentally
morally vitiated. The first line of argument is based on the
inseparability of conjugal act and its two meanings: the
procreative and the unitive (love-giving) . 16 The second line
of argument may be called the argument from respect for the
conjugal act ("language of the body") and respect for the
natural law (the link between the meanings of the conjugal
act: the unitive and the procreative) argument. But these
two lines of argument are essentially the same, except that
CDF words them differently. For this reason, they will be
treated as one, though under separate sub-sections. Morever,
because of this, any counter-argument that shows that CDF's
basic moral norm, the natural law has been mistakenly
applied to the conjugal act and its two meanings by CDF will
automatically disprove both lines of arguments, because the
first is the ground of the second .

. This distinction of the CDF's arguments into two main lines of argument is used by a number of
commentators favorable to the CDF's position. See for example, "Catholic Moral Teaching On In Vitro
Fertilization" by William E. May, in: Reproductive Technologies, Marriage and The Church; The Pope John
XXIII Medical - Moral Research and Education Center, Rraintree, Massachusetts, 1988, p.109 .

. Ibid.
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To begin with CDF's first line of argument, a key point
to note is the meaning of "natural" or "natural law" in
relation to the conjugal act according to CDF. Nature here
involves "an inseparable connection, willed by God and
unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between
the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning
and the procreative meaning. " 17 According to a proponent of
CDF's position, these unitive meaning and procreative
meanings, are "love-giving" and "life-giving" respectively
(see May 1988:109). 18
In CDF's view, it is necessarily one and the same
physical act which unites the marital partners in the
expression of their love (unitive meaning) and in which they
bring about the new life of a child (procreative) . If either
of these elements is absent, the act is viewed as radically
deficient, both as not fulfilling the two aspects of human
nature that it is this act's job to fulfill, and as not
fulfilling the two aspects of the physical act itself, which
is the second line of argument.
Because this connection, CDF holds, is necessary in the
natural performance of the act, anything, that is, any human

. Henceforth, for philosophical reasons of terminology or phrasiology, "will of God" or the "inseparable
connection, willed by God ... " will be called "natural" or "natural law", except where their direct quotation
is necessary ..

. See footnotes 15 for this reference.
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intervention separating the two meanings makes it unnatural.
CDF argues that there is therefore a moral inseparable or a
morally necessary connection between marital sexual
intercourse and human reproduction, as well as a morally
necessary link between sexual intercourse of married couples
and unity between them. To deliberately prevent either aim
or to deliberately separate them from occurring in one and
the same act is therefore immoral precisely because it is,
CDF holds, unnatural.
It is because of this pattern of argument that CDF's
position is described here as deontological. The argument is
grounded in a principle that what is necessary and natural
alone is moral and therefore that what is counter to the
necessary, natural pattern is immoral. This is a
deontological, not a consequentialist mode of argument.
The above claim of CDF is flawed in three important
respects. It is flawed on metaphysical or logical grounds.
It is flawed from the point of view of moral evaluation. It
is flawed on practical grounds. In addition, in the logic of
CDF's arguments, there is an assumption that IVF/ET is
analogous to contraception, which CDF believes had been
demonstrated to be immoral years earlier. 19 Thus it states:

. See Encyclical Lener Of His Holiness Pope Paul VI On The Regulation Of Birth ( Humanae Vitae)
1968, pp. 11-12,· John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, •contraception and the Infallibility of the
Ordinary Magisterium • in: The Teaching of Humanae Vitae A Defense: Is its Teaching Infallible? Are its
Norms Defensible? by John C. Ford et al, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1988, pp.119-219.

159
"Homologous artificial fertilization, in seeking a
procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of
conjugal union, objectively effects an analogous separation
between the goods and the meanings of marriage" (1987:27).
This argument from analogy will also be shown to be
mistaken.
·The order of this critical work will be as follows: I.
The metaphysical or logical flaw of the inseparability
argument. II. The error from moral objectivism; III. The
flaws of the inseparability argument on practical grounds.
IV. The argument from analogy between contraception and
IVF/ET. Then a fifth kind of claim by CDF, on marriage and
the right to procreate, will be examined.
One thing needs to be pointed out first. It is clear
from the exposition of CDF's arguments above that, although
CDF makes frequent use of two sources of moral norms, that
is, using both proportionality and deontological arguments,
it relies principally on its deontological interpretation of
natural law ethical standards in drawing its fundamental
conclusion against the morality of IVF/ET and artificial
insemination, without significant dependence on the
proportionality issues. For example, with regard to
proportionality criterion in !VF/ET, CDF mentions the
proportionality theme in this way: "As with .all medical
interventions on patients, one must uphold as licit
procedures carried out on the human embryo which respect the
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life and integrity of the embryo and do not involve
disproportionate risks for it· ...

1120

But it is an

unconditional deontological criterion based on CDF 's
interpretation of the natural law moral tradition, that CDF
considers decisive for the morality of IVF/ET. For example:

Science and technology requires, for their own
intrinsic meaning, an unconditional respect for the
fundamental criteria of the moral law: that is to say,
they must be at the service of the human person, of his
inalienable rights and his true and integral good
according to the design and will of God (CDF 1987:7;
emphasis mine) .
One further preliminary point deserves notice. CDF, as
an official teaching institution within the Roman Catholic
Church, holds the theological position that the conclusions
of its moral arguments are also human reason's best grasp of
the will of God for human conduct. For CDF, God's will is an
unconditional standard and humans are under an unconditional
obligation tq obey it. So it is not surprising that CDF's
arguments about IVF/ET, are intended to reach unconditional
conclusions, and so are deontological in character. But its
arguments against !VF/ET in this document are of a
philosophical, not a theological nature, as the above
exposition has shown. Therefore it is appropriate here to
subject them to a careful philosophical examination .

. This proponionality principle issue, will be considered in detail in the next two chapters.
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The inseparability argument

(1) What does CDF mean by natural law? In this case, it
refers to the natural or necessary connection, between
sexual intercourse and human procreation, and a moral
requirement not to separate them by human intervention. This
means that an act of intercourse must both procreate and
unite husband and wife, or at least must not be deliberately
prevented by an human intervention from doing so, as IVF/ET
does by moving the procreative event out of the conjugal
act. 21 But in Chapter Two, Aquinas' teaching on a "natural
law" understanding of morality was seen to focus on the
doing of good and avoidance of evil at the command of
practical reason, not on a rigid concern with the material
or, in this case, biological characteristics of an act.
To see this, consider that the way the.se two meanings
of the conjugal act are intertwined in actual occurrences of
the conjugal act, is such that it is not possible to claim
that either of the two meanings ever takes precedence over
the other22 or that they are necessarily of equal value to
every couple performing the act in the biologically typical

. This is a rewording of Richard McCormick's clarification of the understanding of correct meaning of
inseparability and will of God in conjugal act, as stated by CDF. See "Human Rproduction: Dominion and
limits"·by Richard McCormick, in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4, Dec. 1996 p.390 .

. Some authors prefer to say "hierarchical ordering of ends". See footnote 19. for source.
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way. For some married couples, the unitive meaning has a
fuller sense and meaning, linked as it is with mutual sexual
gratification, or companionship, or friendship. For other
couples the desire for children dominates. CDF's argument
requires that such differences be viewed as unnatural
because of the requirement that one and the same
biological/physical act is unitive and procreative. But many
conjugal acts do not procreate and many conjugal acts do not
unite the marital partners in any way but externally, in
spite of the partners' best intentions regarding both ends.
The CDF does not explain why these aspects of the conjugal
act are considered necessary and therefore are

~

considered natural when they are both present together, even
though they so often occur separately. To claim that it is
only when both occur together that the act is consistent
with nature and therefore only then that human nature is
properly fulfilled in this act, is to beg the fundamental
question of what is natural here.
Nevertheless, as noted in the exposition, CDF holds in
the first line of argument that: human material separation
of the material-uniting-of-the-partners, and the materiallyprocreating a child (by making the activities materially
parts of what CDF declares to be separate acts) is immoral
because it involves both a material act and an intention
that are contrary to the nature as CDF views it, of the
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conjugal act as a material reality; that is, an act that is
both materially unitive and materially procreative.
One author23 in the natural law tradition of CDF has
attempted to illuminate CDF's position by distinguishing the
immediate and the ultimate reasons for the marital act. On
the immediate reason, he wrote: "mutual attraction of man
and woman and the desire for a common life is the more
proximate cause for the marital act as we view it
phenomenologically" {John M. Haas 1988:97}. In other words,
the most immediate and powerful reason why people marry in
particular instances is "mutual attraction ... and the
desire for a common life".
But in Haas' view, this immediate reason need not be
the ultimate end as a metaphysician sees it. He writes:

However, the metaphysician wants to understand the
marital act in its most general sense and sees that the
end it ultimately serves is the generation of new life
and the perpetuation of the species. As St. Augustine
said, "What food is to the health of man, intercourse
is to the health of the race". We need intercourse, and
we need it because it generates babies (John M. Haas
1988: 97} .
In saying the above, Haas assumes that what is, for
him, the most proximate end of the procreative act cannot be
at the same time its ultimate end. In other words, he

. John M. Haas is one the ardent supporters of, and commentators on the CDF's document. See footnote
23 below.
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assumes that the union of the spouses cannot be valued for
its own value/good but only in connection with another end,
procreation.
Haas also takes it for granted that "mutual attraction
and the desire for a common life" is the only possible
phenomenologically acceptable proximate reason for the
marital act, on one hand; and that the "generation of new
life and the perpetuation of the species" are the only
existing, possible and acceptable metaphysically ultimate
reasons for marital act on the other hand. Nevertheless, he
writes paradoxically: "The good of procreation is in a sense
more fundamental in intercourse than the other goods of
mutual support or sexual gratification" {Haas 1988:97;
italics original).
Admittedly, this claim could be true for some couple,
especially those who value and have need for children. But
it would not be necessarily true for every married couple,
especially those in old age who are not burdened by any lack
of children, not necessarily because they do not value or
need them, but because they do not need them in the
metaphysical sense Haas wrote above. This means that for
these old couples, the so-called phenomenological reason for
the conjugal act, "mutual support or sexual gratification"
would take precedence for them, and the so-called
"metaphysical ultimate reason" would not even be available.
This is to say that what is adequate as an explanation for
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one couple's conjugal act, may be inadequate for another's
conjugal act. The unity of the two meanings that CDF takes
as necessary and normative because natural is not even
available for many instances of the conjugal act.
If the goods/ends under consideration are of value only
when united, as CDF holds, then should not a married couple
that seeks one of the meanings as their end or value, but
does not necessarily seek the other be at the risk of deep
contradiction or other unnatural condition? Yet, as has been
argued already, there are numerous conjugal acts without
children in which the couples are very united, just as there
are countless conjugal acts leading to children, but without
the unitive meaning. Of course, the mere fact that such acts
occur does not itself demonstrate their naturalness or moral
rectitude. The point is rather that CDF's metaphysical
premise that the two meanings occur together necessarily in
the natural material realm is false.
Moreover, simple precedence of one over the other is
not the only alternative to the inseparability of the two
ends that CDF argues for. Procreation can also be the basis
of unity , as it is among most couples in Nigeria, the
country of the author. This is because, in that country, the
conjugal act without children as one of its goods is itself
readily dispensable. In other words, procreation gives
meaning to conjugal act as unitive and to its other goods as
well.
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Similarly, mutual help to each other can be the primary
reason for the unity between husband and wife; and this in
turn can give meaning to conjugal act, so neither the
conjugal act nor procreation need be the primary focus in
their marital relationship. For example, suppose a wealthy
physically

ch~llenged

84 year old man, mutually agrees with

an intelligent and caring 80 year old and poor woman to
marry primarily for mutual help. The husband would provide
the wife and her poor relatives economic assistance for
their present and future well-being. The woman would provide
the husband with domestic and other needed care until death
and execute his will after death. They are faithful to their
promises and agreement and may be quite happy. Although they
have non-procreative (because of age) marital intercourse,
it does not matter to them as much as 'their commitment to
mutual help that binds them faithfully together till death.
In such a marriage, there is unity and love, guaranteed
by the type of help both of them committed to each other.
This is an example to show that neither the conjugal act nor
procreation is necessary to give meaning to every instance
of marriage. It is what the couple cherish most that is the
primary meaning to marriage and that is what unites them. In
this story, it is mutual help and love for each other.
CDF clearly expresses its claim that there is a natural
law of inseparability in the conjugal act between material
procreation and material unity, in statements like the
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following: "By safeguarding both these essential aspects,
the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal act preserves
in its fullness the sense of true mutual love and its
ordination towards man's exalted vocation to parenthood."
This claim is insupportable for two reasons:

(1) The

inability of conjugal act to produce children sometimes,
compels one to ask: what essential aspects of conjugal act
is to be preserved if this act cannot produce one of its two
essential ends or meanings? Conjugal act can then only
preserve what it produces, namely its unitive value, not
what it cannot produce, namely a genetic child, because
infertility reduces it to a non-functional state with regard
to procreation.
(2)

The clause: "By safeguarding both these essential

aspects, the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal act
preserves in its fullness ... "

holds a

self-defeating

implication. The implication is that the natural law (in
CDF's sense) in conjugal act with regard to its two
essential meanings can only be truly {fullness) natural law,
when the two meanings are present. Or as some advocates of
CDF's position put it "the full meaning of the conjugal act
cannot be preserved unless both meanings are acknowledged"
{Haas 1988:101). Haas goes.ahead to defend the metaphysical
or natural connection between conjugal act and its two
meanings by saying:
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"The Church, through the contemporary language of the
inseparability of the unitive and procreative meanings
of marriage, is doing what the metaphysician had done
in the past. She is merely describing the reality of
marital union and saying that it ultimately does not
make sense unless both meanings are recognized and
respected in each and every conjugal act." (1988:101).

The point that is being defended in this section's
argument is that in reality, although some married couples
recognize and respect the view that procreation and unity
between them as spouses is valuable,

(and worth preserving),

the inability of conjugal act to procreate sometimes, even
when every single act of conjugal act is open to
procreation, makes this claim metaphysical flawed and
logically unacceptable. For it to be acceptable, both
conditions must be present, whenever the act can plausibly
be called natural. If not, then either nature is itself
sometimes incomplete and therefore insufficient, or CDF is
begging the question of what is natural and appropriate for
human conduct.
The two material aspects of the conjugal act are not
only distinguishable, they are also separable as the various
example above clearly show. Therefore the inseparability
argument is metaphysically flawed.
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The error of moral objectivism
Another major weakness of CDF's moral contention
against IVF/ET is its assertion that "the process of IVF and
ET Jill.w.t. be judged in itself and cannot borrow its definitive
moral quality from the totality of conjugal life of which it
becomes part nor from the conjugal acts which may precede or
follow it." According to Janssens, "this is one of the
currents of thought contested by Thomas"

(1979:68). Among

other things, this moral judgment reveals a narrow focus on
an act viewed materially without due consideration to other
valuable elements relative to the act. For as Janssens
attests,

"According to Thomas a moral evaluation is only

possible about a concrete action, considered as a whole,
composed of end and means"

(Janssens 1979:68). The claim of

Aquinas is indicated by the very definition or meaning of
means; namely "means involves being-related-to-the-end"
(Janssens 1979:68). A material act undertaken as a means
therefore,

"is not subject to a judgment that considers it

as an absolutely unrelated thing. The judgment must judge
the debita

~roportio

of the means by virtue of which the

totality of the act participates in the moral goodness of
the end"

(Janssens 1979:68-69; emphasis mine).

CDF while on one hand acknowledging that "one cannot
ignore the legitimate aspirations of sterile couples",
disregards those aspirations on the other hand as relevant
to the morality of IVF/ET. Instead CDF judges the process of
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IVF/ET solely.by itself without regard to the intentions of
childless couple and the medical team who are involved in
the process of IVF/ET. Previous discussion has made it clear
that mere legitimate good intention is not sufficient by
itself to assure the morality of an act. But CDF's argument,
falls into the opposite error of moral objectivism - a focus
on the act or object alone; this is a view Aquinas carefully
avoided in his teaching on natural law morality, as was
demonstrated earlier.
The previous analysis of the structure of human action
as expounded by Aquinas shows the exact opposite of CDF's
claim that an act can be morally judged per se without
reference to the human subject from whom the act originates.
In that analysis, it was clear that

llQ

human act can morally

be evaluated solely by itself without reference to the human
subject who is the origin of the activity. For it is the
human subject that gives meaning to his/her activity not
vice versa. This is not to imply a subjectivistic
interpretation of human action which seeks to judge the
moral legitimacy of an human action from the point of view
of the human individual alone - a stance which Aquinas also
carefully avoided. It was already indicated in Aquinas'
position that human actions are not to be considered merely
as "a succession of separate and disjointed actions but as
the integrated moments of a life history in which unity and
wholeness can be realized ... " (Janssens 1979:43). In this
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context, the action has to be judged by all four of the
conditions articulated by Janssens above.
That is, since the moral legitimacy of an human action
can neither be evaluated only from the moral horizon of the
human subject involved in the act, nor purely from the angle
of the material act itself without reference to the
performer of the act, then the morally reasonable step is to
take into consideration .all the valuable elements on both
sides of the equation of means and end, in order to
determine whether an individual or group of individuals
might proceed with an action or not. In other words, the
whole package of all relevant issues and elements that are
involved in an act, both materially and formally, should be
duly considered. A moral judgment must attend to the means,
(material element) needed to achieve an end (formal
element), as surely a$ it must attend to the end.
Consequently, a moral judgment must not focus solely on the
material actions involved - the material process of IVF/ET without reference to the end of the subject who is pursuing
them - procreation. For these material actions are not
considered as properly human actions except in relation to
the willed pursuit of an end in which they are grounded.
The exposition above, of Aquinas's teaching about the
morality of an human act as interpreted by Janssens, showed
that "the inner act of the will (end/formal element) and the
exterior act (means/material element) are one and the same
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concrete act" (Janssens 1979:49). In this understanding,
Aquinas concluded that the "end" and "means" relationship,
"must also be treated as one from the moral viewpoint"
(Janssens 1979:49). With this consistency of thought,
Aquinas "reacted sharply against those who are of the
opinion that the material event of an act can be evaluated
morally without consideration of the subject, of the inner
act of the will or of the end" (Janssens 1979:49).
For our purposes then, if IVF/ET is

considered as nothing but the material event ... [it]
is an abstraction to which a moral evaluation cannot be
applied. This object-event becomes a concrete human act
only insofar as it is directed towards an event within
the inner act of the will. Only this concrete totality
has a moral meaning. It is the end of the inner act of
the will which specifies the malice or the goodness of
the act (Janssens 1979:49; emphasis mine).

IVF/ET as an act is neither separated nor separable
from the human reason which directs itself to act or from
the end for which the human reason acts, nor from

the

proper nature of the human person who is necessarily
connected to this act as its origin, and can in no way be
separated from it. If an human act always originates from a
person, then it is mistaken to say that the act can be
judged either as good or bad by itself because an act,
cannot act itself. Thus IVF/ET as means cannot perform-or be
considered in terms of any rational or intentional activity
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to bring about an end. In fact, if it were true as CDF
claims that !VF/ET can be judged by itself, the claim that
CDF also makes that it may cause harm to the embryo would
then make no sense at all, because causing harm refers to an
other (somebody/something else) that is affected as a
result. In other words, if this act is truly judged by
itself, then CDF's judgment would have to refer to nothing
beyond the act itself, either as cause or effect. "According
to Thomas a moral evaluation is only possible about a
concrete action, considered as a whole" (Janssens 1979:69).
An

accurate understanding of Aquinas' criteria for

judging the morality of human action, indicates that, when
reason engages in moral judgment it employs .bQt.h
proportionalist and deontological (the intended end)
criteria to do such judging correctly. In Aquinas' standard,
when an human person pursues what reason recognizes as a
good end, through what it also recognizes as a good means,
his/her action would be considered perfectly moral. But when
on the other hand, reason recognizes the end as evil and
intends that evil, automatically the action becomes
perfectly immoral; in which case the agent's action can be
referred to as out of character, or contrary to his/her
proper condition in his/her capacity as a participator in
eternal reason - moral law - do good and.avoid evil.
Now in this account, even when reason recognizes and
intends a good end, the material action or means to the end,
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can still be immoral if it is disproportionate to the
intended good/end, or if disproportionate to other aspects
of human good. CDF however would say that the criterion is
whether the act is unnatural in itself, an act contrary to
nature. In fact according to Aquinas, if as much
commensurate or adequately proportionate means is used,
though ontic evil may still occur, the action is still
moral, although it may not be perfectly good as was seen in
the discussion of means, examined earlier. In such a
situation, some undesired and regrettable evil will occur,
what Janssens refers to as "ontic evil" - an ambiguity in
some human actions. But in such cases, as long as the end is
good (the deontological element), the other question is
whether the means producing evil produce even more good and
are, in comparison with other possibilities, the best
possible in the situation.
One legitimate aspiration of an infertile couple which
CDF should have considered in the moral issue of IVF/ET and
artificial insemination, is the infertile couple's desire to
have children - a desire which is in conformity with CDF's
pre-condition for responsible human procreation. For example
CDF says: "The desire for a child-or at the very least an
openness to the transmission of life-is a necessary
prerequisite from the moral point of view for responsible
human procreation" (1987;29).
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To be sure, again CDF is correct to say that "good
intention alone is not sufficient for making a positive
moral evaluation of in vitro fertilization". But good
intention is not the only moral criterion involved in this
procedure. There are several positive values at stake in the
process: the immediate and future well-being of the
infertile couple and those of the larger community of the
couple in some cultures where child bearing and rearing are
in most cases the main sustenance of a marriage. There is
also the unity which having one's own

genet~c

child fosters

between spouses, especially in cultures where this unity is
threatened by childlessness; there is the conjugal life of
the couple that continues in spite of IVF/ET; and above all
there is the child who is desired.
There are also disvalues to be considered: the
suffering of the infertile couple; the suffering of the
larger community especially in cultures where childlessness
is one of the causes of the break up of some families;
possible harms to the desired child - physical,
psychological and even death; and harms of physical injury
specific to the mother. These values and disvalues, are the
essential elements that are involved in the proposed act
that must be taken into consideration in order for a moral
judgment to be made fairly. Instead, CDF dismisses them in
support of a deontological moral evaluation of a material
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act in itself, independent of its formal characteristics as
an object of human choice.
It should be quite obvious now, that an application of
Aquinas' deontological teaching about the morality of any
human action, including the processes of IVF/ET, shows that
IVF/ET does not have any moral meaning except with reference
to the human agent who wills both the end (the child) and
the means (!VF/ET) toward that end (the child); and that all
things considered, this means-end-combination is the
principal criterion for the determination or the morality of
this procedure. As Aquinas would see it, considering the
good and evil involved in this procedure, the good end to be
achieved, is still

proportionately higher than the

comparative evil involved; so that this procedure is morally
justified, in spite of the potential inherent evil (ontic
evil) in it.
How much these values and disvalues me.an to the couples
and the larger society, should all be taken into critical
consideration to judge the morality of IVF/ET; or to decide
whether to perform an act or not when there is a conflict in
moral demands. A specific case might help to clarify the
issue. Can the most serious disvalue - the death of the
embryo, which is probable in the procedure of IVF/ET,
outweigh the weightiest value, the live birth of a child,
which is also possible in the act of IVF/ET? As JoAnn V.
Pinkerton, and James J. Finnerty, worded the idea: "This is
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not a choice between absolute· good and evil but an attempt
to balance two competing interests, both of which pose
nearly equal moral worth" (1996:292; emphasis mine). Note
that the death or life of the embryo at stake only has
meaning in relation to an human society or other human
beings who desire the life of embryo and equally do not
desire the death of the embryo; but who never-the-less, must
do the balancing or proportionate reasoning.
If the embryos dies, the sufferings of the infertile
couple, and in some cases the larger community of the couple
that are associated with infertility continues. Worse still,
other disvalues closely related to the death of the embryo
may arise to worsen the existing sufferings of those
affected by its death. For example, a more depressed and
daunted life of existence is more likely than not to set in.
To the contrary, if the embryo survives, the sufferings of
the childless couple would discontinue, at least in the
sense associated with infertility. But more importantly,
other values that are in direct relationship with the
survival of the embryo will even augment the overall wellbeing of the parents. For example, a more lively and joyful
and hopeful life is more likely than not to arise. As Mbiti
says, "every birth is the arrival of 'spring' when life
shoots out and the community thrives" (1969:110).
But since it is equally true that death of an embryo
brings sorrow, the persons who must do the balancing, or
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proportionate reasoning, must consider which is more
valuable, life or risk of death? In the opinion of this
author, life is certainly more valuable. Therefore, in this
specific sense, IVF/ET would not be a morally
disproportionate means of human conception, even when it
involves the risk of loss of life, because life is more
valuable than death.
In view of all the arguments above, it is therefore
doubtful whether CDF's arguments about (1) the
inseparability of conjugal act from its procreative and
unitive meanings; (2) that the morality of IVF/ET can be
judged by itself, and so (3) that IVF/ET is unnatural, can
convince anyone not already committed to the policy which
advocates and insists on the exclusive use of "conjugal act'
for human conception, given the helplessness to which
infertility reduces some married couples.

Inseparability argument flawed on practical grounds

Moreover, if it is true that there is such a necessary
natural law binding the conjugal act to its supposed two
meanings, then artificial means such as contraceptives and
natural processes such as infertility, which prevent
conception, and human interventions such as IVF/ET and
artificial insemination, that produce human life outside of
conjugal act, should not practically have been .able to
prevent or cause human conception. That is, the ability of
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both contraceptives and sterility to sever this so-called
essential relation between conjugal act and its two meanings
undercut the claim that this is a natural law. They give
evidence that the connection between the conjugal act and
its purported two meanings or ends is of a different sort
than claimed by CDF.
As has already been hinted at, there is to the contrary
no natural necessary connection between conjugal act and its
two so-called essential meanings. That is, conjugal act is
separable from unity and procreation. The biological or
physiological constitution of a woman that prevents her from
becoming pregnant at some periods in her reproductive years
(safe period} is another evidence of a dissociation between
conjugal act and procreation. Properly understood in its
rigorous logical end, procreation can never occur during
this period. This means that given this safe period, natural
law in CDF's understanding as something necessary, is more
applicable to the dissociation between conjugal act and
procreation, than it is between conjugal act and procreation
for reason already given. In addition, this dissociation is
evidence of an intelligent and responsible mind that sees
the totality of human needs with regard to conjugal act and
its procreative meaning. It is also an evidence that human
reproduction must be seen in context. Human beings run into
serious moral difficulty when they focus narrowly on a
specific meaning of something - a word or action. They
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should be open to other possible meanings of such words or
actions. Those other meanings can never be known or
appreciated except with reference to the individual or group
of individuals that give it meaning.
What is important is bmf, those who should benefit from
the value of this natural mechanism in a woman, use it for
their purposes and general well-being. All things
considered, does the use fit into their overall life's
purposes or not? A similar question mu.at. precede any moral
question regarding !VF/ET and artificial insemination.
Thus if one holds: all that is natural is ipso facto
good without qualification, then the natural device in the
female constitution which prevents her from conceiving
children is also good, regardless of how it is used to
achieve some ends. Similarly, if one holds that all that is
unnatural (no necessity) is by this very fact bad without
qualification, then all intelligent human products which
achieve certain ends are bad regardless of their ends.
Some moralists have pointed out with concern the
implications of the inseparability of the unitive and the
procreative meanings of conjugal act in marriage, which
!VF/ET is said to sever. For example McCormick has asked in
connection with the two meanings of conjugal act:

Specifically, must these be held together in every act
(thus no contraception or !VF), or is it sufficient
that the spheres be held together, so that there is no
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procreation apart from marriage, and no full sexual
intimacy apart from a context of responsibility for
procreation (1996:391)?
McCormick's question is apt in that there are infertile
couples who in spite of their engagement in conjugal act,
remain both childless and united in marriage. It is possible
that such couples, though they may believe that having
genetic children in marriage, is both meaningful and
valuable, but they may not be the most meaningful and
valuable reasons why some people marry; or the

~

reason

for marriage. As has already been shown, it is possible to
find couples in marriages in which conjugal act itself is
excluded from the beginning; yet they are united because of
the help they offer one another.
It therefore can be argued that procreation or
procreative intention need not be a criterion for marriage,
or for conjugal act. In other words, these conditions ought
to be separated from marriage because of other primary
reasons why.some people marry: friendship, companionship,
love, or for mutual help; though these people need not
reject the procreative meaning or value of marriage or
conjugal act. It is the value which they cherish most that
impels them into and unites them in marriage.
Now would conjugal act in such marriages be condemned
as unnatural or immoral because they did not produce
children? Predictably, the answer to this question is: no.
For if conjugal act is condemned in such cases, the
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condemner is faced with the problem of legitimizing conjugal
act in marriages, which by the constitution of a woman's
body (menopause, or safe period of a woman during her
reproductive years according to natural law), human
conception is excluded ab initio.
The point of this analysis should therefore be clear:
what is preventive or procreative of human life, does not
necessarily by this very fact of being preventive, or
procreative within, or outside of what is stipulated as
natural law, become unnatural or immoral (when human action
is involved), except in the proper view of the totality of
means-end package which .1lll.la.t. involve a debita proportio.
It has been argued in this section that, if it was true
that there is such a necessary connection between conjugal
act and its two alleged two meaning - unitive and
procreative meanings then, nothing can practically prevent
conjugal act from achieving these two meanings. This section
of the dissertation has shown that negatively, infertility
and artificial contraceptive devices can successfully
prevent conjugal act from attaining these two meanings or at
least one of them, thereby calling into question the alleged
necessary connection. Positively, IVF/ET can successfully
produce human conception even where conjugal act has failed
to achieve at least one

~f

its alleged two necessary

meanings, thereby again, challenging the claim of a
necessary connection between conjugal act and its two
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alleged meanings. Moreover, conjugal act itself sometimes,
is unable in practical terms to realize its two supposed
meanings as has been shown. Therefore, the inseparability
argument of CDF is flawed on practical grounds.

The analogy between contraception and IVF/ET argument.

A question that arises from CDF's inseparability claim
is: what is the human intervention or initiative that can
dissociate this natural law between conjugal act and its two
meanings? For CDF there are two factors. The first is
contraception: "Contraception deliberately deprives the
conjugal act of its openness to procreation and in this way
brings about a voluntary dissociation of the ends of
marriage" (CDF 1979:27). The second is !VF/ET by analogy:
"Homologous artificial fertilization, in seeking a
procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of
conjugal union, objectively effects an analogous separation
between the goods and the meanings of marriage" (1987:27).
CDF claims that it is in the nature of the conjugal act
that it necessarily has two meanings: unitive meaning and
the procreative meaning; and CDF argues that contraception
and !VF/ET both violate this natural pattern and for closely
analogous reasons. But CDF's reasoning on this point is
flawed because of the profound disanalogies between them.
Contraception is an human intervention which actively
prevents procreation. Infertility, though sometimes
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attributive to some human causes, is ordinarily not a result
of human action; it is a physical evil, that prevents
procreation. That is, the interference with procreation is
profoundly different in the two instances. In addition, the
two actions work in opposite directions, both causally
(materially) and in the actors intentions (formally) .
Contraception prevents conception/procreation; IVF/ET, when
successful, brings about conception/procreation. In order to
claim that the two activities are closely analogous, CDF,
must overlook profound metaphysical and moral differences
between the two acts.
Therefore, it is inappropriate for CDF to use the
analogy between contraception and IVF/ET in relation to the
two meanings or ends of conjugal act, because while
contraception could prevent human conception, but not
conjugal act, IVF/ET neither prevents the procreative nor
the unitive meanings of conjugal act. But contraception by
preventing procreation, does not as a matter of fact prevent
conjugal act nor its other relevant meaning - unitive
meaning, conjugal act is not necessarily procreative and
unitive. On this foundation, that it is not necessarily
procreative and unitive, a couple may opt to use conjugal
act as a means to the attainment of one of the benefits of
marriage - the right to conjugal act which may or may not be
open to procreation to some couples.
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Since in reality IVF/ET is causative while
contraception is preyentiye of human procreation, the two
concepts are not the same. Therefore, it is a category
mistake to assert that creating life and preventing life are
analogous in the practical sense of achieving the same
meaning or valued end. The analogy between contraceptives
and IVF/ET is itself analogous to saying that: a person who
prevents the drowning of an only child of his/her parents,
stands on the same moral judgment platform as a person who
willfully causes the drowning of an only child of his/her
parents. To be, and llQt. to be,

~

conceptually opposed to

each other. This is to say that some similarities between
contraceptives and IVF/ET are not worth examining. But the
moral judgment about contraception, eyen if it were
justified, would not therefore {by reason of that
justification) pass on to IVF/ET. So, the analogy does not
hold.
In addition, whether or not IVF/ET succeeds, normal
sexual intercourse between husband and wife continues.
Still, IVF/ET by design is geared towards procreation; which
means that, there is procreative intention, to say the
least. In its proper context, IVF/ET "in seeking a
procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of
conjugal union" simply means that, another method of
reproducing human life is used instead of conjugal act-under
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a specific circumstance; which hampers one of the ends of
conjugal act.

Marriage and the right to procreate argument

There is a further inconsistency in CDF's arguments
against IVF/ET. CDF maintains that every conjugal act is
procreative in nature and at the same time holds the view
that spouses are unjustified in defending IVF/ET by claiming
that non-procreative conjugal acts are defective and they
may therefore, by right, act to correct them. If there is no
such right, then the procreativeness of the act

would seem

to be a contingent matter, not something with the necessity
of nature. Also, CDF argues that "marriage does not confer
upon the spouses the right to have a child, but only the
right to perform those natural acts which are per se ordered
to procreation"

(CDF 1987:34}. But CDF does not offer any

coherent development of this argument in support of their
claims about a right to have children or its absence, nor
any further explanation of the relation of such a rightsbased position to the morality of IVF/ET. Lack of any
further argument by CDF on this claim gives no ground for
further criticism here.
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Conclusion
In its own right, IVF/ET is a valued means, of human
reproduction, the use of which originates from two rational
(proper to nature} persons a married couple who are bound
together by mutual love, a love out of which this couple
mutually desires, seeks and expects a child - the fruit of
their mutual love. Many people will readily approve of the
view that, mutual loye, nQt. conjugal act is the major reason
for couples to desire to have a child, that it is mutual
love not conjugal act that unites husband and wife and
enables them to endure one another's hardships mutually.
This very process does not in any way prevent couples from
engaging in marital sexual intercourse in its unitive
meaning.
Opponents would agree that a good intention is good in
itself; that is, abstractly and that a bad intention, is
also bad in itself, also abstractly. Opponents would also
concede to the view that a good means in itself (abstractly)
is good; just as they would consent that a bad means is bad
in itself (abstractly}. Now as was demonstrated earlier, in
Aquinas' view, if an intention (form/formal) is good and the
means (mater/material) to achieve that good (formal)
intention is also good, then the action is also morally
good. This would be a good will, willing a good act.
Similarly, if an intention (form/formal) is bad and the
means (mater/material) is bad, then the action is also.bad
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or immoral. This would be a bad will, willing a bad act. But
if an intention (form/formal) is good but the means
(mater/material) is a mixture of good and bad in that it
produces both good and bad results, then the act may not
necessarily be bad, depending on the proportion of ontic
evil in the means (material element) involved in the
achievement of the good (formal) intention or the overall
good in the

Qile.

act. This would be a good will, not

necessarily willing a bad means but willing the
proportionately greater good involved in the integration of
the good and the bad.

An act such as IVF/ET can never be judged morally by
itself. On the contrary a moral evaluation of any act IVF/ET
for example is only possible if it is an evaluation made
from the point of view of the totality of this act which
involves means and end. So, in IVF/ET one must consider the
totality of the process of this procedure, when one
considers whether or not IVF/ET and artificial insemination
as means negates the requirement of love which a couple has
for each other and which in turn, flows into a desire for a
child or responsible parenthood through IVF/ET.
All of CDF's arguments are profoundly flawed and fail
to demonstrate that IVF/ET is an inherently immoral act vi$a-vis Aquinas methodology for the moral evaluation of any
human action. Further consequentialist or proportionalist
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arguments for and against human embryos, based on Aquinas'
teaching will be carefully examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER POUR
THE VALUE AND DISVALUE OP IVP/ET:
A CONSEQUENTIALIST EXAMINATION OP HARM/BENEFIT REVISITED
Harm and benefit of present policy.
It has been demonstrated that one malfonnation or
dysfunction in either the male or female reproductive system
is sufficient to cause infertility - a condition that
renders human conception through the ordinary means
impotent. The preceeding chapter has shown that IVF/ET is
not morally objectionable for the deontological reasons
proposed by CDF.
This chapter will off er a proportionalist or
consequentialist analysis of IVF/ET with reference to some
of its specific harms and benefits. This consequentialist
examination will assume the appropriateness of the criterion
of debita proportio for the moral justification of a human
action, as explained in Chapter Three. It will argue that in
general, humanity will be better off with IVF/ET than
without it. In particular, it will also argue that infertile
couples who seek children in Nigeria will be better off with
IVF/ET available than without it. For the value attached to
child-bearing (human life) in marriages in that culture
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holds children to be priceless and irreplaceable. This
chapter shall endeavor to give a careful and detailed
analysis of the harms and benefits to IVF/ET involves. The
thesis of this chapter is that a strong consequentialist
moral justification for supporting IVF/ET can be made. The
chapter will first show that bearing genetic children and
the unity of spouses are among the primary reasons and
values for marriage, both within the perspective of CDF
being examined here and within the cultural tradition in
Nigeria. Secondly there will be an examination of the most
important of the harms or projected harms of this
technology, followed by an examination of the most important
of the benefits. The Third section of the chapter will first
examine psychological harm. The chapter will then focus in
more detail on some of the possible harms of !VF/ET using
the scenario of ectopic pregnancy and spontaneous abortion
as illustrations of three other specific possible harms of
IVF/ET - the death of embryos; physical harm, that is
deformity; and harm to the embryo's mother.
The goal of all this is to demonstrate that the values
generally achieved by IVF/ET outweigh its commonest
disvalues. Supporting such a thesis demands a careful
analysis of the benefits and harms of this technology. This
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analysis muat. neither ignore how much the means (IVF/ET) and
its end (genetic child) which IVF/ET seeks are valued by
those who seek them, nor treat the human

subje~ts

who

actually value the means and end (IVF/ET and child
respectively), as if they, themselves, do not matter or not
valuable.
The most important singular value among other values or
particular goods which IVF/ET seeks to procure is a child.
This good, together with unity of spouses are among the
goods valued by people who enter into marriage for the sake
of a specific good or goods, such as the unity of spouses
and their respective families. In addition to the specific
good or value such as the unity of spouses and their
respective families, are the happiness and joy, etc.,
bearing of a genetic child by infertile couples brings to
all who are affected by this child's birth. The most general
good that IVF/ET will yield is the well-being of infertile
couples and society.
Infertility is the prevalent evil which the procedure
of IVF/ET wants to alleviate. This major evil, can also be
accompanied by other evils such as sufferings of pain and
misery or anguish to childless couples and their families in
particular, but also social evils in general such as
pro~titution

and divorce of spouses. 1

. The social evils will be discussed in the next chapter. It was just important to mention it here.
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Therefore, a comparison of the facts about having or
not having IVF/ET and of the values and disvalues of having
or not having it and arguments based .on these facts, values
and disvalues, will be necessary here. The chapter will make
extensive use of the work of CDF discussed above because it
is one of the best known philosophical writings on the moral
problems of IVF/ET so far. Although that work principally
develops a deontological argument against IVF/ET nonetheless
develops some consequentialist or proportionalist arguments
as well. For example, it says

As with all medical interventions on patients, one
must uphold as licit procedures carried out on the
human embryo which respect the life and integrity of
the embryo and do not involve disproportionate risks
for it but are directed towards its healing, the
improvement of its condition of health, or its
individual survival (CDF 1987:15).

The value of children (human life)

This chapter will assume the position on the value of
children that is taken by CDF. It will be demonstrated here
that CDF's consequentialist comments against IVF/ET fail
(they are not fully developed arguments). That is, on the
basis of CDF's value assumptions about the two essential
meanings of marital sexual act (conjugal act), the unitive
meaning (love of the spouses) and the procreative meaning
(value of the child), IVF/ET is in'fact morally justiffed.
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CDF's consequentialist or proportionalist reasoning is
based on the view that children are a value without which
the continuation of the human species is impossible. Most
people would agree that the life or value of a child as a
human being is of great value because as most people would
also agree that children are one of the central reasons for
the labors of their parents in particular and society in
.{

general, and they are the hope of our future. Moreover,
children are the

~

link between past and future human

generations; they are a necessary gateway to future
generation, a necessary means without which posterity has no
meaning. Again, for sake of clarity, all the above values of
children are assumed here on the basis of CDF's position
that procreation and unity of spouses are necessarily linked
to conjugal act. CDF's deontological position that IVF/ET,
because it separates these two elements of this act, is
unnatural, hence inunoral. It's consequentialist conunents
stress the risk and harms of IVF/ET, although CDF does ot
develop a full consequentialist argilment. But like CDF's
deontological position, its consequentialist conunents also
fail to show that IVF/ET is inunoral.
Obviously, not every married couple is infertile, so
the human race will in general continue in existence, but
not in every particular instance. But the·human race did not
begin in general but with particular instances of male -and
female having sexual intercourse, without which there would
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have been no human race in general ."'so it would be a mistake
~

to take care of any particular infertile marriage

seeking children both for their own well-being and as a
contribution to the general well-being of humanity.
But it is just the conjugal act which CDF emphasizes,
that brings about unity of spouses; children also play a
pivotal role in the unity of husband and wife in marriage.
For without them many marriages would more easily break up
than they do today. Haas attests to this fact in the
following words:

"Even the bond of marriage comes to be understood as
indissoluble because of the child, the procreative
good." Marital indissolubility serves the procreative
good because it firmly establishes the conunon, stable
life which will provide the necessary context for the
nurture and care of the child(1988:97; emphasis
original).

Haas is right. If spouses do not provide a stable place
for the nurture of their offsprings, then they run the risk
of harming them sometimes seriously, even to the point of
ruining the basis for other future lives. Children are so
valuable that many married people would do anything within
their power and accepted moral rules to have children,
especially those who enter into marriage primarily for the
sake of bearing children. But this.point can also be made of
anything that some people need for survival. As has already
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been demonstrated, the current cases of IVF/ET where couples
pay exorbitant amount of money to procure one are good
examples. This example assumes those who developed this
technology to help infertile couples who desire to have
children realize the importance of children in human well
being. Also as has been stated already, the fact that prior
to IVF/ET couples in some parts of the world used (as they
still do) such culturally accepted means, such as polygamy
to bear and rear children is another important point to
establish the value of children to maintain human existence.
The following is a true story. A couple divorced with
one child. Both remarried. Although they attempted to have
their own children with their new spouses, they failed.
After several years of fruitless attempts, both parties gave
up their attempts, but were still happy in their new
marriages. The child of the first

ma~riage

grew up and was

devastated by the divorce of his parents. The teenager
arranged six different meetings with his father and mother
in which serious discursive attempts were made to reconcile
them. All failed. The teenager decided to attempt a seventh
meeting using a different method of approach. On the
appointed day, he arranged for his father and mother to meet
him in a well known restaurant.
After their meal the party set off for the boy's room
at school. On the way close the school, the boy said, "I am
so hungry." His and mother were surprised at his utterance.

197

"You just had a big meal, what is the matter with you?" they
inquired surprisingly. The boy said, "Mom and Dad, you know,
I am hungry for you not food; I am hungry for your love not
hungry for food. You both brought me into the world and left
me without you and without your love." At this utterance,
almost simultaneously, the father and mother called him by
his name, and each of them saying, "You know I love you."
The boy replied, "I don't need the "I" of your love. I need
the "we" of your love. I have been hungry for your "we"
love, and it seems I will always be hungry for it.' At this
point, the father and mother turned to each other, then to
their son and the three hugged themselves

and were resolved

to come back together, as indeed they did.
The point of this story is principally to illustrate
two key issues; namely (1) Neither the disvalue that
prompted the divorce of the boy's parents in their first
marriage, nor the conjugal act with all its gratification in
their new marriages, was sufficient to keep them from the
powerful effect the words of their genetic child had on
them, a powerful value, before which mere marriage or
marital sexual intercourse was helpless.

(2) In these

people's lives, children are the most essential values, even
outweighing other values in marriage. This position on the
value of children to marriage goes beyond the position that
CDF takes, but is held very strongly in many African
cultures.
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But an opponent could point out other things which the
above story exemplifies; namely that childlessness need not
be the only reason for divorce, because parents divorce
irrespective of children. Nicholas N. Obi articulates
several other causes of divorce world-wide as follows:

grounds for divorce for different societies,
creeds and tongues include: repeated or exaggerated
infidelity or extra-marital sexual experience;
childlessness or sterility; sexual impotence or
unwillingness; habitual drunkenness; desertion ... ;
neglect or failure to support; laziness and economic
incapacity; incurable madness; unconfessed prior
marriage and imprisonment; quarrelsomeness or continues
nagging; brutality - mental and physical cruelty;
sexual incompatibility and frustration; ... uncontrolled
jealousy; stealing ... " (1987:93).
11

Although this couple divorced themselves in spite of
bearing a child, yet it is this child who is the compelling
factor that reunited his parents.
Writing specifically about marriage and
procreation in African societies, Mbiti has pointed out that
lack of children in a marriage is probably the greatest
single cause of divorce "since inability to bear children
blocks the stream of life" (1969:145). This implies that
although there are other reasons for divorce, childlessness
is

~he

most frequent.
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What follows may help a foreigner to African or
Nigerian culture, to understand the philosophy of marriage
in that society and the irreplaceable value which Africans
place on bearing their own genetic children. Caldwell
and

Caldwell saw clearly the irreplaceable role which

genetic children play in linking this and the other world,
when during their investigation about fertility in SubSaharan Africa, they wrote: "We try to substantiate the
proposition that the culture, both with regard to this world
and the next, has been a seamless whole. The emphasis is on
societies molded by stress on ancestry and descent"
(Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:410}.
There is good reason to believe that the cultural
belief in a seamless relationship between this world and the
next and the stress on ancestry and descent are paramount
concerns in Nigeria. Caldwell and Caldwell have shown by
their survey of "The Cultural Context of High Fertility in
Sub-Saharan" that Africans put no l.imit to their emphasis on
the continuity of heritage. For example:

In a 1973 study of all couples ... in Ibadan City.
Nigeria, who had voluntarily limited the size of their
families to fewer than six live births, we explored the
widespread condemnation by relatives of these innovators. It
was found that the most frequent charge against them was
that of irresponsibility, in that even families with several
surviving children can be quickly wiped out . . . . The critics
usually claim to know instances of families of four or five
children all dying (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:412}.
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The underlying reason behind such a criticism is, as
the above authors state clearly, the commonplace fear of
dying without children. This reason, among other important
ones, explains why Nigerians want to bear many children. In
the survey referred to above, the authors have this to say
with regard to childbearing:

In Nigeria a majority of women with 12 or more live births
said that they wanted to continue childbearing. Restricting
the analysis to the more meaningful measure of surviving
children rather than births, and examining the situation
among women with seven or more surviving children (averaging
between eight and nine), those stating that they wanted no
more amounted to only 33 percent in Kenya, 3 percent in
Ghana, 10 percent in Cameroon, and among the Yorubas of
Nigeria. surveyed in the Changing African Family Project.
non at all (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:413).

Clearly, here a lineage-based philosophy of human existence
significantly affects, a society's attitudes towards
procreation. Given this, and the prolific reproductive
manner by which Nigerian married couples desire and give
birth to children, a barren couple would find it extremely
difficult to accept infertility in such a society.
There are then two sets of powerful values that support
infertile couples in undertaking IVF/ET: the general value
of children to both parents in most marriages and to the
race for its continuation, and the more particular value
placed by Nigerian and other cultures on children because of
their lineage-based view of human life.
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The harms of IVP/ET or disadvantages.

In comparison with these positive values of IVF/ET, the
single most powerful group of

argum~nts

against the

technology of IVF/ET as a morally acceptable answer to the
agonizing problem of infertility are arguments based on the
risks of harm IVF/ET might pose to both mother and fetus.
The risks and possible harms include: (1) to the embryo:
psychological harm which, it is contended, the child will
suffer if he/she knows that he/she is a product of
unconventional methods of human reproduction. (2) To the
embryo: wastage/death. (3) To the embryo: exposure to the
possibility of injury which may result in physical deformity
or mental damage to the fetus. (4) To the mother: injury or,
the very unlikely, possibily of the_ death of the mother. (5)
To society: various social harms that this artificial means
of procreation, might cause by making possible for example,
the selection of embryos by sex preference, a practice which
in itself, might cause a major imbalance in human population
and one which could exacerbate injustices based on gender
discrimination. 2
For critics of IVF/ET, such harms seem sufficient for
them to suggest that the procedure will have serious
consequences in the connnunities in which this reproductive

. This projected harm will not be discussed in this work because it will take us too much afield.
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technology is used and so it needs to be prevented or
stopped. But before one holds this position, one needs to
ask: (1), whether value of

children which IVF/ET seeks is,

on balance, at least worth any one or all of these projected
ills and,

(2), whether infertility, which IVF/ET seeks to

overcome is worse than any of these harms so that the
procedure would be justified by its on balance, better
consequences. This harm issue will be returned to again
later.

Benefits of a policy supporting IVP/ET

As already said, the single most important and
inunediate benefit of IVF/ET is the capacity of this
technology to enable a childless couple to have their own
genetic children. But in addition, it could also lessen the
fears and anxieties of unmarried people about the
uncertainty of their ability to bear children in their
eventual marriages; and it might increase their hope because
their chances of bearing children would be greater than
without this technology if they turned out to be unable to
reproduce children by the ordinary method.
For example, in our hospitals are many young people who
are afflicted with diseases such as cancer, the successful
treatment of which may cause sterility. Glover et al attest
to this fact when they say: "A number of cancers in young
people can now be treated by chemotherapy and radiotherapy.
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An instance is leukemia in young women. But the treatment

makes them sterile, by killing germ;cells in the ovary"
(1989:104). When such ill-health strikes unmarried young
persons in a culture where having children is the basic
reasons for marriage, the single persons may lose both the
hope of being married and of having children.
But with the availability of egg-freezing and spermbanking, these young people will increasingly ask for their
eggs or sperm to be banked before their treatment, so that
they might still have genetic children after (see Glover et
al 1989:104). This reproductive technological opportunity
would bring with itself, special joy to the hearts of these
young, unmarried, and diseased persons. It would also help
to protect for them

their hopes for,marriage and bearing

children; this would be more so, in .a society where being
married and bearing children are two of the life's prides
and hopes of marriageable men and women and their parents.
These are two values that would be lost to the above
identified people in the absence of IVF/ET.
There is also concrete evidence to show that the hopes
of the people being talked about are not foundationless. For
example, as was shown in Chapter One, over 150,000, children
have been born to infertile couples throughout the globe, to
infertile couples who without IVF/ET technique, would have
still been suffering both the anguish of childlessness and
the lack of joy of having genetic offsprings.
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But the fact that, in general only about 10 to 15
percent of IVF/ET is successful (Winston and Handyside
1993:936) must be factored into this analysis.
Obviously then, a large percentage of sterile couples still
cannot be helped by this technology. For example, according
to Winston and Handyside, fewer than 5,300 babies were born,
following IVF/ET in Great Britain, where there may be as
many as 600,000 infertile couples (1993:936}.
However, no one can doubt the fact that, 10 to 15 per
cent success rate of IVF/ET procedure represents a sizeable
reduction in the number of infertile couples among us. It is
a benefit to those affected. On the other hand following the
major loss, the loss of child-bearing, resulting from
infertility, is a host of other evils and human suffering
also associated with infertility, which IVF/ET would help to
minimize. For example, it would lessens the amount of guilt,
shame, anguish, psychological scar, and separation or
divorce of spouses which mark the lives of many couples on
account of childlessness.
This technology of IVF/ET, would be highly useful to
numerous childless couples in Nigeria, where the purpose of
marriage is mainly to bear children: (1) It is child
bearing, if anything within the context of marriage, that
unites husband and wife. (2) It is this fact of (l} that
makes marriage worthwhile and attractive to marriageable men
and women.

(3) It is on the bearing of children, that the
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continuation of the human species is possible; for many
lines of families have been closed as a result of
infertility. (4) The fact of (1) is the precondition for the
boon of good social or recreational, economic, political,
and religious life. The starting place of these boons of
life is in the family.

(5) Seen from a Nigerian outlook on

marriage, the fullness of marital joy begins to emerge with
the birth of a child to spouses.
Again viewed from the perspective of the Nigerian
culture, the joy of marriage is only partial and the notion
of family partial without a child. For a household is
complete only when at least one child is born into that
household. In most cases, a household is considered complete
only when a male and female child have been born into it. As
Onwuejeogwu has written: "It is evident that at an early
stage the position of the new family is shaky and may never
be formed at all if no children are born"(1975:90).
It is when a child is born that husband and wife begin
to enjoy the fullness of the joy of their marriage because
they .th.en qualify for the title, parents. In other words,
parenthood carries with it a special kind of value and

~

which neither marriage nor sexual intercourse with no
child/ren, are capable of providing.
As Tola Pearce (1992) has noted, in Nigeria "subfertile
women or those in search of sons are under pressure to
produce a child of whatever condition." Thus a connnunity
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which has a means by which couples unable to have genetic
children at all cost, are helped to have children would be
more valuable than another community which has nothing at
all to help couples in similar or equivalent situation.
In cultures such as Nigeria where children is the supreme
benefit and reason for marriage, then, the whole culture is
better off with the possibility of IVF/ET than without it
since infertility is a major threat to the realization of
the most valuable good and by reason of this threat, it
becomes in turn a threat to other goods, such as unity
between husband and wife and their families. In this way the
very institution of marriage as the foundation for human
family and society is also in jeopardy if infertile couples
have no recourse.

Psychological harm

The opponents of IVF/ET, notably,

CD~

and others, 3 claim

that children born of IVF/ET will suffer psychologically or
emotionally without specification about the kind of
psychological or emotional harm these children will suffer.

For the purposes of this dissertation, this author, will
understand "psychological" in one of the three sense
designated by The Random House Dictionary Of The English
. See, •'Give Me Children or I Shall Die!' New Reproductive Technologies and Harm to Children• by
Cynthia B. Cohen, in: Hastings Center Repon, Vol. 26, No. 2, March- April 1996, p.20.
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Language; namely, that which pertains to, or affects the
mind "as a function of awareness, feeling, or motivation".
This author will also understand "emotion" in three of the
five senses the above dictionary defines this term; namely,

"1. an affective state of consciousness in which joy,
sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is experienced, as
distinguished from cognitive and volitional states of
consciousness. 2. any of the feelings of joy, sorrow,
fear hate, love, etc. 3. any strong agitation of the
feelings actuated by experiencing love, hate, fear,
etc., and usually accompanied by certain physiological
changes, ... and often overt manifestation, as crying
or shaking."
This author would add: such emotional states or
psychological states or reaction as "shame", "guilt",
"embarrassment", "worry", "depression", "anger" and others.
The claim that IVF/ET will cause children resulting from
them psychological and/or emotional harm seems
foundationless. Available evidence on the issue of how an
IVF/ET child would feel on his/her knowledge that he/she was
conceived by this technological process, indicates
otherwise:

Until recently very little has been known about how AID
children have fared as they have grown up within their
families, and even now the information is based on the
experiences of only a small number of individuals.
Occasionally. usually in the popular press. one hears
of the experience of adults wbo haye become aware of
their AID origins and wbo are disturbed by this
knowledge. Often these individuals have found out about
their origins accidentally or in a hurtful way during a
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family quarrel. It may be significant that the young
people contracted in the Exeter project had all been
told in a purposeful and planned way. These young
adults had accepted their AID status equably and none
of them had found it a particularly traumatic
experience. They had certainly been sux:prised when they
were told, but some of that surprise was because their
parents had kept the matter such a close secret for so
many years. None of them regretted the fact that ~
had been conceived by AID. They were enjoying life and
happy to be alive and realizeq.that they owed their
existence to AID. They were also pleased to feel that
their parents had wanted a child so badly. and that
they were that child who had fulfilled their parents'
wishes. One said, ' ... the realization that I had been
brought into the world, you know, they actually went to
tremendous lengths because they wanted to have a baby.
And I suddenly felt that they must love me a tremendous
amount. that I was vex:y important to them' (David R.
Bramham et al 1990:82; emphasis mine).

The citation above indicates that the available
empirical evidence goes against the opponents of IVF/ET. It
is not hard to imagin why; namely that the children of this
technology would have stronger reas9n to be happy that they
are alive and that they owe their

~x~stence

to IVF/ET. That

is, these children would have nothing to be embarrassed
about or ashamed of since they have genetic affinity with
both of their parents {this dissertation is focused on
homologous IVF/ET) and for the reasons already given.
But this evidence is n'ot to deny entirely that some of
the children of IVF/ET might be negatively psychologically
affected. For as the first six lines of emphasis show in the
block quotation above, some of the adults of IVF/ET (AID),
have been quite disturbed by the knowledge of their origin.
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But we need to consider also the reason and circumstances
for their disturbance. ·we are told that part of the reasons
for their disturbance is the manner through which they
gained knowledge of their origin, namely "accidentally or in
a hurtful way during a family quarrel".
The real issue with these people, might well be, not
that they were conceive by IVF/ET, but rather the way in
which they gained this knowledge. Moreover, even if one
should grant that they were more disturbed by the fact of
the origin of their conception than by the manner through
which they learned about their origin, it may still be that
the fact of their very existence matters more to them than
the process of their conception. In other words, even if
there is some comparative psychological loss, still most if
not all when everything in their life is considered, would
prefer that they were conceived than not conceived.
A second group among these person were told of their
origin "in

a purposeful and planned way" but still found it

psychologically painful. Although this group was surprised
when they were told about the manner of their conception,
part of that surprise was not so much that they disvalued
being conceived by the means in question, as it was their
disvalue of the fact that "their parents had kept the matter
such a close secret for so many years." But even at their
expressed dislike,

"non.e of them had found it a particularly

traumatic experience" to be conceived by IVF/ET. Instead,
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everything considered, they "were enjoying life and happy to
be alive ... "
In addition, to return to earlier theme, these young
people realized how much having children meant to their
parents; for we are told that "They were also pleased to
.feel. that their parents had wanted a child so badly, and

that they were that child who had fulfilled their parents'
wishes."
Such evidence, indicates that the children conceived by
IVF/ET, do not suffer a disproportionately greater
psychological trauma, upon their learning of the process of
their birth, than is normal in healthy children born through
traditional means of conception. Any difference in
psychological reaction is surely not sufficient to warrant
condemning IVF/ET on the basis of a projected psychological
loss and/or emotional harm. If anything, it is the behavior
of their parents in revealing the methods of birth in
improper ways, or when revealing them in proper ways, still
keeping them too long as a secret before revealing them,
that seem to create some psychological feelings in the
children, llQ.t. the actual means of conception. But this
behavior of the parents, even if it should be attended to,
tells us nothing about the morality of IVF/ET.
Clearly, in order to avoid or lessen this apparent
psychological ill feeling, parents of IVF/ET children should
start early enough to educate the children about the process
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of their conception. This means that the role of parents in
this matter is as important to maintain a good psychological
balance in the children, as it is important for the parents
to fulfill their natural desire to have children. Society's
role in this matter about educating the parents of IVF/ET
children is also clearly important.
Admittedly, the evidence about psychological harm from
IVF/ET given above is on AID children. But the above
analysis provides strong basis for us to claim that IVF/ET
(AIH) would at the very least fare as well as the IVF/ET
(AID) . What was assumed because of the very concept of
IVF/ET-AID is that the children were also told that either
the egg or the sperm, or both which form the living adult
human being, came from another person/s; in which case the
reaction of the IVF/ET AID persons, was not only about the
fact that they were conceived by an extraordinary method
(so-called artificial means), but also that their present
parents are not necessarily their biological parents. As was
shown above neither of the two

issu~s

mattered so much to

them as to be overly psychologically affected. By comparison
with IVF/ET (AIH), the biological consideration of their
origin, is excluded from our discussion; so that Qllly the
one fact of being conceived in the so-called artificial way
cou~d

constitute psychological problem or feeling, if any.
It seems much more unlikely that IVF/ET (AIH) children

could develop a disproportionately negative psychological
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feeling about life in general, on their knowledge of .onl.l!
the means of their conception, than the children of IVF/ET
(AID) could develop about life in general on their knowledge
of both the means itself and the biological issue; such that
they would have preferred not being alive through that means
than being alive through it.
The point was made above that such children would
naturally prefer to have been born rather than not. But is
it better to be born or not to be born? Some critics 4 could
say that being happy that one is born and alive depends on
the kind of life one is experiencing. They could reason that
if one is experiencing a life of tremendous pain and
suffering such that one questioned why he/she was born in
the first place; that is if one is experiencing a life of
pain and suffering sufficient for one to wish to die rather
than to live, then it would be more likely that one would
have preferred not to have been born at all. But if one is
enjoying life as it is, in its ups and downs, in one's given
situation such that one is unwilling to die, then one could
say that it is better to have been born than not at all.
However, against the above argument, it could be
claimed that one who lives a regrettable life of pain and
misery such that one prefers death to life would only be
pos~ible

where one has had an experience of a better life

. See author, footnote 9.
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before. For it could be possible that if the life of pain
and misery is the only kind of life one ever knew, one would
have no reason to wish to die because one would have no
better life to compare with. There is in oter words a value
to such a person's life that even his/her pains cannot
counter. So few if any persons can consistently hold that it
would truly have been better not to have been born. As has
been shown, however, few children, if any, conceived by
IVF/ET would take this view anyway.
Therefore these criticism do not appear to be plausible
reasons to convince a married couple against their wish to
have their own children just like other couples because,
life of pain and misery in general, life of pain and misery
due to serious physical deformity in particular as projected
will happen to children of IVF/ET, will not be the exclusive
preserve of those children, for such lives are already among
us (though we need not intentionally create more; and not
IVF/ET intentionally does}. Therefore those who oppose
IVF/ET on the basis of exessive psychological harm to the
children of IVF/ET have not made a strong enough case.
Robertson words the idea fittingly: "Preventing harm would
mean preventing birth of the child whose interests one is
trying to protect. Yet the child's interests are hardly
protected by preventing the child's existence" (1994:75).
Another way to make this point is to say that this set
of arguments against IVF/ET is too narrowly focused on the
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risk of harm. The good intent to eliminate as much harm as
possible does not have room within it for an, equivalent
intent to produce as much good as possible for all the
parties involved.

Another possible harm from IVF/ET: death of embryo

Some scenarios of disvalue to many married couples
who absolutely desire to have children are the loss of
embryonic lives, mostly through the mishaps of ectopic {also
called extrauterine) pregnancies or through miscarriages
(also called spontaneous abortions) . "An extrauterine
pregnancy is one in which a fertilized ovum implants in an
area other than the uterine cavity" {Martin L. Pernell, and
Sara H. Garmel 1994:314); while "spontaneous abortion is ...
a pregnancy terminating before the 20th completed week (139
days) of gestation" {Pernell and Garmel 1994:306).
It has been noted already that according to Aquinas,
from the moral viewpoint, an act is good "only when the
exterior action is proportioned to the end according to
reason, when there is no contradiction of the means and the
end in the whole of the act on the level of reason." Also,
it has been observed that because of his/her limitations,
the human person cannot always realize his/her
pos~ibilities;

and so in his/her ambiguity sometimes antic

evil is experienced in an attempt to do morally good acts.
The question throughout this chapter is the question of
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proportionality. Is the benefit of children equal to or
greater than the harm of IVF/ET?
Most people would agree that ectopic pregnancy and
miscarriage are physical evils. Statistics show that these
conditions are very common throughout the world. In Europe
for example, extrauterine pregnancies "occur about once in
every 150 pregnancies. Elsewhere they are more common: in
Jamaica they occur once in every 20 pregnancies, and they
are even more common in parts of Africa" (Glover et al
1989:104). It is estimated that miscarriages in the United
Kingdom alone, "are about 100,000 hospital admissions a
year" (Glover et al 1989:104). In the United States of
America, "about 1 in every 5 pregnancies end in miscarriage"
(Janet S. Peterman 1988:21).
The harms that are associated with these pregnancy
conditions are very grave. For example,

(i) they cause

infertility, sterility, or childlessness among numerous
married couples (Glover et al:104; Martin L. Pernell and
Sara H. Garmel (1994:319). (ii) The loss of the lives of
many embryos are blamed on the ectopic pregnancies and
miscarriages (see Yvonne Brown 1992:82; Pernell and Garmel
1994:320). (iii) Sometimes the loss of the lives of both the
fetus and its mother are blamed on them (see Glover et al
1989:104; Pernell and Garmel 1994:320). In general "about 1
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in 1000 ectopic pregnancies result in maternal death"
(Pernoll and Garmel 1994:318) 5
A careful study of the harms associated with ectopic
pregnancy condition therefore is necessary here and could go
some length in helping to determine whether one should
support the arguments for IVF/ET or whether one should
support those against the use of this procedure. Let us now
examine the examples above accordingly.
(i) Ectopic pregnancyies cause infertility, sterility,
or childlessness among numerous married couples. The first
case against ectopic pregnancy is that it causes infertility
- "infertility is present in about 60% {Pernoll, and Garmel
1994:320). Statistics show that 10 to 20% of women who have
had ectopic pregnancy the first time, will have it a second
time; and 4-5% of the second time occurrence, "will occur in
the opposite tube" (Pernoll and Garmel 1994:314}. According
to Pernoll and Garmel, the normal treatment for this
percentage of suffering women is "total tubal excision"
(Pernoll and Garmel 1994:320). This is not to say that the
4-5% represents all the women who will remain sterile
without special intervention. It simply means that 4-5% of
all women affected by second time occurrence of ectopic
. Spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) will not be examined here because all the major causes of
miscarriage which can be helped by ivf/et involves a is miscarriage which arises from a "Genetic error" and
tberef~re which must be instancies of AID, not Alli which is the topic of study. See "Early Pregnancy
Risks• by Martin L. Pernoll, MD, & Sara H. Gannet, MD, in Current:Obstetric &: Gynecologic Diagnosis
&: Treatment, eds. Alan H. DeCherney, MD, and Martin L. Pernoll, MD. Appleton & Lange, 25 Van Zant
Street, East Norwalk, Connecticut, U.S.A., p.312, 1994.

•,

.
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pregnancy will have their two reproductive tubes cut off.
This means that the only alternative left is IVF/ET, since
as has been shown already other alternatives are not as
beneficial as IVF/ET. The ethics committee of the American
Fertility Society lends credence to this as follows:

The most common indication for the use of human IVF
procedures is irreconncilable tubal damage or
destruction, which exists in patients who have
undergone surgical removal of the fallopian tubes
because of inflammatory disease or tubal ectopic
pregnancy (1986:328).

By being the cause of sterility, ectopic pregnancy adds
to the existing sources childlessness. This situation is not
helped by the fact that in "the past 5 years, the incidence
of tubal ectopic pregnancy has increased more than 50\ owing
to the following factors: epidemic salpingitis; microscopic
tubal surgery of all kinds ... " (Pernell and Garmel
1994:320). The growing pain about this upsurge, is that,
this rise, is bound to increase the number of women
suffering childlessness due to some form of ectopic
pregnancy.
However, there is evidence that IVF/ET themselves can
sometimes cause ectopic pregnancy. F?r example, Pernell and
Garmel include "in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer"
(1994:315) among other factors that can cause ectopic_
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pregnancy. This is to say that IVF/ET can be part of or add
to the problem it attempts to solve.
But history shows that IVF/ET (excluding artificial
insemination) 6 as we have it, today did not come into being
until July of 1978 when its first product was born. The rate
of occurrence of extrauterine pregnancy had tripled for many
years prior to the first IVF/ET baby, and just two years
after the baby's birth. Pernoll and Garmel attest to this
fact when they say that ectopic pregnancy "rate increased
from 4. 8 in 1000 term births in 1970 to .14. 5 in 1000 in
1980 ... " (Pernoll and Garmell 1994:314). This means that the

rapid increase in the occurrence of ectopic pregnancy is not
necessarily due to IVF/ET, even though it is contributive to
the increase in recent times.
An opponent might still contend that two years( from
1978-1980) aggressive IVF/ET practice can significantly

influence the rate of increase in the number of extrauterine
pregnancies over the years antecedent to this technical
reproductive procedure. This view would be mistaken if one
considers that IVF/ET is not mentioned (though its sister
method, artificial insemination is) among the kind of

. Artificial insemination (AI) as a method of human conception has been in use for more than two
centuries. Two physicians, John Hunter (1728-1793) of England, and Thouret of France are said to be the
first in the successful application of this method on human beings. Cf. John C. Wakefield, Artiful
ChikbMking: Articial Insemination Jn Catholic Teaching, Pope John XXIIl Medical-Moral Research and
Education Center. St. Louis, Missouri, 1978, pp. 18-19. This method "has been widely used as a.method to
fight infertility in humans since about 1950" (Richard Westley Guidlines For Contempomry Catholics: Life,
Death and Science, The Thomas More Press Chicago, Illinois, 1989, p. 84).

219
factors that have augmented the rate of the occurrence of
this lethal condition when one of the most recent surveys
were conducted. Pernell and Garmel report:

In the past 5 years, the incidence of tubal ectopic
pregnancy has increased more than 50% owing to the
following factors: epidemic salpingitis; microscopic
tubal surgery of all kinds; conservative management of
the tube with preservation of an organ that still
retains the causative factor; the timing of artificial
insemination and natural methods of contraception,
which lead to fertilization of a late ovum; an
increased number of tubal ligations with increased
failures; and DES syndrome (1994:320).
Thus artificial insemination as a disvalue in the sense
that it can cause ectopic pregnancy, is inconsequential in
that it can be more readily controlled by a more accurate
timing of ovulation, a claim that cannot be made for
classical causes of ectopic pregnancy. Classical causes of
ectopic pregnancy include "tubal factors" which are
responsible for about "50% of excised tubal pregnancies"
(Pernell and Garmel 1994:315); "zygote abnormalities ...
including chromosomal abnormalities, gross malformation, and
neutral tube defects ... abnormal sperm counts or a high
incidence of abnormal spermatozoa . . . . Ovarian factor,
Exogenous Hormones" factors (Pernell and Garmel 1994:315).
Granted then that the assisted methods of human
reproduction can sometimes cause the problem it seeks to
alleviate still the nature of the technology or insemination
is such that it can sometimes redress its own errors, as
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well as those of other factors of infertility by producing
the value that was originally sought after. Aquinas urges us
to focus on the human agents (married couple) who seek a
child

on one hand and the human agents (the medical team)

who are assisting the couple are all involved the procedural
acts of IVF/ET or artificial insemination on the other.
Understandably, the possibility of the antic evil of
ectopic pregnancy can arise here. But when these agents
consider the value of their end and the overall good, and
what that value means to them, especially the infertile
couple, they must weigh these values (particular and common
or general good) against the disvalues of the couples's not
having a child at all, it is not surprizing that they judge
the risks involved in the procedure are worth taking. The
value of the ectopic embryo's short life, its possibility to
become a child is more valuable than if it had no life at
all.
Moreover, their valuing and planning to achieve their
good end/s (particular and whole good end), through this
means of IVF/ET, involves at the same time plans to
eliminate or at the very least to lessen whatever
harm/disvalue might frustrate their end/s. In this way all
things considered, IVF/ET and artificial insemination
remains a valuable means chosen by human agents to achieve
the desired good end even though some disvalue (antic evil)
might be encountered. In other words, the total picture
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about all relevant factors in the entire project makes good
sense. The number of successful IVF/ET procedures, cited
earlier in this work are in support of their judgments.
{ii) The loss of the lives of many embryos are blamed
on the ectopic pregnancies and miscarriages. Many arguments
against IVF/ET have narrowly focused on various harms the
procedure holds for the embryo, to a seeming neglect of the
harms the embryo's parents suffer, ·especially its mother.
The seriousness of the risks of harm involved in ectopic
pregnancies may be suggested by the fact that "maternal
mortality rate due to ectopic pregnancy in the USA is 1-2%;
the prenatal mortality rate is virtually 100% {Pernell and
Garmel 1994:320). The virtual 100% death rate of the embryos
raises an understandable alarm about the enormity of ectopic
pregnancy; at the same time, it can easily mask the
prolonged suffering of the parents, especially the mother
who undergoes the physical pains and injuries that are
involved.
Still in view of the fact that virtually 100% of the
fetuses die in an ectopic pregnancy, it is arguable whether
the suffering of the fetus is sufficiently harmful to it
that is a more serious disvalue than the suffering of its
infertile parents and the positive value of a possible
child. If it is true {as human experience shows), that an
injury or harm that befalls a child/person especially one
involving death, can have a negative emotional or
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psychological affect on his/her parents and vice versa, then
an important question also arises with regard to the
suffering of the human embryos that are lost in ectopic
pregnancies in relation to their parents. So we must ask
whether death is really a harm as such to the embryos, since
they do not have real awareness of their own death (not
meaning that they do not feel pain), and we must look at the
suffering of their parents who learn of their death and
suffer accordingly.
For most people, death is a harm because of the fear of
various kinds of pains and sufferings associated with some
illnesses that cause death; fear and anxiety about the
uncertainties of the outcome of the injuries or sickness
they are exposed to; fear of the unknown or anxiety about
the uncertainty of one's spiritual status hereafter; sorrow
or guilt felt for not accomplishing some important sets of
personal, cultural, social, or religious values they are
cormnitted to; but not necessarily because of death itself;
so that death can actually be harmful if such fears of it
causes tremendous psychological harm to the person.
This is not to deny that there are people who are
afraid of death itself. It must be acknowledged though, that
this fear issue, does not remove the pain and suffering
which embryos/fetuses of certain age feel. However, it seems
true to say that even. at this, the infertile couple remain
more wounded emotionally on long term basis, especially the
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woman who bears the entire brunt of the physical pains
involved with resolving an incidence of ectopic pregnancy
and the tremendous harmful anxieties of her spouse, families
members and others experience within the period. For most
infertile couples, this kind of harm lingers until death.
It is also true that in real life situation, that
although the death of an expectant child brings sorrow to
its immediate family members, and the larger community, the
birth of another child by that couple minimizes the pain and
sorrow caused by the dying of the former child. This is not
to claim that the birth of this child eliminates the entire
experience relevant to the loss of the dead child; nor is
this to claim that the dead child was less human than the
living child. If the above is true of in vivo births, there
seems no reason why it should not be true of in vitro
children.
For in a pronatalistic society such as Nigeria where to
bear one's own genetic child, is the human-rock-foundation
for the pride, and happiness of married couple, the bearing
of a child is still cherished more than the many more
children that never saw the light of day; though their
deaths are very much grieved by all in the community.
Nonetheless, the joy which this one child brings to the
infertile couple and the members of
sufficient to compensate the loss

~he

society is

?~_many

embryos and the

social stigma of infertility. The following may give a
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foreigner an inkling into the kind of joy and rejoicing that
accompanies the birth of a child to a couple that have long
experienced the sadness and stigma of sterility: "As a rule,
the whole occasion of birth is marked with feasting and
great rejoicing among the relatives and neighbors of the
parents concerned" {Mbiti 1969:114).
Can one still claim, in view of the above that embryos
suffer more serious disvalue in the loss of their lives than
their parents who are infertile or who become aware of their
loss of the fetuses and aware of their own emotional or
psychological trauma? It seems to this author that the
·immediate suffering of the infertile couples which the loss
of a cherished value (child) and the long term emotional or
psychological hurt that infertility brings to bear on them
may justly tip the scale in favor of giving an embryo a
chance at life, even at the risk of ectopic (or other
circumstance) of early death.
But even when the kind of disvalue examined above is
ameliorated, one of the most serious.ethical objections to
IVF/ET reproductive technique may not necessarily be
resolved. That objection is that either defective or "spare
or unimplanted embryos" may be used for scientific
experimental purposes and f inaly destroyed as one author
clearly points out: "Many ova are fertilized, the 'spare'
ones are either immediately destroyed, used for scient.ific
research, or frozen for future implantation or
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experimentation and ultimately destruction" (Westley
1989:88). The experimentation the unimplanted embryos will
be subjected to, is to achieve other purposes which these
medical scientists claim might, be beneficial to humanity.
On this issue, the opponent's attention is called, not
to confuse the creation of embryos for laboratory goals,
with, creating embryos solely for implantation into its own
mother's womb for further development. This means that, in
this specific instance, the intention or primary goal of
those involved in IVF/ET is specifically to assist infertile
couples to conceive a child. Admittedly, sometimes, the
physiological, hormonal, or chromosomal condition of a
couple may necessarily result in the creation of abnormal
embryos that would not be viable enough to implant in a
woman's womb. In this case the embryo should be permitted to
die without being implanted since its fate will be the same
in either case, but the implanting of a known severely
defective embryo would involve an almost certain loss and
some risk of physical harm to the mother.
But the issue of what to do with spare embryos which
are alive and not implanted lingers on. Two major avenues to
remedy the situation have been suggested: the first is that
the number of embryos created should not exceed the number
that can actually be implanted in a woman (Smith 1990:33);
the second is that if more embryos than are needed

ar~
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fertilized, then as some authors 7 have suggested, they ought
to be frozen for future implantations. It is more probable
and than not that an infertile couple who desires a child
would prefer to have their excess embryos, safely preserved,
than that they

w~uld

prefer to have them destroyed. Others

have even suggested they "should be treated as a person" on
the basis of a prima facie obligation only" (Richard A.
McCormick 1991:13) . 8

IVP/ET and harm of deformity to embryo
Another consideration of possible harm is that embryos
even if IVF/ET is successful, and the implanted embryo is
born alive but deformed what moral reasons could justify the
IVF/ET that brought it to life?
The real issue about this question, is not necessarily
that the child is deformed, as it is that the child will
suffer because he/she is deformed. The worst scenario one
can envision would be a situation where a child is severely
deformed. How does one balance the severity of sufferings
arising from such a deformity possibly as a consequence of

. "The Case Against Thawing Unused Fror.en Embryos" by David T. Ozar, in: Hastings Center Repon,
August 1985, pp. 7-12. ; What We May Do with Preembryos: A Response to Richard A. McCormick" by
John A. Robertson, in: Kennedy Institute cf Ethics Joumal, Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 1991,- Also •Resolving
Disputes Over Fror.en Embryos", by John A. Robertson, in: Hastings Center Repon, Nov./Dec. 1989, pp.
7-12 .

. "Who or What is the Embryo? by Richard A. McCormick, in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol.
1, No. 1, March 1991.
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IVF/ET procedures themselves with the fact that such
children are the products of IVF/ET which is undertaken to
alleviate sufferings due to infertility?
In one kind of case of possible deformity the infertile
couple together with the medical team know that they have a
significant risk of fertilizing a deformed baby. This risk
is nevertheless still less than a 100% chance of having no
children without IVF/ET. This means that the chance of risk
they are taking is worth taking because, the value being
pursued (having a child/the life of a child) is worth a lot
more than the risk. Although there may be some exceptions in
the case of severely painful deformities that would prevent
a child from experiencing parents' loving care in general by an argument analogous to the one offered above in
discussing psychological harm - it seems reasonable to hold
that to be born deformed is better not to be born at all.
This is to say that in the vast majority of cases, the risk
and procedure, are commensurate or in due proportion to the
value at stake (child), especially as there is no better
option available.
What is important is, how suffering is looked at in the
face of one's value systems. The following story may be apt
to help analyze the moral issue involved. A father narrated
his.experience about a genetically inherited, and
progressive disease, called "Fibrodysplasia Ossificans·
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Progressiva (FOP)", which his daughter, named Sarah, suffers
from. The rest of the story reads:

In Sarah's case it appears to be progressing faster
than expected. She is now seven and half years old. Her
jaws open only a centimeter and she has a crossbite.
Her neck, shoulders and spine are rigid. She can read
and write and feed herself but cannot dress or bathe
herself. She has trouble sitting in most chairs and
increasingly is confined to a wheelchair, one custommade for her rigid, contorted body. Her cognitive,
social and fine motor skills range from average to
superior, but her gross motor and daily living skills
are drastically sub-normal. She wears hearing aids
because the bones of the inner ear have fused (Steele
1994:2).

Sometime our imaginations about another person's pain,
or happiness are not accurate. Our first hearing of Sarah's
physical condition might chill our feelings because, being
in good physical health, we project how we might feel if we
were in Sarah's condition, to how Sarah actually feels. So
we draw the conclusion that she is suffering terribly. But
the fact may well be that Sarah, is not actually feeling as
we imagine and feel about her. In that case what we rightly
call a disvalue (Sarah' suffering) can be blown out of
proportion because our senses or imaginations deceive us or
because we are unable to put the disvalue (Sarah's
suffering) into proper perspective. But when we put it into
correct perspective, taking account of the human subject who
is directly involved in the suffering, then our value ·
judgment or perspective may also change.
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Sarah's father, makes the point clear when he states
that Sarah views her condition as narrated above differently
from the observer. "It may well be that this absurdity is
felt less by the disabled themselves than by their families"
{Steele 1994:2). Sarah's father illustrates his point:

Recently one of Sarah's friends tried to hold her arms
locked like Sarah's arms. She did this with the evident
intention to understand, not to mock. After a few
moments she gave up in frustration. Sarah, wise beyond
her years, said, "I'm used to it and she's not because
I've never known anything else" {Steele 1994:2).
The point therefore, is that, it is not necessarily
true that babies who may be born severely deformed through
IVF/ET process will actually suffer to the degree that we
imagine the suffering ourselves especially if they are
deeply loved and related to. And it remains true of course
that their state of life is not anything less than that of a
human being who must be valued and loved. This is not to
deny that they will experience sufferings, nor to deny that
their physical conditions may cause them limitations.
So to argue as has been done here is not to hold the
view that IVF/ET is trouble free. But then, like the
assisted reproductive technology of IVF/ET the ordinary
method of human reproduction carries with it a range of the
dangers and harms. The proper question is to weigh these
against the values to be gained.
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Other kinds of deformity not associated directly with
hereditary or genetic diseases, which may be attributable to
IVF/ET, can now be examined. It is possible that IVF/ET can
produces some children who will suffer serious deformity
because of problems with IVF/ET procedure itself. According
to Cynthia B. Cohen, data from Australia provide evidence of
some severe abnormalities attributed to IVF/ET. According to
the data, children born of IVF/ET

"are two or three times more likely to suffer such
serious diseases as spina bifida and transposition of
the great vessels (a heart abnormality) . The Australian
data also suggest that some drugs used to stimulate
women's ovaries to produce multiple oocytes in
preparation for IVF increase the risk of serious birth
impairments in the resulting children (1996:20}.

However, even critics of IVF/ET such as Kass claim that up
to 1985 no report of any severe abnormalities arising from
IVF/ET was made. Other studies seem to support Kass' claim.
For example, Cohen, in citing a conflicting evidence with
the Australian study, notes that:

"other reports, however, suggest that there is no
increase in disorders at birth among children resulting
from the use of the new reproductive technologies. One
small American follow-up study of the health status of
children born of IVF and gamete intraf allopian transfer
(GIFT) could find no significant differences in the
rate of physical or neurological abnormalities in
children born of techniques of assisted conception
(1996:20).
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But one cannot write off the Australian claim without
due consideration, because of the ever present possibility
of error in any human action. When that possibility is taken
seriously, it becomes credible that serious mental 9 or
physical deformity, by IVF/ET is possible. However, the
probability of deformed children being produced by IVF/ET,
is even less today than it was in the early days of the
technology, because the procedure has undergone so much
improvement. This means that infertile couples who are
sterile have lesser chances of bearing deformed babies by
IVF/ET (barring hereditary or genetic diseases which might
cause deformity), than they had twenty years ago when the
technology came into practical effect. In other words this
form of disvalue of the procedure is in decline and from the
available evidence has never been very great.
As was mentioned earlier, some authors are of the view
that IVF/ET would not.necessarily be immoral even if it
produces children with serious physical deformity, because
to be alive and deformed is better than not being alive at
all. For example, a certain author says that:

. Mental or psychological and emotional harm will be examined separately below.
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[A] higher incidence'of birth defects in such [IVF/ET]
offspring would not justify banning the technique in
order to protect the offspring, because without these
techniques these children would not have been born at
all. Unless their lives are so full of suffering as to
be worse than no life at all, a very unlikely
supposition, the defective children of such a union
have not been harmed if they would not have been born
health¥c (John A. Robertson 1988:434; square bracket
mine) . 0

But the arguments above are not all. The rate at which
embryos' lives are lost in IVF/ET raises legitimate moral
concern. Yes, it is true that the rate at which embryonic
lives are lost through IVF/ET, is important to merit serious
consideration when pursuing a view point that, is
representative of the new form of human reproduction. But,
it ought also to be said, without being polemical, that
similar loss of lives are not only not absent in the
ordinary method of human reproduction, but indeed are more
frequent in their occurrences as the statistics (2/3 of all
pregnancies) given earlier makes no effort to conceal. These
are antic evils that must be evaluated in comparison with
the values to be achieved.
It is the responsibility of humanity, especially those
who have the skill and knowledge, to lessen or prevent as
much as possible such antic evils especially as they
frustrate some of the primary goals (bearing children) of
the·procedure. Not tx:yin9 to prevent or lessen this antic
. Quotation cited by Cynthia Cohen in Hastings Center Report Vol. 26, No. 2, March-April 1996, p. 21.
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evil, would itself be a moral evil in so far as a person has
the know-how to lessen or prevent some of it. If someone
willfully fails to do so, knowing this evil to be a serious
evil that frustrates the well-being of some members of
society and therefore the development of humanity that would
be a serious moral wrong.
This responsibility to act is even more demanded of us
because knowledge as a resource, is itself a good, to
promote other good or even higher good (in our case human
life) . It seems compelling that we should prevent or lessen
these antic evils since the promotion of the good we seek
will not cause more antic evil than already occurs in
ord~nary

method of human reproduction. Such consideration

with those presented earlier, point to the conclusion that
all things considered, IVF/ET is not a disproportionate
means of achieving the rational person's goal of human
conception, given the

gravity of suffering of infertile

couples, the value of, and need for children.

IVP/ET and possible harm to the embryo's mother

It is possible that the life of the mother could be at
risk because of an ectopic pregnancy as a result of IVF/ET.
The issue is one of a vexing moral conflict between two
human lives, that is, risk to the mother's life for the sake
of the possible life of a child who might be born. As JoAnn
V. Pinkerton, and James J. Finnerty, note, the fact is "This
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is not a choice between absolute good and evil but an
attempt to balance two competing interests, both of which
pose nearly equal moral worth" (1996:292}.
But nearly egual is not the same as egual. For example,
in cases of ethical dilemmas involving embryonic-maternal
life conflicts in Nigeria, society grieves the death of the
woman more than it does over the death of the conceptus.
This is to say that the life of a mother, all things
considered, is relatively more valuable than that of the
conceptus. Several reasons can account for the more
sorrowing for the mother whose death is considered more
grievous than that of the fetus.
(1) The mother is a fully developed, actual person,

while the embryo is not considered a person yet though it
has the possibility to reach the status of a person. (2) The
mother occupies and excises actual and functional,
political, religious, economic position in the society; this
means that she does something meaningful and visible for
society. The fetus does not yet have such a place or
responsibility in society, though it has the potential. (3)
There is a special bond, for instance, the bond of
friendship, between the mother and the members of the
society which establishes a personal affect in the members
of this society on account of the mother's death. There is
no such relationship and interaction yet between the embryo
and any members of the human society except the limited
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interaction between the mother (and possibly father) and the
fetus.
These arguments do not suggest that the dead fetus is
not recognized as valuable or as an actual human being; As a
matter of fact Nigerians recognize pregnancy as "the first
indication that a new member of society is on the way"
(Mbiti 1969:110). But this recognition of the fetus as a
prospective full member of the human society, does not of
itself bring it to the status of a social person, a status
which only members of society can confer on it. Mbiti
explains:

In African societies, the birth of a child is a process
which begins long before the child's arrival in this
world and continues long thereafter. It is not just a
single event which can be recorded on a particular
date. Nature brings the child into the world, bl.lt.
society creates the child into a social being. a
cor::porate person. For it is the conununity which must
protect the child, feed it, bring it up, educate it and
in many other ways incorporate it into the wider
conununity. Children are the buds of society, and every
birth is the arrival of 'spring' when life shoots out
and the conununity thrives. The birth of a child is,
therefore, the concern not only of the parents but of
many relatives including the living and the departed.
Kinship plays an important role here, so that a child
cannot be exclusively 'my child' but only •our child'
( 19 69: 110) .
As Mbiti helps to clarify, what is grieved in the death
of a mother, that is different from that of the death of a
fetus, is the co:r::porate personality of the woman which
society has helped to create her into right from the moment
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of her birth; that is, all that it has helped her to become
culturally. Every child is created into the cor.:porate
culture of his or her sex. (The corporate personhood that
society will create a woman into in Nigeria, is different
from that of a man, without discriminating of their equality
as human beings/persons) .
The gravity of the loss of the mother of the fetus is
known by such verbal expressions as: "Who is going to take
care of the younger ones? (where the woman is known to have
children needing motherly care and protection}; or "she
could have had another chance to bear a child" (where the
woman has no child yet}. The later of these utterances, it
could be argued by those who believe that a fetus is a
person, carries little or no weight at all because the
mother is no more valuable than the fetus, for two of them
are equally human beings, with their individual
possibilities. Thus they could then contend that, the fetus
could have as much chances as the mother if it had survived,
to bear its own children and then keep open the line of
progeny.
These objections do not seem to counteract the view
that both mother and fetus are human beings equally valuable
as such. What it seems to fail to consider is the social
factor in creating who we are as social persons, a social
personality that a fetus so far lacks. As a consequence, if
the risk of ectopic pregnancy meant serious risk of death to
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the mother, that would be a serious argument against IVF/ET.
But there is very little evidence of such risk. It is a
legitimate question to pose, but there is so little risk
that it is not a reason to reject IVF/ET.

Conclusion

The consequentialist arguments against IVF/ET have been
examined and found wanting because the general risk of harm
to embryo, child, and mother are outweighed, often greatly
outweighed by the direct and indirect values achievable by
IVF/ET.
This chapter has noted that from the start, the
destruction, or wastage of human embryos has been one of the
vexing criteria for the opponents of IVF/ET to judge it as
immoral. The outcome of the analysis of available evidence
about psychological harm which children of IVF/ET would
suffer, does not support the claims·· of the opponents.
Children conceived by IVF/ET are happy that they were born
to their parents.
The analysis of available facts about the number of
embryos lost through ordinary method of human conception,
when compared with those lost through IVF/ET are far more
than the amount of embryos lost during IVF/ET; given the
fact that there are by far more fertile women in the world
who loose embryos through ectopic pregnancy than there are
of the number of infertile women who lose embryos through
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IVF/ET. Also given the overall value of children and the
disvalue which childlessness cause couples and society, the
risk of the action - bearing children and causing some harm
outweigh the risk of inaction - not causing harm and
therefore not having any children at all. In addition, the
birth of even one child successfully by IVF/ET means a lot
more than the dead ones because the live birth removes the
otherwise horrible stigma of sterility, and minimizes the
pain and suffering which the mother undergoes on account of
the dead embryos.
The back bone of the arguments of the opponents lose
their strength when measured against more evil consequences
of not having this technology as has been demonstrated in
this section. It therefore seems to this author that the
various above benefits far outweighs their opposing harms,
all things considered, to justify morally the technology of
IVF/ET for the benefit of infertile couples and society at
large. The introduction of this technology is urgently
needed in Nigeria, where infertility as against other
factors is the main cause for the separation of husband and
wife, and is the source of enormous emotional pain to
couples and society at large.

CllAPTER FIVE
A CONSEQUENTIALIST EXAMINATION OP PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO
IVP/ET.

Consequentialist, or proportionalist, arguments are
always comparative between alternative courses of action.
The previous chapter examined the benefits and possible
harms of IVF/ET. The main proposed alternatives to IVF/ET
will be examined here. The analysis will show that IVF/ET is
generally a better course of action than the alternatives
proposed by CDF and others. The chapter shall give a careful
and detailed analysis of the pros and cons of each
alternative to IVF/ET. In this connection,

(a) "adoption",

(b) "surgical reconstruction of the oviduct",

(c)

"acceptance of childlessness together with the development
of other avenues towards leading a worthwhile fulfilling
life", and (d), "polygamy" are the alternatives to be
examined. Obviously, the last alternative is not one
proposed by CDF; but it is a recourse traditionally taken in
Nigeria and therefore needs to be examined as well.
The thesis of this chapter is that a strong
consequentialist justification for policies supporting
IVF/ET instead of its rival policies can be made. The
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chapter will try to show that in general IVF/ET will produce
greater amount of values and lesser amount of disvalues than
any of its competing alternatives. This implies that its
thesis demands a careful analysis of the benefits and harms
of each rival alternatives. Such an analysis

~

neither

ignore how much the means (IVF/ET and its competing
alternatives) and end (genetic child) which IVF/ET and the
rival alternatives seek, are valued by those who seek them.
Since the advantages and disadvantages of IVF/ET have
already been addressed in the previous chapter, it is now
left to examine its competing alternatives.

Alternatives to IVF/ET
(a) Adoption

Adoption has been proposed as a way of meeting the
desires of infertile couples to have children and therefore
as a way to avoid the possible harms posed by IVF/ET. In
addition to that, some infertile couples may satisfy their
desires to have children by adopting other people's babies.
For instance, Uniacke says: "Legal adoption of a normal
infant, which in most cases would not be the biological
child of either partner, is an alternative which many
couples on the IVF program say they would welcome"
(19.88: 143).

The basic negative of this proposal is that the desire
of infertile couples to have children is ordinarily not
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simply a desire to have child/ren, but a desire to have
their~

genetic children. So adoption of another person's

child does not respond to the desire for a child of one's
own blood and the deep, sense of lack and incompleteness
attending this desire especially in cultures like Nigeria.
Besides, adoption has its own problems. Therefore a conflict
of values arises in choosing between the use of adoption and
IVF/ET to alleviate the problem of infertility suffered by
married couples.
Given this conflict, what justification is offered for
adoption as a more preferable policy than IVF/ET, with
regard to the needs and desires of infertile couples? How
can we morally assess the comparative values of the adoptive
system and IVF/ET? These questions can be answered by
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of adoption to
the people affected by infertility with those of IVF/ET done
in the previous chapter.

The advantages of adoption

One of the advantages of adoption is that it can
provide permanent home to abandoned children, who otherwise
would have no family they could call their own. Orphans
would benefit immensely from adoption for it would certainly
be .better to be adopted than to remain in a foster home
without parents. There are also some children who, were it
not for support of a policy of adoption, would have been
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aborted by their mothers for one reason or another. Those
children have life because adoption has been supported in
general. The biological parents of these children are also
spared of the moral guilt which the aborting of the children
would have caused them {for those who find abortion morally
objectionable). There are still some other children who
would have suffered inunensely in various ways because of
economic adversities of their genetic parents; or would have
been victims of some sort of social problems; but who now
find adoption as the best thing that could ever have
happened to them. The following could be illuminating: "an
eighteen-year-old located her birth-mother and learned that
all those she is genetically related to - mother, father,
and siblings - are alcoholics and drug addicts." (Jean A. S.
Strauss 1994:114).
In all these cases the children benefit from adoption,
as it is more valuable for them to have parents rather than
not. But to say that adoptees are better off having parents
is not to say that adoptees would prefer to have adoptive
parents than to have their genetic parents; nor is it to say
that adoptive parents would prefer adoption to having their
own genetic children. An analysis of some of the ills and
benefits of adoption

wou~d

give us a clue as to whether it

is more preferable and so more valuable to be adopted or to
have genetic parents, given a

hypo~hetical

condition that

the adoptive and genetic parents have similarly equivalent
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status. But these issues will shortly be discussed more
carefully in discussing the disadvantages of adoption.
Tbe joy of Parenthood, is therefore one of the most
important benefits and values in married life, which IVF/ET
sometimes brings to those, who, without this procedure,
would have been without the joy highlighted above. But does
not adoption bring parents the same· joy? As has already been
suggested above, to the Nigerian, life is most meaningful
when it is able to generate another·life for the
continuation of the human species. The most valuable
portrait one can paint of oneself is to have a child of
one's own genes to behold. It is from this horizon that a
non-Nigerian needs to be educated to listen to the heart
beat of childless couples who desire to have children of
their own genes rather than resorting to the adoption of
children who are other persons' portraits. Therefore, there
is a sharp difference for Nigerians and the many cultures
and individuals who are like them in.this regard, between
adoption and efforts to have one's own genetic child.
It should be borne in mind, moreover, that Nigeria is
not an individualistic culture. The community and extended
family structure of this society, implies that many more
people share the joy which IVF/ET makes possible by its
provision of a child to a childless couple. This contrasts
with the state of unhappiness which the condition of
barrenness brings with it to the community. Shared joy

244

implies shared sadness. That is, it is not the subjective or
selfish or idiosyncratic preferences of individuals for
genetic children that is at stake here. Very deep culturally
held values and a view of life's meaning are at stake. In
the view of this, it is not only more valuable to experience
the condition of joy in relation to bearing one's own
children through IVF/ET, in comparison to sadness in
relation to the state of infertility, it is also a far
greater value to strive for one's own genetic children
through IVF/ET than to resort to adoption.
It has been claimed that IVF/ET is a painful, and an
expensive process of childbearing. But it is a process worth
more than the price, pains and sufferings it involves and
worth more than the agonizing condition of childlessness in
marriage due to infertility. In its most literal meaning,
the local Nigerian saying: "the individual that has a human
being is wealthier than the individual that has money" is a
witness to the foregoing claim.
IVF/ET would in some measure be a valuable technique of
checking the threat of infertility as a menace to the
continuation of the human species. For from a Nigerian view
point, every line of human life that is threatened to die
out due to infertility, can be considered as an endangered
spe~ies.

Earlier in this work, we merely sketched out some

of the causes of infertility. Those causes and a

bunc~

of

others, if unchecked by some kind of medical intervention
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could proliferate and endanger some of the most talented
members of our human society.

The disadvantages of adoption

Adoption is fraught with its o'Wn inherent problems.
The most noteworthy of the problems·are psychological and
social in category. Some adoptee, their adoptive, and
genetic families can suffer significant psychological and
social damages. Sometimes adoption can be divisive of our
basic social institution - the family. The adoption case of
Jessica DeBoer is a classic example. Carole A. McKelvey and
Dr. JoEllen Stevens (1994) give a descriptive account of the
anguish of the genetic and adoptive parents of Jessica in
their legal battle to secure legal custody right of Jessica.
What follows is but a partial view of some of the negative
reactions of society, to the case referred to: "Thousands of
couples hoping to adopt also felt a catch in their throats.
With such dramatic evidence that birth parents can regain
their children, many grew reluctant to open themselves up to
such sorrow" {McKelvey and Stevens 1994:7, emphasis mine).
Imagine then, the sorrows and anguish which the adoptee's
biological and adoptive parents were going through, because
of fear of the possibility of losing Jessica. The sorrows
and. anguish of Jessica's adoptive parents must be imagined
with the true background that this couple is infertile.
Worse still, is the fact that a two,year old baby is in the
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middle of the turmoil and sufferings which have arisen from
her adoption.
Admittedly some of these difficulties with adoption for
adopted children and their parents could be lessened by
changing adoption policies. But there are many important
moral and public policy issues involved in such policies and
such changes may and perhaps should not happen. So adoption
must presently be compared with IVF/ET as it is, with all
the problems it has.
The search by an adoptee for his/her genetic parents or
mother or father, which follow long after adoption is
instructive for the present study. There is, for many
adoptees, a longing to find what is missing in one's life;
that what is missing is valuable in one's life to be sought
for. Or as one adoptee put it:

"Some adoptees, who never felt a part of their adopted
homes, perhaps are looking for a mother or father when
they choose to search. But I wasn't. I searched, not to
find parents, but to find pieces of myself that were
missing. I don't intend to make it sound like all I
wanted was to locate a data bank. I wanted to meet a
special person. She had given me life (Jean A.S.Strauss
1994:315).

This longing is closely tied to the longing for genetic
children by infertile couples. There is a deep need in
humans for genetic bonds to one another.
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In some instances, there is also a damaging
psychological effect which living in an adopted environment
can create in a child. Strauss {1994) describes the feelings
of some of the adoptees "interviewed for Jill Dremntz's
book, How It feels to Be Adopted "·
One adoptee narrates her state of discomfort in her
first reunion with her birth family:

"They had a big family gathering, which included
{several members of my birhtfamily) .... I was too
overwhelmed by it and felt uncomfortable. Everyone
treated me like a relative, which bothered me because I
didn't feel that way. At one point, someone who was
talking to me ref erred to (my birthmother) as "your
mom" and I didn't like that at all and said so. If I
hadn't said anything I would have felt guilty and that
wouldn't have helped in the long run" (Strauss
1994:312-313).

It was not just the adoptee•s well-being and feelings
that are at stake but also, those of other people who are
related to the adoptee either by blood or adoption. Such a
reunion one would imagine, should evoke joyful feelings. But
it is not always the case. Adoption often is spoken of in
hurtful words or language especially following a reunion of
an adoptee with his/her birth family. For the words or
language we use play essential role~'in our connectedness.
Terms such as "'Mother,' 'father,' 'daughter,' •son,' are
powerful words, words that automatically conjure up specific
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images and expectations" (Strauss 1994:313). They are
capable of evoking feelings of discomfort and sadness.
Consider this description:

Lee, my own birthmother, wrote of the time
following our reunion: "Jean is so hung up on labels
and names. I'm definitely not her mother, but I·
struggle with 'What am I?' Her two little boys are
related to me, but how?
Language or at least my preoccupation with it,
also drove my sister Sue crazy. She wrote, 'When people
call my sister Jean my half-sister I just cringe and
say, Which half is my sister? I know adoptees have
their mothers and sisters and brothers and nobody wants
to confuse anyone, but do we have to label everything?
What is my mother supposed to refer to Jean as? A
daughter? A birthdaughter? A fetus?!'
Lee is accurate in what she wrote about the months
following our reunion. I was hung up on labels and
names. I struggled to define who she was in relation to
me in my adult life. She had carried me for nine
months, given birth to me, then courageously let me go
(Jean A.S. Strauss 1994:313).

Jean is not alone in her concern about how to define
her ties with her birthfamily and therefore the confusion
and psychological imbalance she experiences. Another adoptee
wrote about her discomfort:

I wish you [her birthmother] would stop
identifying members of your family as ~ sisters, ~
aunts, etc. That makes me feel like I'm being pulled
into your family before I'm ready.
I just don't think of~ family as~ family. I don't
know if I ever will .... It's~ that I wanted to find,
not a family (Strauss 1994:316).
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In yet another interview, a young adoptee recalled:

It upset me when [my birthmother's] friends would say
stuff like, "So you're Alison's daughter." I didn't
know what to say. I sort of went along with it because
I didn't know what else they would call me, but by not
saying anything, I felt like I was taking away
something from my mom. It's confusing because I don't
know how to categorize my relationship with Alison. I
don't want to think of it as purely biological, but I
don't know how else to define it. I feel ridiculous
introducing her as "my friend," and yet I certainly
don't think of her as my mother (Strausss 1994:316317) .

One adoptee illustrate the unhealthy psychological
state of mind and confusion which can exist among adoptees,
their adoptive parents and their genetic parents, with an
analogy:

"As humans, we tend to describe the unknown by
comparing it to things that we already know. What do
frogs taste like? Kind of like chicken. Are they
chicken? No. And neither is your birthmother 100
percent your mother nor your adoptive mother 100
percent your mother (Strauss i994:317).

For many adoptees, then, it is very painful to be in
such a divided state of being and loyalty to two different
families' influences in one's existence. As Straus says, one
should not be surprised that many adoptive parents feel
extremely threatened by adoptees's search for their
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biological mothers or parents. One of the reasons for such a
threat is as Strauss correctly supposes that the need of
their adopted children to know their birthparents could
easily be interpreted as a failure on the part of the
adoptive parents. "If they had done a better job, their
child would not need this connection" (Strauss 1994:102).
The need for an adoptee to search his/her genetic
parents demonstrates an important fact about adoption in
relation to infertile couples; namely that an adopted child
is not completely the child of the adoptive parents. Another
fact is that the adopted child has two competing roots or
heritages. As Strauss explains: "The heritage through the
adoptive family is experiential and social, not physical"
(1994:103). In connection with this kind of realization,
Florence Fisher, has written that: "one •cannot sign away
chromosomes and genes ... '" (Lamport 1988:113). Consequently,
for infertile couples who might choose adoption, it remains
true that:

while the adoptee and the birth parents can begin to
resolve their loss and pain through being reunited, the
adoptive parents have no real ability to resolve their
own loss and pain. There exists no •search' tor them.
They can confront their pain and learn to accept their
losses ... But they cannot change that there is no one
for them to 'search' for . . . . The unborn children they
may grieve do not exist (Strauss 1994:103-104).
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The above citation among other things, makes clear the fact
that the desire of some infertile couples are not truly met
by adoption. As has been said already, when the adoptees
leave to reunite with their genetic parents, the pains and
reality of childlessness revisit and haunt their infertile
adoptive parents. Here, too, some of the points of the
adoptive situation might be lessened by children not seeking
birth-parents, etc. But the point is that there is a deep
human need for having genetic family relations that adoption
cannot satisfy and that IVF/ET, if successful, can. So a
policy that would favor adoption over IVF/ET would not
generally be the better option; IVF/ET should be supported.
Of course adoption does not only concern infertile
couples. It can be argued that adoptions serve the needs of
children much more, and the needs of a society seeking to
provide abandoned children or orphans with homes; that is,
much more than it satisfies the desires of childless couples
for children. For instance, it can be contended that the
adoption of children by numerous married couples who already
have many children of their own, is not an effort to satisfy
their own desire for a child but an attempt to provide the
parental and other needs of a motherless and fatherless
child. By doing so, society will address some of the
negative experiences which are direct results of children
being parentless. Opponents of IVF/ET, and advocates of
adoption, may also claim that a policy supporting IVF/ET
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exaggerates the desire of infertile couples to have their
own biological children. These opponents would argue, as
some have done, ·that

although some childless couple may

desire to have their own genetic children, "Not all
infertile couples will want children ... " (Uniacke 1988:243).
Granted!
Admittedly, for those who desire and need children, and
are absolutely satisfied with adoption, then having
biological children would be viewed as unnecessary. For such
couples, therefore, infertility would not be so serious
matter to warrant IVF/ET especially because some risk of
hann and many psychological and financial costs are
associated with the procedure.

The~~_adoptive

parents would

not view having their own genetic children as a great value,
but only having a child. So for these couples, having a
genetic child is not of a greater value than having an
adopted child. However, there are also many couples who
desire very strongly to have only their own genetic
children.
Moreover, it should be clearly borne in mind that, the
above advantages of adoption are only available in a society
where there are many children to adopt. In a society where
the circumstances for adoption are a rarity, as is the case
in Nigeria, the weight of the value.attached to adoption as
analyzed, therefore significantly diminishes. Given this
additional difficulty, as well as the risk of significant
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pains resulting from adoption, adoption seems to have
serious drawbacks as an alternative to IVF/ET, especially
for Nigeria's childless couples and cultures and countries
like it.

Some hidden dangers of adoption revisited:

As already mentioned, one might minimize pains of
adoption by keeping adoptive parents' identities secret. On
this topic there is plentiful evidence about the effects of
secrecy surrounding adoption. In the United States of
America where democracy is at its best: "Over the years the
child's best interest concept has evolved to enshroud the
adoption process in secrecy to the extent that forty-five
states and the District of Columbia have sealed records
statutes" (Lamport 1988:110). Lamport says that "The often
touted justification for secrecy is 'the best interest of
the child.'" This implies that vital information about the
pedigree of the child is inaccessible both to the adopted
child and to his/her adoptive parents. This issue of secrecy
underscores some of the inherent dangers in adoption.
"Children grow up and ask questions, questions their
adopted parents are unwilling or unable to answer." When
they are not told because of this unwillingness, "they are
left to wonder and fantasize, and later to search for the
information about their natural parents on their own"
(Lamport 1988:111).
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One can only imagine the mental agony that the adoptee
suffers upon learning that his/her ancestry is anonymous
(where at best the adoptive parents tell the child the truth
that he/she was adopted. Imagine further the psychological
anguish an adoptee and his/her adoptive parents go through
when a medical record that contains vital information of
utmost concern to the adoptee's health, is available but
he/she has no right to access it.simply because .of
maintaining the secrecy or anonymity of the adoptee•s
ancestry or parentage. "In a world where scientific progress
is as prolific as it is today, and where "adult adoptees are
becoming more aware of the importance of hereditary aspects
of illness, physical features and life span" (Lamport
1988:113); there will be increasing number of adoptees who
will like to have information about their medical history.
The current secrecy and anonymity in adoption certainly do
not augur well for the well-being of adoptees and their
future generations. The possibility of detecting a
deleterious hereditary disease or other defects which
sometimes are contributive to infertile conditions, are
rendered ever more remote within the prevalent secrecy in an
adoption.
An infertile couple who are aware of such secrecy but

who nevertheless adopts a child of an anonymous heritage
will always be filled with anxiety about the feature health
of the child. This is not to say that similar anxiety does
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not exist among fertile couples who are carriers of such
diseases, as has just been described. But, one's attention
is called to the difference in the anxieties alleged above.
The later is based on fact, the former is not.
Lamport reports yet another set of problems which are
particular to children of incestuous relationship; to the
medical doctor, and to the potential adoptive parents.
According to Lamport (1988), although the number of children
resulting from incestuous mating is difficult to ascertain,
because some of the women fail to report the father of the
child, incestuous children are seen frequently. These
children of incest "have increased risks of recessive
disorders such as homocystinuria, mental retardation, cystic
fibrosis, and various congenital malformations" (Lamport
1988:115). The following might make. the point clearer:

a child seen in the clinic was the product of a halfsibling mating. The common ancestor was the child's
grandmother. Both the grandmother and the father had
mental disorders. The grandmother was a diagnosed
paranoid schizophrenic and her son was also reported to
have severe mental difficulties. The child's risk for
schizophrenia was significantly increased because of
the increased number of common genes (Lamport
1988:115).

Given the value of children in Nigeria, and given the social
stigma of not having one, an infertile couple desperately
seeking a child of any kind,

(and there are many such
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instances in Nigeria), might adopt such a high risk child as
in the citation above. However, this couple would also have
to bear the daily burden of anxiety of what the child's
mental state might be in the future, and all the more so
given the proposal being considered here of total secrecy
about a child's birthparents. Such a policy is not an
obvious corrective to the problem of adoption already
discussed.
Numerous parents of IVF/ET children today are happy to
have their own genetic children through IVF/ET. They are
living evidence that IVF/ET can be the answer to the desire
of many couples vis-a-vis infertility. This is not to deny
the view that there are also many infertile couples whose
desire for children have been happily filled by adoption.
Nor should the fact be ignored that not all IVF/ET are
successful. Nevertheless, this point in conjunction with the
fact that not all IVF/ET are successful does not constitute
sufficient evidence to override a p9licy advocating IVF/ET.
Given the disadvantages of adoption, particularly on
the issue of adoptees searching for and reuniting with their
genetic parents, some infertile couples could never feel
that an adopted child could fill the void which a genetic
child of IVF/ET fills for them. In this sense then, a
genetic child is more valuable to some adoptive parents than
an adopted child would be to them. This is not to imply that
one child is more important or valuable than any other
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another per se. What it implies is that a genetic child of
IVF/ET, would be more valuable to some infertile couples
than an adopted child, since a genetic child is the only
child that can fill the emptiness which these childless
couples feel, that is, a child they can truly call their

mm.
(b) Surgical reconstruction of the oviduct and other
surgical procedures

Another alternative to IVF/ET is "surgical
reconstruction." Leon R. Kass is one of the proponents of
this alternative. The benefits of this procedure have been
summarized by Kass who concludes: "This therapeutic surgery
for women is without possible moral objection or adverse
social consequences" (1985:51). But not having moral
objection or social consequences does not by itself make it
more beneficial and more effective than other competing
alternatives nor preferable to those whose lives they seek
to affect, other things considered.
The values and disvalues must be weighed. Kass bases
his position on the risks to the embryo from IVF/ET. "The
use of IVF/ET to initiate a new human life - unlike oviduct
repair, ... and, of course, sexual union - involves the
necessary and deliberate manipulation of human embryo
itself" (1985:52}. According to Kass, the effect which
manipulation will have on the child, attracts serious· moral
questions about the safety of the embryo: "Does the parents'
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desire for a child {or the obstetrician's desire to help
them get one) entitle them to have it by methods which carry
for that child an unknown and untested risk of deformity or
malformation" (1985:52)? For that reason Kass concludes:

"Therefore, should both options be feasible and
available, oviduct repair is to be preferred over
artificial fertilization both in principle (namely, one
should use the least objectionable means to achieve the
same unobjectionable end) and in practice (1985: 51-2).

On this specific point of risk to the embryo, however,
it has already been argued above in Chapter Four that the
benefits of IVF/ET to all affected outweigh these risks.
Therefore, for Kass to make his case about surgical
repair being superior he would have to show that it yields
an even greater net value for those affected than IVF/ET
does. This he failed to do even in those cases where such
surgery addresses the actual cases of infertility because
oviduct repair is not a sure remedy and in fact has been
replaced by IVF/ET as the treatment of choice. Kass himself
writes:

There is an alternative treatment for infertility due
to tubal obstruction, namely surgical reconstruction of
the oviduct, which, if successful, permanently removes
the cause of infertility (i.e., it treats the
underlying disease, not merely the desire to have a
child). At present, the success rate for oviduct
reconstruction is only fair, but with effort and
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practice, this is bound to improve {1985:51; emphasis
mine) .

That is, it should be pointed out that "surgical
reconstruction" is not a certain alternative because, in the
citation above, the phrase "if successful", suggests that it
is still a conditional, an uncertainty, a mere hypothesis in
deed experimental. Kass fails to give any statistical
records of his suggested procedure's success rate, so the
most that can be said from Kass's advocacy at this point is
that infertile couples are no better off with this
alternative than they are without it either in particular or
in general. Further data on success rates will be offered
below.
But in addition, IVF/ET has long passed the
experimental stage. McShane's words in 1988 indicate that
IVF/ET was already an established practice and had been for
some time. "The accomplishment in 1978 of a normal birth
following fertilization of the egg outside the body was the
culmination of decades of reproductive research
{1988:34). aspirations of those

bu~~ened

II

by the disvalue of

infertility.
In addition, it should be recognized that, Kass's
alternative is seriously limited in its range of application
to infertile couples because, causes of infertility in women
are more than tubal obstruction. The prevalence of the major
causes of female infertility and the deficiencies of
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developed methods of treating them were among the reasons
for the development of IVF/ET in the first place. To this
fact, Mcshane says:

There have been major advances in the use of medication
(such as danazol) to treat endometriosis and some
progress in the surgical approach to adhesions and
tubal obstruction due to both infection and
endometriosis. But these are still the most difficult
category of fertility problems and were the original
reasons for the development of in vitro fertilization
(1988:33-34; emphasis mine).

It is quite obvious in the above citation that infertility
remained intransigent despite the major advances in the
areas emphasized. Therefore Kass's willingness to suggest
that IVF/ET should be set aside altogether in favor of
surgical oviduct repair is without foundation. In fact,
oviduct repair is of no value for a variety of infertility
conditions in men; these can be addressed presently only by
IVF/ET. For example, Patricia M. Mcshane explains this and
reinforces the previous point. "Tubal factor infertility is
the most common reason for using IVF, followed by male
infertility, unexplained infertility, and cervical or
immunological factors" (1988:34).
From Chapter One the reader may recall that "bilateral
absence of the vas deferens" is one of the major causes of
male infertility. Some statistics show that in these area of
common causes of infertility to which surgery is impotent,
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IVF/ET has been found useful. For example referring to
IVF/ET success rate, Mcshane documents that:

"one fertility unit reports that over a 2 year period,
infertile couples with ovulation disorders achieved
approximately 60% pregnancy rates; over 35% pregnancies
for those with male infertility, but only 25% success
for women with tubal damage or endometriosis"
(1988:34}.

The category of "unexplained infertility" is also
significant and cannot be assisted by oviduct repair. As
Foad Azem et al explain: "In a considerable proportion of
infertile couples, there seems to be no explanation for
their condition when standard methods of investigation are
used" (1994:1088}. The theory is that "Such unexplained
infertility may be the result of both male and female
factors" (Azem et al 1994:1088}. The following is
noteworthy:

The designation •unexplained infertility' is applied to
couples who have failed to achieve pregnancy despite
evaluations that uncover no obvious reasons for their
infertility or to those who remain infertile despite
correction of all detectable causes of infertility ....
Approximately 10% to 15% of infertile couples will be
diagnosed eventually as suffering from this entity
(Azem et al 1994:1090}.
This is why IVF/ET has become one of the standard
options today for fulfilling the desire of some infertile
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couples to have their one's own genetic children. As Azem et
al have said, "In recent years, the therapeutic options for
alleviating infertility have increased dramatically and now
include ovarian superovulation ... IVF, ... GIFT, and zygote
intrafallopian transfer" (1994:1090) . 1 In such cases neither
surgical reconstruction of the oviduct nor any form of
surgery for some conditions 2 which affect 40% of infertile
male can be of any avail.
This argument does not however, detract from the
sometimes positives results to be obtained from surgical
procedures. One such procedure is "subinguinal
varicocelectomy" 3 where varicoceles is the cause of some
male infertility. For example, the following positive result
was noted in a comparative study

made of infertile male

"patients undergoing laparoscopic varicocele repairs" and
those of infertile male "patients undergoing "subinguinal
varicocelectomies":

Pregnancies occurred in both treatment groups. Four
pregnancies occurred in the subinguinal treatment group
and two pregnancies occurred in the laparoscopic
treatment group. However, of these pregnancies, one
The reader is reminded that GIFT, and zygote intrafallopian transfer are not different from our
definition of ivf/et.
·
Varicoceles is one such conditions. "Varicoceles is an abnormal dilation of the veins of the spematic
cord..... its prevalence among infertile males is 400/o" (Erik Enquist et al 1994: 1092). Fortunately "Several
surgical treatments now are available for the ligation of varicoceles" (Erik Equist et al 1994: 1092).
Subinguinal varicoceletomy is a surgical procdure used to repair varicoceles. See footnote 2 in this
section.
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miscarriage occurred in the subinguinal treatment
group. (Enquist et al 1994:1095).

The above cited pregnancies occurred"among fourteen patients
who underwent laparoscopic surgery and 33 patients who
underwent subinguinal varicocelectomy, from January 1991 to
December 1992 (Enquist et al 1994:1094).
The value of a surgical procedure that can alleviate
infertility is that it avoids the risks to the embryo that
have been discussed above, and especially if its rate of
success for pregnancy has been found to be high. In the case
of varicocelectomy, the success rate stands much higher than
that of IVF/ET "37 to 42%" (Robert M. L. Winston and Alan H.
Handyside 1993:932).
However, it is clear that

such;~. surgical

procedures

cannot help childless couples whose childlessness is due to
other causes. To take one example, consider azoospermia.
"Azoospermia is conunon in the infertile male population"
(Herman Tournaye et al 1994:1045). According to Tournaye et
al, azoospermia is "caused either by spermatogenic arrest or
by obstruction of the genital tract" (1994:1045). It is
noteworthy that "Although there is no treatment for the
former cause, the latter can often be treated successfully
by f?Urgery" (Tournaye et al 1994:1045).
Kass's option for the surgical reconstruction of the
oviduct as the preferred solution to infertility rather than
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IVF/ET seems to have ignored the couples whose childlessness
may be as a result of spermatogenic arrests. There surely is
no reason to think that simply because a procedure is
surgical, its benefits are therefore significant; too many
surgical procedures have success rates that are appallingly
low. Tournaye et al give an example:

However, if azoospermia is the result of congenita.;I.
bilateral absence of the vas deferens, the classic
surgical approach, i.e., the creation of an alloplastic
spermatocele, has been reported to be successful in a
maximum of 4% of cases. Therefore this condition has
been viewed as almost irreversible sterility
(1994:1045).

By comparison IVF/ET at worst averages 3 to 4 times
greater success rate than the above. For example, Robert M.
L. Winston and Alan H. Handyside have said that:

Human in vitro fertilization (IVF) is surprisingly
unsuccessful. In the United States, overall birth rate
per IVF treatment cycle is 14%, from 16,405 oocyt
retrievals . . . . In Britain, the.live birth rate from
each IVF treatment cycle started is 12.5% ...
(1993:932).

But even at this low success rate of IVF/ET, it cannot be
argued that it is still much more beneficial both in terms
of ±ts percentage outcome and in terms of its comprehensive
application to all kinds of infertility problems and iessens
more of this antic evil than its competing alternative does.
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With specific regard to surgical reconstruction of the
oviduct to repair tubal blockage Kass says that "the success
rate for oviduct reconstruction is only fair" (1985:51). But
Uniacke writing 3 years later describes it as
"disappointing; and sometimes a woman's fallopian tubes are
not there to be repaired" (1988:243).
But the above contention is not all there is with
IVF/ET success rate. More recent developments in
Superovulation which makes possible more than one
fertilization at a time gives rise to even greater
opportunity for pregnancy, and so increases the rate of
IVF/ET success rate. For example, Winston and Handyside
attest to this when they say that IVF/ET:

Success is greater when more than one embryo is
transferred simultaneously. Superovulation hopefully
leads to fertilization of several oocytes, and it is
corrunon to transfer several embros to the uterus,
anticipating that at least one will implant (1993:932).

The direct outcome of this newer procedure is that higher
per centage of "Pregnancy resulted from 13% (184 out of
1436) of transfers when three or fewer embryos were
transferred, 25% (238 out of 944) with four, and 26% (229
out of 871) with five or six embryos" (Winston and Handyside
1993:932).
This development is not without some negative outcome.
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Superovulation and multiple embryo transfer. While
increasing the chance of success of pregnancy, also
increases the likelihood of deaths of embryos. Some of its
negative consequences have been reported:

Simultaneous transfer of multiple embryos increases the
incidence of multiple pregnancy and the possibility of
miscarriage and prematurity. Of triplets and
quadruplets born after IVF, 64.1% and 75%,
respectively, required admission to intensive care,
often for weeks. Multiple pregnancy also has
considerable social, social economic, and psychological
impact on parents. Prematurity after assisted
conception was associated with a perinatal mortality
rate of 27.2 1000 ... , three times the United Kingdom
average for births after natural conception. The
increased mortality was almost entirely due to multiple
pregnancy (1993:932).

Such negative results may seem to make the practice of
superovulation and multiply transfer of embryos on balance a
less desirable alternative than other methods of infertility
treatment. But the argument offered in Chapter Four led to
the conclusion that every single instance of risk to embryos
for the sake of having a genetic child is justifiable for
clear consequentialist or proportionalist reasons. If this
risk were sharply multiplied without a significant increase
of live births, this argument would have some weight. But
the increase in the number of embryos at risk occurs
together with a sharp increase in live births. Once again,
the realities of supperovulation and multiple embryo
transfer reminds us of the realities of antic evil in human
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action, and of the necessity of comparing all alternatives
in terms of the total values and disvalues brought about for
all affected. In this case, the argument offered in Chapter
Four still applies. Risk to embryos is more than balanced by
the value of possible life to the embryo and the value of
genetic children to the parents, especially in a culture
like Nigeria's.
In fact, more experience with perinatal mortality
associated with multiple transfer of embryos during IVF/ET
procedure, has produced valuable lessens to minimize the
antic evil of embryo death or. loss and to maximize success
rate of human conception and live birth through this means.
This is to say that the level of responsibility taken by
those involved with IVF/ET has been stepped up to minimize
embryo loss.
Added benefits that accrue from the knowledge gained
from these unintended mishaps is scientific understanding of
some pregnancy problems associated with of infertility, such
as miscarriages and the formation of abnormal ooytes.

"Superovulation preceded by desensitization of the
pituitary by gonadotrophin-releasing hormone (GnRH)
agonists, and reduction of luteinizing hormone
concentration, before egg collection may improve egg
maturation, which may in turn result in fewer
miscarriages. GnRH antagonists and recombinant
follicle-stimulating hormone (rFSH) may possibly help
reduce the incidence of defective oocytes" (Winston and
Handyside 1993:932).
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Or as Patricia M. Mcshane put it, "Meanwhile, IVF has had
tremendous impact on our understanding of fertility and
should help physicians in their approach to infertility in
the future" (1987:31). Among other points one might grasp
from here is that, all that is to be gained from IVF/ET, is
not only the reproduction of a child, though, this is its
chief goal; but also knowledge gained from both successful
and unsuccessful IVF/ET can help future patients and
medicine in general.
In fact, the knowledge gained has helped to
dramatically improve the success rate of IVF/ET some
programs. The following result is an example: "For the last
3 years, we have seldom transferred more than two embryos
simultaneously ... , and have been able to maintain pregnancy
rates of 37 to 42% per transfer with only the occasional
(1%) triplet pregnancy" (Winston and Handyside 1993:932) . 4
To return to the surgical procedure, there is also
evidence of similar efforts to improve surgical technique in
infertile conditions that permit surgery as means of
. Other studies or experiences drawn from ivf/et has shown that implanting numerous embryos at a time
increases chances of herterotopic pregnancies (the formation of pregnancy in an abnormal site) but reduction
of the number yields better result. For example, "In 1991, the maximum number of embryos transferred at
University Hospital [London, England) was reduced from five to three to lessen risk of multifetal IUP
[Intrauterine Pregnancy). It appears happily, that this reduction has an unforeseen tendency to reduce
heterotopic pregnancy also. . .. Risk of heterotopic gestation is augmented by transferring four or more
embryos." (Ian S. Tummon et al 1994:1067). This study goes ahead to share this piece of valuable
knowJedge with other clinics of ivf/et in these words: "Programs that do not limit uniformly embryo
numbers to three may wish to give consideration to such a limitation for women with distorted tubal
anatomy• (Ibid 1994:1067). Cf. also William Schoolcraft et al, •Jmproved controlled ovarian
hyperstimulation in poor responder in vitro fertilization patients with a microdose follicle-stimukiting
hormone flare, growth hormone protocar in, Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 1, Jan. 1997.
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alleviating infertility. The low rate of the success of the
surgical approach of alloplastic spermatocele, as indicated
above, has been improved upon by microsurgical method of
aspirating sperm in cases of "congenital bilateral absence
of the vas deferens". For example, Tournaye et al say that:

since the report by Temple Smith et al ... on the
successful use of microsurgically aspirated epididymal
sperm in IVF-ET, an effective fertility treatment for
these patients with congenital bilateral absence of the
vas deferens has become possible. The combination of
microsurgical epididymal ·sperm aspiration and IVF-ET
has been shown to off er couples who are suffering from
infertility because of congenital bilateral absence of
the vas def erens a chance to have their own genetic
children (1994:1045-1046).

But as one can see from this citation, this particular
microsurgical method still depends on IVF/ET before it can
produce children. So, this alternative neither equates with,
nor does it give evidence of being better than IVF/ET in the
attempts to lessen the problem of childlessness among
married couples. Nor, as has been indicated, are surgical
procedure comprehensive enough to tackle the broad range of
forms of infertility enumerated in our survey of issues with
some reasonable chances of success. The magnitude of types
of infertility simply overwhelms means of surgical
rec~nstruction.

Therefore IVF/ET when compared with

"surgical reconstruction of the oviduct" and other such
related surgical means, in their pros and cons, is more
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beneficial than this alternative and Kass•s effort to turn
attention away from IVF/ET and towards surgery is not
justified.
As a matter of fact, Kass himself seems to accept the
unavoidability of ontic evil in the form of risk to embryos,
and the consequent need to carefully weigh values and
disvalues when he writes:

To insist on more rigorous standards, especially when
we permit known carriers of genetic disease to
reproduce, would seem a denial of equal treatment to
infertile couples contemplating in vitro assistance. It
also gives undue weight to the importance of bodily
harm over risks of poor nurture and rearing after
birth, or, to repeat, against the goodness of bodily
life itself. Wouldn't the couple's great eagerness for
the child count, in the promise of increased parental
affection, toward offsetting even a slightly higher but
unknown risk of mental retardation? It should suffice
that the risks be comparable to those for ordinary
procreation, not much greater but no less (1985:55).

But Kass does not off er any argument to support his
final standard of no risk of harm greater than in ordinary
procreation. Infertility is itself an ontic evil; and the
means available to address and remove this evil may require
risks of harm to be faced that are greater than where this
evil does not exist. Kass's rigid standard is unjustified.·
What is needed is a conscientious weighing of all
alternatives in terms of all the values and disvalues they
produce.
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(c) Adjustment to infertility and acceptance of
childlessness as an alternative.

It was argued above, that some infertile couples may
not want children. With that understanding, some sterile
couples can adjust to infertility and accept childlessness.
This would mean that among other things, bearing children is
not at the top of the list of their value and needs. This
may be because the risks and burdens of IVF/ET and other
remedies are greater than the value of children or because
the suffering and unhappiness associated with childlessness
are not a great a negative for them. In this light Uniacke
is correct to note that the "type of infertility for which
IVF is a possible remedy results from a physical problem
which itself is not a barrier to a very healthy life"
(1988:244).
This perspective represents one end of a spectrum of
points of view of infertile couples. But as Uniacke
observes, at "the other extreme, some clearly become
distressed to the extent that the unfulfilled desire for a
child overshadows all other aspects of their lives"
(1988:244). But sufferings of

infertile couples need not be

extreme before they deserve our concern and attention. CDF
recognizes this when it says that the "suffering of spouses
who cannot have children or who are afraid of bringing a
handicapped child into the world is a suffering that
everyone must understand and properly evaluate" (1987:33),
as in deed it must now be.
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Some people may argue that after "an initial period of
even quite intense disappointment many people accept
infertility and lead qualitatively very good lives despite
it" (Uniacke 1988:244). It cannot be gain-said that whether
infertility is acceptable or not, depends heavily on whether
bearing one's own genetic children is a value that gives
principal meaning to and sustains couples in unity in
marriage. Much will depend on the amount of weight one
places on the value of children, and how much the overall
life style and well-being of couple would be negatively
affected or not if bearing genetic children is foregone. But
again, some couples who desire children but cannot bear them
suffer enormously. Even CDF, in its opposition to IVF/ET,
admits this fact when it says "The suffering of spouses who
cannot have children ... is a suffering that everyone must
understand ... " (CDF 1987:33). In fact, CDF considers the
desire to bear children to be a characteristic of the human
condition. For example, CDF says "On the part of spouses,
the desire for a child is natural" (1987:33); and CDF
acknowledges that: "This desire can be even stronger if the
couple is affected by sterility which appears incurable"
(1987:33-34).
The following statistical results of surveys among
var~ous

groups of people about their opinions on the use of

IVF/ET in the case of infertility reveal on one hand how
much infertility is disvalued, and on the other hand how
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much bearing a child is valued. The surveys also support the
view that infertile couple are more likely to be unable to
adjust to their infertile condition and accept
childlessness, than they are likely to adjust to these
conditions because widely accepted views in most societies
point in the same direction.
"A Japanese survey of married women aged 20-50 years in
May 1984 ... gave approval ratings for the use of IVF by a
married couple if it was their only means of having children
of 62%, with disapproval by 33% of respondents" (Macer
1994:29). Even priests gave positive approval. "Buddhist
priests ... were surveyed at the end of 1986, and 43%
approved of IVF for married couples with 22% disapproving
and 35% undecided" (Macer 1994:29). Still "Japanese
psychologists in a survey conducted in May 1983 ... 55%
approved, 16% disapproved and 27% were undecided" (Macer
1994:29). Yet in another survey conducted in New Zealand in
1984,

11

88% of respondents were in favor of IVF for use by

married couples, and only 8% were against" (Macer 1994:30).
In Switzerland, "74% of Swiss people overall supported
assisted procreation ... subject to restriction on embryo
storage" (Macer 1994:30) .·
These examples are only drawn from three societies, 5 of
course; but there is arguably a pattern of public opinion in

. African societies' views in this direction is discussed in some detail in the next alternative, "polygamy."
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favor of this method of human reproduction, IVF/ET, for
married couples, rather than holding that they should accept
infertility as an alternative.
If these are the views of people who are not affected
by infertility, it is surely likely, for a greater reason,
those who are directly affected would more approvingly
welcome this technology rather than merely accept their
situation. The proposal being examined here is that
acceptance of childlessness is a generally better
alternative than IVF/ET for infertile couples. While some
couples may accept it without great anguish, many do not and
many people in the general public who are not affected judge
their pains reasonable and the use of IVF/ET to try to
address them justifiable. No general rejection of IVF/ET can
be supported by such an argument. Instead each infertile
couple must conscientiously weigh .all the values and
disvalues involved in their own case; and public policy, it
has been argued should support IVF/ET as one of their
options.
It is important to say that an infertile woman who
desires to have her own child ordinarily is not simply
ref erring to the pleasure of being pregnant and actually
bearing the child. Infertile women suffer greatly by reason
of t?e absence of genetic offspring, of parenting and
sharing their life with their child, and other values-of

275

having genetic children discussed above. Consider this
statement from an infertile woman:

Please tell your readers it is never OK to ask, 'when
are you going to start a family?' What may seem like an
innocent question can be as painful as a stab in the
heart.
Childless couples ache when they see a beautiful
baby. They go completely to pieces when they read about
newborns found in plastic bags in dumpsters. They are
angry that life has treated them so unfairly and wonder
what they did wrong. They bargain with God, thinking
perhaps if they give up this or that, they might get
pregnant and have a child.
Going through test after test and from doctor to
doctor is pure agony. They live with the hope that the
next test will reveal some good news. After a while,
they are emotionally exhausted. They feel cheated and
"different." It seems that no one understands. But life
goes on, and friends and relatives get married and have
children. When they hear that the Smiths or the Joneses
are having their third or fourth and aren't very happy
about it, they become furious - then depressed. Why is
life so unfair (Anonymous author, Ann Landers 1996: c-4
1996:c-4)?

Such powerful suffering from infertility will be
especially conunon in cultures that view childlessness, as an
individual's break from the continuity between this and the
other world or between the human and the spiritual world.
This continuity issue is one of the major reasons for the
irreplaceable value which Africans generally place on
bearing their own genetic children. Thus Caldwell and
Caldwell write that,
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"the essence of the traditional belief system is the
importance attributed to the succession of the
generations, with the old tending to acquire even
greater and more awe-inspiring powers after death than
in this world and with the most frequent use of those
powers being to ensure the survival of the family of
descent (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987:409).

One would expect that acceptance of a life of
infertility would have some special means of ameliorating
the sufferings of childless couples to offer; for example,
by providing them with some value or point of view
sufficient to take the place of child-bearing in order to
make infertility tolerably acceptable. But, especially in
cultures like Nigeria, none is available. To an African or
Nigerian, it sounds too harsh, too inhuman, and very
surprisingly unsympathetic for anyone or group of people to
suggest that childless couples could use involuntary
infertility as an opportunity for services that promote the
well being of other peoples' children or families. Consider
the following lines:

Sterile couples must not forget that "even when
procreation is not possible, conjugal life does not for
this reason lose its value. Physical sterility in fact
can be for spouses the occasion for other important
services to the life of the human person, for example,
adoption, various forms of educational work, and
assistance to other families and to poor or handicapped
children" (CDF 1987:34; emphasis mine).

.

,. '
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In the eyes of the Nigerian society, the requirement
for an adult to contribute to the well-being of society is
the requirement to continue the line of progeny. It cannot
be simply replaced with some other form of service. This
requirement is not fulfilled until a child is born to a
couple. As Mbiti writes: "To be productive, in terms of
having children, is one of the essential attributes of being
a mature human being. The more productive a person is, the
more he contributes to the existence of society at large"
(1969:142). IVF/ET is therefore a far more valuable
alternative for an infertile couple who desires to fulfill
this essential human responsibility for the continuation of
human species than is adjustment to infertility and
acceptance of childlessness.
The heart of Mbiti•s statement is that in particular,
every married couple is happy when it fulfills this
essential attribute of being mature. In general, society is
also happy because new members are being added to its
number. To the contrary, infertility by its essence and
function blocks and frustrates both the essential attribute
and contribution to society by way of reproduction. As the
Igbos of Nigeria proverbially say: "He/She who has a person
is worth more than he/she who has money". Or as Onwuejeogwu
says, "the number of children a woman bears and their sex
enhances her •status'" (1975:25). This is not meant to imply
that, selfish enhancing of one's status is the goal of
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having children. If t.his was true, it would mean that
children are merely used as means and as property. Instead,
these words primarily mean that a person/couple who has
multiple children of both sexes has great satisfaction in
life because of their contribution for the continuation of
the human society and its well-being.

Polygamy'

Polygamy is a widespread phenomenon throughout Africa.
Mbiti affirms this fact by saying that getting "married to
two or more wives is a custom found.all over Africa, though
in some societies it is less common than in others"
(1969:142). This implies that although polygamy is an
African custom, it is not practiced by everyone; Mbiti
confirms this when he says that "The proportion of
polygamous families would not exceed more than twenty-five
per cent of the population even in societies where polygamy
is most practiced" (1969:144). Peter B. Hammond writes

. There are two kinds of Polygamy: "(a) polyandry - which exists when one woman has several
husbands; (b) polygeny - which exists when one man has several wives" A Commentary on the Code of
Canon Law:Marriage Today, by Bernard A. Siegle, 3rd. Revised ed. Alba House, New York, 1979, p. 25.
Throughout this section, this work refers to polygeny when the term "polygamy" is used. It will be assumed
that polygamy in the two senses above, is immoral. in the eyes pf many civil and religiosus societies, though
not necessarily in all cultures. It must be borne in mind that before Christian and Islamic religions came to
have foothold in Nigeria, there was nothing except Local Traditional religion; that is, a way of worshipping
God, which each individual person's or community's ancestors handed down to their children. But,
Traditional religion is not meant to connote a National organized religion comparable to Christianity or
Islam. So, polygamy is meant as a cultural practice, not a religious way of life.
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similarly that: "In most societies, however, regardless of
the preference for polygamy, most domestic groups are
monogamous ... " ( 1978: 186) . 7
However, among other important reasons for plural
marriage in Nigeria, infertility remains one of the major
reasons for this practice. Some men are polygamous

~

for

the purpose of the good it sometimes serves - a means to
bypass infertility in marriage in order to have children.
Therefore it will be useful to examine polygamy as another
alternative to IVF/ET, even though, of course, this is no.t.
an alternative proposed by CDF.
Surely, the most significant benefit of polygamy is
that it sometimes enables a married man whose wife is
infertile to have a child/ren if the man himself is fertile,
and that the second wife is also fertile. Some African
writers on the issue of marriage

h~ye.

noted that in African

marriages,

. The societies referred to in this quotation, are African societies, of which Nigeria is one, and by far the
most populated, and the most diverse. "In Nigeria there are at least two hundred and fifty languages languages, not dialects; while in each language area there are several dialects some of which are almost
distinct, different languages." African Traditional Religion A Definition, by E. Bolaji ldowu, SCM Press
Ltd, 58 Boomsbury Street, London WCI .. A fuller account of why polygamy came to be condemned as
immoral and by who, can be found in, Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891, by J.F. A. Ajayi, Longman
Group LTD, London, England, 1965:103-108. See also '/he Missionary Impact on Modem Nigeria 18421914, --1 Political and Social Analysis, by Ayandele, Longman Group LTD, Longman House, Bur:nt Mill,
Harlow, Essex, U. K. 1966: 334-338. What follows is significant: "The high sexual morality that prevailed
in the traditional society was upset by W estem civilization and its conception of monogamy, missionary
enterprise beginning the process in the greater part of Southern Nigeria" (Ayandele 1966:336). It will be
assumed here that polygamy is immoral.
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"If the first wife has no children, ... , it follows
almost without exception that her husband will add
another wife, partly to remedy the immediate concern of
childlessness, and partly to remove the shame and
anxiety of apparent unproductivity (Mbiti 1969:142).

Obvious in this citation, are two goods which a
fruitful polygamy accomplishes, namely "to remedy the
immediate concern of childlessness"; that is to bear
children, and secondarily "to remove the shame and anxiety
of apparent unproductivity." Two additional benefits of a
fruitful polygamy in the circumstance under consideration
are noteworthy. One is that another woman is made happy,
both by the fact that she is married and by the fact that
she has born a child to keep open her line of human
succession. The other is that it preserves both the first
marriage and the second one. This is to say that polygamy as
a means of bypassing infertility, when fruitful also helps
to unite the man and his two wives.
But polygamy can have a down-side too. Experience drawn
from polygamous marriages shows that this double union is
not always possible. When this unity_between first wife and
her polygamous husband is not possible, the evil
consequences can be enormous. But proponents of polygamous
marriages in the circumstances in view will argue that
whatever the disadvantages are, as will be shown shortly,
polygamy that fulfills the two ends of bearing children and
removing shame of unproductively is still morally justified,
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because when these two good ends are achieved, especially
the bearing of a child, then the goods outweigh all the
evils of polygamy.
The claim that a polygamous marriage unites the first
wife and her husband is intended to indicate also that
polygamy prevents divorce. In order words, instead of a man
divorcing his first wife for the reason of her infertility,
he still lives and relates with her as his wife. But this
does not mean that some husbands do not divorce their
childless wives in order to marry another woman to bear a
child, nor does it imply that some childless husbands do not
neglect their wives, and bear children extramaritally
{through adultery) while still living with their infertile
wives.
The second aspect of the good of polygamy in the
citation from Mbiti is to "remove the shame and anxiety of
apparent unproductivity." This is a very secondary issue, in
fact, and is contingent on the possibility of the primary
goal of polygamy, namely to bear children. But the
achievement of both of this principal goal and the secondary
one must be seen in proper context: .o.n.C! with reference to
the husband. The child to be born or that is born by a man's
second wife whose first wife is infertile satisfies .o.n.C!
desire for a child by the man or by the new marriage. It
does not satisfies desire for a child in the first marriage
except with reference to the husband.
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So, a husband who resorts to polygamy to resolve the
problem posed by infertility of his wife, does not actually
solve the problem, but simply identifies the personal source
of the problem. The husband has only succeeded in
vindicating himself from blame in public eyes when his
second wife is able to conceive and bear a child; his first
wife remains infertile. This vindication has also a negative
implication, putting the blame for childlessness of his
first marriage on his first wife. Bearing this blame would
understandably have a damaging and lasting negative
psychological sense of worthlessness, guilt, and shame for
his first wife. In other words, the good value that resulted
from the man marrying a second wife and bearing a child/ren
is also accompanied by a lasting evil impact on the first
wife.
In many cases the childless woman develops ill feelings
against her husband and jealousy towards his new wife. In .
many instances too, feelings of enmity develops in the
household. This kind of enmity happens most often when the
childless woman is in opposition with her husband's marrying
another woman out of unflinching loyalty to the demands of
Christian church authority. As Isichei records: "Some women
were empowered by church support to refuse an unacceptable
marriage, or leave one, especially where polygamy was
involved" (1995:240). Usually such tensions and disagreement
in the new polygamous household has a ripple effect
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spiraling from the family to their extended families,
creating alienation of one extended family from the other.
This in turn affects social life and leads to boycotting of
social events or community developmental programs.
However, such a step on the part of a husband to
marry another woman, instead of bearing the suffering of
childlessness with his infertile wife, only reinforces the
claim made earlier in this work about the irreplaceable
value attached to child-bearing in Nigeria. Also such a step
on the part of the husband is unfair to his first wife in
other ways, but more especially in the particular sense that
the husband preserves only his own lineage at the expense of
his first wife.
Some authors have pointed out some other
disadvantages which critics of polygamy see in the use of
plural marriage as a means to bypass infertility. For
example, Mbiti notes that "Quarrels and fights among the
wives ... are not infrequent" (1969:143}. But is the
possibility, or even probability of frequent quarrels, a
strong enough disvalue to override the value in the resort
to a second wife as a means to the desired child and the
general human good of continuity brought about by this
means? It does not seem so. People know before entering into
marr~age

that quarrel is a strong probability, even between

husband and wife, with or without children. Or as Mbit.i
says, "the problems of polygamous families are human
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problems and are not necessarily created by polygamy as
such; nor have they been solved or avoided in monogamous
families either in Africa or Europe and America

(1969:144).

So, the objection -that the wives of a polygamous marriage
will quarrel is not a strong objection to override the good
sought after by polygamous means. On this score, polygamy
may appear to be a positively valuable practice on balance.
But other criticisms against polygamy as a way of
bypassing childlessness seem quite strong, on the basis that
it is disrespectful to the dignity of a woman. Experience
drawn from the common occurrence among polygamous households
seem to bear out the fact that the husband in the special
condition under consideration gives preferential treatment
to the wife who bears a child over the barren wife. Such
practices will often compromise the dignity of his first but
infertile wife. For example, Mbiti says it "is cruel for the
husband to neglect some wives because he favors others
especially the latest additions" (1969:143).
If it is true, as Mbiti says above, that some
people (though unjustly) can favor their latest addition of
wives, certainly then, it will be true that a man is even
more likely to favor his new wife with a child/ren than the
one without child/ren, given the pre-eminent value attached
to children. This cruelty of neglect frequently leads the
childless wife to even greater evils - divorce of her
husband - an action which some Nigerian writers perceive and
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interpret as a personal catastrophe, and one which must be
avoided at any cost (cf. Nicholas N. Obi 1987:91). Again,
divorce itself, by definition, severs the love and unity of
relationship between the woman and her husband. In many
cases, the woman is so aware of her helplessness that she
embraces prostitution, partly as a reaction to the neglect
of her husband and partly as reaction to her woeful failure
in life to bear children. So Nicholas N. Obi writing about
the variety of reasons for prostitution in Nigeria, notes
that "For a married girl or woman, childlessness may well
push her into it" (1987:109).
Obi goes ahead to point out both the potential and
the and actual hazards prostitution is fraught with in what
follows:

How odd, this world of ours! If it wasn't as odd,
we would since have known that prostitution is nonreproductive and incompatible with the family system
and therefore downright dysfunctional, and , if
sufficiently widespread, would bring about a society's
collapse. We would have known that since this ill is
visible in our streets, it is most unhealthy to our
youths. We would, undoubtedly, have seen prostitution
as a social problem because, among other things, it
institutionalizes the use of sex for pleasure alone, to
say nothing of bastards that are brought into the world
as a result. We sure would have all been aware of other
social problems associated with prostitution - the
spread of venereal disease, for example; ...
(1987:110).

Moreover, the awareness on the part of the·
infertile woman that she is involved in prostitution, which
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is a social evil which no descent family wants to be
associated with, may lead her then to flee even her own
parental family and community. In so doing, polygamy
together with the woman's infertility becomes the beginning
of a chain of events involving dissociation of spouses and
then even families - a great evil. 8
Because of the intricate nature of the Nigerian
culture, other ways are available to avoid or minimize
dissociation of husband and wife and their families, and the
personal and social harms following divorce, and thereby
maintaining unity. For example, in the Igbo sub-culture of
Nigeria, by agreement with her husband, a barren woman
sometimes freely arranges a second wife to bear children for
her husband when she (the first wife) is the source of
childlessness in the first marriage. This means that the
woman realizes the indispensable value of a child in a
marriage; but it also implies that the first wife and her
husband are not willing to be separated from each other on
account of the love they have for each other. In this
instance, polygamy acts as a mediating factor, a socially
acceptable therapeutic remedy for childlessness and other

.A fuller account of why polygamy came to be condemned as immoral and by who, can be found in,
Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891, by J.F. A. Ajayi, Longman Group LTD, London, England,
1965:1~3-108. See also The Missionary Impact on Modem Nigeria 1842-1914, A Political and Social
Analysis, by Ayandele, Longman Group LTD, Longman House, Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex, U. K. 1966:
334-338. What follows is significant: "The high sexual morality that prevailed in the traditional society was
upset by Western civilization and its conception of monogamy, missionary enterprise beginning the process
in the greater part of Southern Nigeria" (Ayandele 1966:336) ..
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evii consequences of infertility as well as a preyentiye to
diyorce and prostitution to which childlessness and polygamy
so often lead.
But even this more positive practice has its own
evils. In the culture that practices it (or used to practice
it), the second wife is seen as the wife of the first wife
so to say, because she arranged for her, even most probably
arranged for all the financial costs in the name of her
husband; but above all she chose the second wife because
after all due personal inquiries and observation of the incoming new wife, the first wife believes she can live in
harmony with her. Unfortunately, in many cases of this sort,
the second wife plays more of the role of a servant to her
husband's first wife. But the servile harmonious good
relationship between the second wife and the first wife does
not always last, and even where it lasts, such a servilernarital relationship seems among other things in discord to
the unity and equality of relationship that marriage calls
for.
In addition, a man who is considering polygamy or
IVF/ET in terms of their costs, should not only consider the
cost of marrying another wife, but also the uncertainty of
marrying another infertile woman together with all the
suff~rings

involved for himself and the new wife. For the

practice of polygamy is not a guarantee of fertility and
offspring.
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Since infertility in marriage can also be caused by
some reproductive deficiency on the part of a man, including
chromosomal aberrations, or defective sperms which may be
responsible to series of spontaneous abortions which leave a
woman childless, then a husband who is the direct source of
childlessness in marriage is not always immune from the
negative consequences of his reproductive incapability. The
negative psychological (guilt, shame, depression, feeling of
worthlessness) impact which a woman awareness of her
infertility has on her, especially when it has become public
knowledge, are replicated on the husband when he is the
direct source of childlessness in their marriage. But the
result is even worse on a man if his wife decides to pursue
the good of bearing a genetic child and so also to escape
the stigma of infertility. In most cases of this sort the
consequence is divorce.
For while a husband may not divorce his first wife if
she is infertile, a woman can divorce her husband if he is
the sole source of their childlessness. The reason behind
such non-reciprocal behavior is that Nigeria is a
patrilineal society. This means that a woman cannot marry
another man without divorcing or separating from her first
husband because for reasons of lineage within society,
polyandry is not practiced in Nigeria. The only way such a
wife can bear her own child/ren is ._if she divorces her
infertile husband and marries another man, or if she begets
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a child/ren extra-maritally. Thus, in Nigeria the wife of an
infertile husband may go out and have a sexual relationship
with a man outside of or even within the local community in
order to have a child. Or as Mbiti says: "Where the husband
is impotent or sterile, his 'brother' can perform the sexual
duties and fertilize the wife tor him, and thus save the
marriage from breaking down" (1969: 145). 9 In this
situation, as in the case described above where the husband
preserves his own lineage by marrying and bearing a
child/ren by another woman, so does the wife (so to say)
preserve her own lineage by bearing a child with another
man, though not from her legal husband.
Obviously, when childlessness causes a divorce or
separation, the unity between husband and wife is
automatically broken. Here again, the theme of the
indispensable role played by

procre~tion

in Nigerian

marriages, and the irreplaceable yalue of children in the
Nigerian culture, is demonstrated by the woman's behavior
(divorce or separation) in pursuit of this good/end (child) .
But there are evil in the practices just discussed as well.
When a wife leaves her husband for the known reason that he
is infertile, the husband and his family members are
bumiliated and exposed to shame. But this is not all. The
humiliation and shame to which the husband and his family

. The moral implication of this quotation will be addressed shortly.
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are exposed has a long term negative effect on them because
the husband will never be able to marry again. For in
Nigeria, marriage involves the whole community. Mutual
inquiries are instituted regarding the character and values
of a man and a woman, along with their families, who seek to
be in marital relationship with each another. This means
that the man's inability to fertilize a woman or other
problem of infertility will be exposed to another woman and
her family members whose hand may be sought in marriage.
Therefore, the psychological pain will therefore also
fall on members of the husband's larger or extended family
when the wife divorces or separates from her husband. Given
what was learned in the section of psychological harm in
Chapter Four, it seems clear that, in general, this has a
much more long damaging effect than knowledge by a child
that he/she is a product of IVF/ET would have on him/her.
In Nigeria, a child who is a product of adultery, has
at least two major issues which may be sources of
psychological problems to him/her. The first is that he/she
is faced with the problem of resemblance. The second is that
he/she will face the problem of genealogy/lineage. "From
where comes this child who neither resembles his father or
his mother?" is typical of the kind of questions members of
the community ask, especially if the child is a male in
which case there is evidence through lack of resemblance
that the infertile husband is not the father of the boy.
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This kind of a situation can create a lot of stress and
psychological problem of identity for the child, who may
latter learn the conditions surrounding his conception and
birth. Also, the husband may not be happy with the knowledge
that he is not the father of the child. The situation can
present a crushing feeling of emptiness or incompleteness,
shame and worthlessness with reference to his incapacity to
have his own child through conjugal act.
The atmosphere in the household, is one of uneasiness,
especially where the husband and wife are not in agreement
with each other about the method of the conception of the
child. The conception of a child due to adultery of the kind
being described, sometimes ends up with the woman simply
leaving or divorcing her husband; in order to marry the man
responsible for her pregnancy. As Mbiti writes: "In the
African situation what constitutes a divorce must be viewed
against the fact that marriage is a 'process'. In many
societies that 'process' is complete only when the first
child is born, ... (1969:145). This simply means that a
marriage is insecure, and is most likely to break up if no
child is born within a certain period of years.
An additional evil of the practice of polygamy in

the specific instance where the wife/woman is the reason for
chil~lessness

is that, it is heavily prejudiced against

married infertile women in favor of men. For, while the
practice permits men to marry other women in order for them
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to satisfy their desires for children, it does not permit
women to satisfy similar desires on their part. In this way
it leaves the genealogy issue incompletely attended to
because it is helpful only to the men. Ancestry may be
maintained for a man and his second, or third wife, it is
broken for his first wife. The question that arises in all
of the above benefits and harms of polygamy as a means of
bypassing infertility, is whether polygamy is a better
alternative to address the problem of childlessness than
IVF/ET?
A clarification of Mbiti's citation above is important
now. Mbiti's presentation of the need for one's brother to
impregnate his wife in order to preserve the marriage from
breaking down, may lead a non-African the wrong impression
that incest is a welcome practice in Nigeria. It is not. But
the value and need for a child could compel a woman to
engage in otherwise morally prohibited sexual behavior such
as Mbiti described, even though that kind of behavior is
severely punished as well. For, just as infertility is a
sufficient reason for divorce, adultery within or outside of
the community is also sufficient ground for divorce. In this
connection M. Angulu Onwuegeogwu writes: "The most common
grounds for the divorce of a woman are: real or assumed
barrenness;

acts which bring her into public disrepute;

adultery with a kinsman" (1975:91).
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However, when the issue is infertility where the man is
the reason for childlessness, most men allow their wives to
bear children for them through adulterous practices. The
reason for such a permission is that

.llQ

man in Nigeria would

willingly submit to public knowledge of impotence or
infertility on his part. The notion of a man's inability to
bear a child is without exaggeration, one of the most
humiliating of all humiliating issues for a Nigerian man. It
would be preferable to a man to divorce his wife or instead
to permit his wife to bear children through adultery than to
acknowledge that he is incapable of bearing a child.
Nigerian culture, as indicated, sees a marriage as empty if
it does not produce children and this cultural judgment does
not exclude the Catholic segment of its population who are
infertile.
When one compares the very limited benefits and all the
evils following from polygamy as described here with the
risks and great benefits of successful IVF/ET one finds a
marked difference. The major issues involved are firstly, to
bear a genetic child and secondly to safeguard unity in
marriage. It is obvious that polygamy is incapable of
actually assisting the childless couple to bear a child of
their own genes without another woman when either the wife
or the husband is the source of childlessness. Polygamy
extends the family, but leaves key parts of the value of
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lineage and continuity unaddressed, and brings many evils as
well.
But when successful, IVF/ET is able to help the couple
to bear their own genetic child/ren when either or both of
them are contributors to childlessness. In this way, the
issue of dissociation arising from divorce, and the further
social evil of prostitution which arises from it are guarded
against, and unity of spouses as well as social health are
preserved. In addition and more importantly, the child that
is born preserves both the lineage of his/her parents and
his/her own proper parental identity. In other words, the
child will not suffer from any psychological problem arising
from lack of real knowledge of his/her biological identity
as the child born of adulterous relationship would.
Firstly then, it was already

~iscussed

that the overall

good to the parties involved - parents, the larger society,
the child born, and posterity, in the means of IVF/ET
outweigh all the negatives of this technology. But the
practice of polygamy involves more evils than benefits. In
allowing a husband to marry another wife to bear a child
polygamy does not fully consider the good of his first wife
nor the good of society, nor that of posterity, but only the
husband's own point of view. Such a means also encourages
the variety of serious evil consequences embedded in
polygamy. Those evils - divorce and prostitution, cause
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social ill-health that are harmful to individuals and
society.
Their negative impact on society as a whole outweigh
the good brought about by polygamy, because this particular
good - the child, will eventually suffer the harm produced
by this particular means. This argument holds also for a
woman who is considering to divorce her husband on account
of infertility and marry another man in order to have a
child.
In view of the various facts shown by the analysis of
the competing alternatives to IVF/ET, some conclusions
become obvi6us. IVF/ET has an overwhelming advantages over
the other competing alternatives. (1), it is able to help
some infertile couples to reproduce their own genetic
children while some cannot, as was seen in the examination
of IVF/ET versus "adoption" and "acceptance of infertility
... " (2), IVF/ET is a better alternative to surgical
reconstruction of the oviduct and other surgical procedures
because it is much more comprehensive of the variety of
infertility conditions it can sometime bypass to produce
children than this alternative which is limited in its
scope. (3) It is a superior alternative to polygamy because
it is able to preserve the genealogies of both spouses and
prevents unnecessary social evils that are damaging to
social life as a whole.
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In all of the above, what is suggested is not that
IVF/ET should replace any or all of the alternatives because
IVF/ET is not perfect, just as the traditional means of
human conception is not perfect. There may be situations
that may allow the use of any of the other alternatives
instead of IVF/ET although the evils of polygamy are
considerable and the most difficult to justify (with
reference to IVF/ET) . For example if a couple decides that
they are better off adopting rather than using IVF/ET to
bear and raise children, then in that specific instance it
would be more beneficial to them all things considered to
use that method than to employ the services of IVF/ET. This
is to say that the availability of more than one option to
an infertile couple to have a child, in order to lessen the
amount of suffering or harm involuntary childlessness
imposes on them, makes each of the available means of human
conception and methods of bypassing infertility
complementary to one another.
Therefore opponents to IVF/ET are not justified in
condemning IVF/ET as inunoral on the basis that it is fraught
with more harm than the other suggested alternatives. For
the investigations of this chapter have shown that this
technological procedure is in fact superior to the other
alternatives in terms of yielding more benefits and
incurring less harm when the whole human good is considered.
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation has made a carefully focused
consequentialist/proportionalist philosophical examination
and critique of CDF's deontological philosophical arguments
on the morality of IVF/ET; and applied the findings of this
critique to the Nigerian cultural framework. Both CDF's
position and this dissertation's are two different
interpretations of Thomas Aquinas' on natural law morality.
Chapter One set the scene of the arguments of this
dissertation by reviewing the biological presuppositions of,
and then the general arguments about IVF/ET focusing on
homologous IVF/ET. Chapter Two provided a philosophical
background for a proper understanding of the meaning of
natural law. Chapter Three provided a more precise ethical
philosophical foundation for CDF's document againt IVF/ET;
gave a textual exposition of CDF's arguments, and showed
that CDF's main deontological argument is fundamentally
flawed. Chapters Four and Five take a consequentialist or
proportionalist approach to the morality of IVF/ET, basing
their reasoning on value assumptions about children that CDF
itself accepts. More precisely Chapter Four examined the
risks and harm and benefits of IVF/ET, and showed that, in
general, the practice of IVF/ET yields more goods than harms
for.those involved, especially in a culture like Nigeria. A
comparison of IVF/ET with other alternatives was the subject
matter of Chapter Five. In each case, it was shown that

298

IVF/ET in general yields a better balance of good over evil
than the other alternatives {adoption, surgical
reconstruction of the oviduct and other surgical procedures,
acceptance of childlessness together with the development of
other avenues towards leading a worthwile fulfilling life,
and polygamy) . For example, {1) , it is able to help some
infertile couples to reproduce their own genetic children
while some cannot, as was seen in the examination of IVF/ET
versus "adoption" and "acceptance of infertility ... " (2),
IVF/ET is a better alternative to surgical reconstruction of
the oviduct and other surgical procedures because it is much
more comprehensive of the variety of infertility conditions
it can sometime bypass to produce children than this
alternative which is limited in its scope. {3) It is a
superior alternative to polygamy because it is able to
preserve the genealogies of both spouses and prevents
unnecessary social evils that are damaging to social life as
a whole.
In all of the above, what is suggested is not that
IVF/ET should replace any or all of the alternatives because
IVF/ET is not perfect, just as the traditional means of
human conception is not perfect. There may be situations
that may allow the use of any of the other alternatives
instead of IVF/ET although the evils of polygamy are
considerable and the most difficult to justify {with
reference to IVF/ET) . If a couple decides that they are
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better off adopting rather than using IVF/ET to bear and
raise children, then in that specific instance it would be
more beneficial to them all things considered to use that
method than to employ the services of IVF/ET. This is to say
that the availability of more than one option to an
infertile couple to have a child, in order to lessen the
amount of suffering or harm involuntary childlessness
imposes on them, makes each of the available means of human
conception and methods of bypassing infertility
complementary to one another. Therefore opponents to IVF/ET
are not justified in condemning IVF/ET as inunoral on the
basis that it is fraught with more harm than the other
suggested alternatives.
By properly articulating the natural law philosophical
argument on which CDF bases its deontological arguments,
giving them careful critical philosophical examination, I
hope that it will be a genuine contribution to scholarhip as
well as an open door invitation to more carefull scholarly
discussion of CDF's position without its ecclesiastical
aura.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. DOCUMENTS/DICTIONARIES
Airalsinen, Time and Gasparski Wojciech [eds.]. 19 ....
Practical Philosophy and Action Tbeo:r:y - Praxiology:
The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and
Methodology. New Brunswick, London: Transaction
Publishers.
Cauchy, Venant [ed.]. 1988. Philosophy and Culture:
Proceedings of the XVIIth warld Congress of Philosophy
I.I..... Montreal: Editions Montmorency .
. 1988. Philosophy and Culture:
Proceedings of the XVIIth warld Congress of Philosophy
~Montreal: Editions Montmorency.

~~~~~~__,...~~~~

Congregation For The Doctrine Of Faith. 1987. Instruction On
Respect For Human Life In Its Origin And On The
Dignity Of Procreation: Replies To Certain Questions Of
The Day. Vatican City: Edition
Edwards, Paul et al. [eds.]. 1972 Tbe Encyclapedia of
Philosophy, Vols. 3-6. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Co., Inc. & The Free Press.
The Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society.1986.
'Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive
Technologies.' Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 46, No. 3,
Sep. 1986.
International Society 'The Fetus As a Patient' VII.
International Congress 1991. August 24-26, 1991, Bonn,
Germany. "Abstracts." Fetal Diagn Ther. 6 (1991]: 153193.

300

301
Pearce, Tola Olu. 1992. "Importing The New Reproductive
Technologies: The Impact of Underlying Models of the
Family, Females and Women's Bodies in Nigeria." [A
Paper presented at Conference on Women, Equality and
Reproductive Technology, Helsinki, August 3-6, 1992].
Pope, Paul VI. 1968. Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope
Paul VI
On The Regulation Of Birth, July 29, 1968.
B. TEXT BOOKS
Ajayi, J.F.A. 1965. Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891:
The Making of a New Elite. London: Longman Group Ltd.
Albert, S. Moraczewski et al eds.1983. Technological Powers
and The
Person: Nuclear Energy and Reproductive
Technologies, The pope
John XXIII Medical-Moral
Research and Education Center, St.
Louis,
Missouri, 1983.
Alpern, Kenneth D. [ed.]. 1992. Tbe Ethics of Reproductive
Technology. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Inc.
Aquinas St. Thomas. 1273. Summa, Theologica. Volume 12 [la.
84-89] Human Intelligence (Latin Text and English
Translation, Introductions, Notes, etc.). Translated by
Paul T. Durbin, 1968. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd.
-------------------- 1983. On Being and Essence. translated
by Armand Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies.
Arrington, Robert L. 1989. Rationalism. Realism. and
Relativism: Perspertives in Contemporary Moral
Epistemology. Thaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Ashley, Benedict M. and Kevin D. O'Rourke. 1986. Ethics of
Health Care. St. Louis: The Catholic Health Association
of the United States.
Ashmore, Robert B. 1987. Building a Moral System. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Ayandele, E.A. 1966. The Missionar.:y Impact on Modern Nigeria
. 1842-1914: A Political and Social Analysis. United
Kingdom: Longman Group Ltd.
Baruch, Elaine Hoffman et al. 1988, Embr.:yos. Ethics. and
Woman's Rights: Exploring the New Reproductive
Technologies. New York/ London:· The Haworth Press.

302
Baumgarth, William P. and Richard J. Regan [eds.]. 1988 .
Thomas Aguinas on Law. Morality and Politics.
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

.s.t.......

Bayertz, Kurt [ed.]. 1994. The Concept of Moral Consensus:
The Case of Technological Interventions in Human
Reproduction. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress. 1983. Principles
of Biomedical Ethics. Second Edition. New York/Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bromham, David R. et al. [ed.]. 1988. Philosophical Ethics
in Reproductive Medicine. Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press.
Browder, W. Leon ed. Developmental biology: a comprehensive
synthesis. New York: Plenum Press, 1985.
Curran, Charles E. and Richard A. McCormick [eds.]. 1979.
Readings in Moral Thelology No. 1. New
York/Ramsey/Toronto: Paulist Press.
Edwards, Rem B. and Glenn C. Graber. 1988. Bio-Ethics.
Chicago: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.
Evan, William M, 1990. Social Structure and Law: Tbeoretical
and Empirical Perspectives. Newbury Park/London/New
Delhi: Sage Publications.
Feinberg, Joel. 1973. Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
--------------- 1980. Rights. Justice. and the Bounds of
Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method: Outline of an
Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Trowbridge, Wiltshire:
Redwood Burn Limited.
Ford, Norman M. 1988. Wben did I Begin? Conception of the
Buman Individual in History. Philosophy and Science,
Cambridge/ New York/ Sidney: Cambridge University
Press.
Frankena, William K. 1973. Ethics, Second Edition. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

303
Frith, Lucy. 1994. Societies. Diochotomies and Resolutions:
An Inquix::y into Social Synthesis. Aldershot: Averbury
Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1976. Philosophical Herxneneutics.
Translated and Edited by David E. Linge. Berkeley. Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
George, Robert P. [ed.]. 1992. Hatural Law Theox::y:
Contemporax::y Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Glover, Jonathan et al. 1989. Ethics of New Reproductive
Technologies: The Gloyer Report to the European
Commission, Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois
University Press.
Hannnond, Peter B. 1978. An Introduction to Cultural and
Social Anthropology, Second Edition. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
Hare, R.M. 1963. Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Haring, Bernard. 1975. Ethics of Manipulation: Issues in
Medicine. Behayior Control and Genetics, New York: The
Seabury Press.
·
Hartshorne, Charles. 1967. A Natural Theology For Our Time,
La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company.
Rittinger, Russell. 1987. A Critique of the New Natural Law
Theox::y, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Hull, Richard T. [ed.]. 1990. Ethical Issues in the New
Reproauctiye Technologies. Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Company - A Division of Wadsworth,
Inc.
Hume, David. 1978. A Treatise of Human Hature. edited by
L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Isichei, Elizabeth. 1995. A Histox::y of Christianity in
Africa. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company.
John, C. Ford et al. 1988. Tbe Teaching of Humanae Vitae:A
·Defense, Ignatius Press, San·Fransisco, 1988.

304
John, C. Wakefield. 1978. Artful Chilamaking:Artificial
Insemination in Catholic Teaching, Pope John XXIII
Medical- Moral Research and Education Center, St.
Louis, Missouri, 1978.
Jones, Howard W. Jr. and Charlotte Schrader [eds.]. 1988 . .In
Vitro: Fertilization and Other Assisted Reproduction.
New York: The New York Academy of Sciences.
Jonson, Albert R. et al. 1986. Clinical Ethics: A Practical
Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Hedicine.
Second Edition. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company
- A Division of Macmillan, Inc·.
Kant, Innnanuel. 1959. Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals. translated by Lewis W. Beck. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company.
-------------- 1960. Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H.
Hudson. New York/San Francisco/London: Harper Torchbooks. Harper and Row Publishers.
--------------- 1965. CritiQJJe of Pure Reason, translated by
Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press.
--------------- 1983. Ethical Philoso.,phy: The Complete Texts
of Grounding For the Metaphysics of Morals and
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. translated by James
W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc.
Kass, Leon R. 1985. Toward A More Natural Science: Biology
and Human Affairs. New York: The Free Press - A
Division of Macmillan, Inc.
Kenny, Anthony [ed.]. 1976. Aquinas: A Collection of
Critical Essays. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Kraut, Richard. 1982. Aristotle on the Human Good.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kripke, Saul A. 1982. Wittgenstein on &ules and Priyaate
Language: An Elementax:y Exposition. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Publisher Limited.
Kuhri, Thomas s. 1970. The Structure of Scietific Revolution,
Second Edition Enlarged. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.

305

Leclerc, Ivor. 1984. Wbitehead's Philosophy Between
Rationalism and EJnpiricism. Leuven: Center for
Metaphysics and Philosophy of God Institute of
Philosophy.
Levi, Isaac. 1986. Hard Choices: Decision Making Under
Unresolved Conflict. Cambridge/London/New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Levine, Carol [ed.]. 1987. Taking Sides: Clashing Views on
Controyersial Bioethical Issues, Second Edition.
Guilford, Connecticut: The Dushkin Publishing Group,
Inc.
Magill, Frank N. [ed.]. 1990. Masterpieces of World
Philosophy. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Mair, Lucy. 1974. African Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mbiti, John S. 1964. African Religions and Philosophy.
London/ Ibadan/Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books
Ltd.
.
McCormick, Richard A. 1992. The Critical Calling:
Reflections on Moral Dilemmas Since Yatican II.
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
McKelvey, Carole A. and JoEllen Stevens. 1944. Adoption
Crisis: The Truth Behind Ado.ption and Foster Care.
Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing.
McKeon, Richard [ed.]. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle.
New York: Random House, Inc.
Mill, John Staurt. 1979. Utilitarianism, edited by George
Sher. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, Inc.
Mishell, R. Daniel, Val Davajan, and Rogerio A. Lobo eds.
Infertility, Contraception and Reproductive
Endocrinology Boston: Blackwell Scientific, 1991.
Mischelle, Stanworth. ed. Reproauctive technologies: gender.
motherhood, and medicine. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1987.
Nathanson, Maurice. 1970 The Journeying Self: A Study In
Philosophy and Social Role. Menlo Park, California:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
·
Obi, Nicholas Ncha. 1987. This Odd World: Spot-Lighting
Nigeria's Blindspots. Yaba, Lagos: Joe en Jude Prints -

306
A Division of Worldwide Communications Associates Ltd.
Obiechina, Emmanuel. 1975. Culture. Tradition and Society in
the West African Noyel. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Onwuejeogwu, M. Angulu. 1975. The Social Anthropology of
Africa: An Introauction. London/Ibadan/Nairobi:
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.
Pope, John Center St. Louis. 1980. ·The New Technologies of
Birth and Death: Medical. Legal and Horal Dimensions,
The Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and
Education Center, St. Louis, Missouri, 1980.
1988. Reproductive
Technologies. Harriage and The Church, The Pope John
XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center,
Braintree, Massachusetts, 1988.
Popper, Karl R. 1979. Objective Knowledge: An Eyolutionar:y
~proach. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Ramsey, Paul. 1970. Fabricated Han: Tbe Ethics of Genetic
Control. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Ross, Sir David. 1964, Aristotle. Bristol: J.W. Arrowsmith
Ltd.

,,

·..

,,

Ross, W.D. 1988. The Right and the Good.
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey [ed.]. 1988 .. Essays on Moral Realism.
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Schillebeeckx, Edward. 1965. Harriage: Buman Reality and
Saying Mystery, translated by N.D. Smith. London: Sheed
and Ward Ltd.
Scott, G.E. 1990. Moral Personhood: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Moral Psychology. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Shue, Henry. 1980. Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence. amci
U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Siegle, A. Bernard 1979. Marriage Today, 3rd. Revised ed ..
Alba House, New York.

307
Stanworth, Michelle [ed.]. 1987. Productive Technologies:
Gender. Motherhood and Medicine. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Sumner, L. W. 1987. The Moral Foundation of Rights. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Thelakat, Paul. 1985. God Suffers Evil: An Attempted
Rapprochement of Classical and Non-Classical Theism - A
Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Doctorate in Sacred Theology.
Leuven; Katholieke Universiteit Te Leuven
Thompson, John B. 1981. Critical Heoneneutics: A Study in
the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habennas.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tomberlin, James E. [ed.]. 1992. Philosophical Perspectives.
6 Ethics. 1992. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview
Publishing Company.
Werhane, Patricia H., A.R. Gini and David T. Ozar. 1986.
Philosophical Issues in Buman Rights: Theories and
Applications, New York: Random House, Inc.
Westley, Richard. 1989. Guidelines For Contemporary
Catholics: Life. Death and Science, Chicago: The Thomas
More Press.
Whitehead, Alfred North. 1978. Process and Reality: An Essay
in Cosmology. corrected Edition, edited by David R.
Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: The Free
Press - A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
Wiredu, Kwasi. 1980. Philosophy and an African eulture,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1963. Philosophical Investigations.
translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Publisher Ltd.
C. ARTICLES
Abramowitz, Susan. 1984. 'A Stalemate and Test-tube Baby
Research.' The Hastings Center Report.
[February
1984]: 5-9.
Anan, Seiichi [ed.]. 1987. 'Turns and Movements in the
Natural Law Tradition.' Vera Lex. Vol. 17, No. 1.
[1987]: 15-16.

308
Arieh, Raziel; et al. 1997. 'The Outcome of In Vitro
Fertilization in Unexplained.Habitual Aborters
Concurrent With Secondary Infertility.' Fertility and
Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 1, [Jan. 1997] :88-91.
Armstrong, D.M. 1982. 'Laws of Nature as Relations Between
Universals and Universals.' Philosophical Topics. 13
[Spring 1982]: 7-24.
Azem, Foad et al. 1994. 'Outcome of Donor Versus Husband
Insemination in Couples With Unexplained Infertility
Treated By In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer.'
Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 61, No. 6 [Jun.
1994] :1088-1091.
Barden, Garrett. 1989. 'Sources of Value.' Method, Vol. 7,
No. 2 [October 1989]: 132-140.
Berkowitz, Richard L. 1993. 'Should Every Pregnant Woman
Undergo Ultrasonography?' The New England Journal of
Medicine. Vol. 329, No. 12 [September 16, 1993]: 874875.
Blank, Robert H. 1985. 'Making Babies: The State of the
Art.' The Futurist. [February 1985]: 11-17.
Brandt, Richard B. 1967. 'Ethical Relativism.' In The.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vols. 3 and 4, edited by
Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
and The Free Press.
------------------ 1984. 'Utilitarianism and Moral Rights.'
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XIV, No. 1 [March
1984]: 1-19.
Brown, Yvonne. 1992. 'The Crisis of Pregnancy Loss: A Team
Approach to Support. Birth, 2 [June 1992]: 82-88.
Buckle, Stephen. 1988. 'Arguing from Potential.' Bioethics.
2 [November 3, 1988]: 227-253.
Callahan, Sidney. 1988. 'The Role of Emotion in Ethical
Decision making.' The Hastings Center Report.
[June/July]: 9-14.
Canberra, John Passmore. 1986. 'Natµre, Intellect and
Culture,' in Philosophy and Culture: Proceedings of the
· XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy. Montreal: Editions
Montmorency.
Carol A. Holden; et al. 1997. 'Frozen-Thawed Epididymal
Spermatozoa
For Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection.'

309

Fertility and

Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 1, [Jan.

1997] : 81- 86.

Chervenak, Frank A. and Laurence B. McCullough. 1991. 'The
Fetus as Patient: Implications for Directive Versus
Nondirective Counseling for Fetal Benefit.' Fetal Diagn
Ther. 6 [1991]: 93-100.
----------------------------------------------. 1993. 'How

to Critically Evaluate Positions on Obstetric Ethics.'
The Journal of Reproauctive Medicine. Vol. 38, No. 4
[April 1993]: 281-284.

----------------------------------------------

1993.

'Identifying and Managing Ethical Conflict in the
Gynecologist-Patient Relationship. The Journal of
Reproauctiye Medicine. Vol. 38, No. 4 [April 1993]:
553-557.

Cooper, Neil. 1988. 'The Formula of the End in Itself.'
Philosophy. 63 [July 1988]: 401-402.
Coughlan, Michael J. 1988. 'From the Moment of conception
... ':The Vatican Instruction on Artificial Procreation
Techniques.' Bioethics. 2 [November 4. 19881; 294-316.
Crossley, David J. 1990. 'Utilitarianism, Rights, and
Equality.' Utilitas. Vol.2. No. 1 [May 19901: 40-45.
Dawson, Karen. 1988. 'Segmentation and Moral Status In Vivi
and In Vitro: A Scientific Perspective.' Bioethics.
Vol. 2, No. 1 [ 19 8 8] : 1-13. . ,1 ,.
Dean, Malcolm. 1994. 'New Controversies Over Assisted
Conception.' The Lancet. Vol. 343, [January 14, 1994]:
165.

Degrazia, David. 1992. 'Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory:
Theories, Cases, and Specified Principalism.' Journal
of Medical Philosophy. Vol. 7, No. 5 [October 1992]:
511-539.

Deparseval, Genevieve Delaisi and Anne Fagot-Largeault.
1988. 'The Status of Artificially Procreated Children:
International Disparities.• Bioethics. 2 [November 2,
1988]: 136-150.

Devettere, Raymond J. 1993. 'Clinical Ethics and Happiness.'
Journal of Medical PhilosQphy. Vol. 18, No. 1 [1993]:
71-89.

310
Edwards, Rem B, 1985. 'J.S. Mill and Robert Veatch's
Critique of Utilitarianism.' The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 [1985]: 181-199.
Edwards, Robert G. and David J. Sharpe. 1971. 'Social Values
and Research in Human Embryology.' Hature. 231 [May 14,
1971]: 87-90.
Edwards, Robert G. 1974. 'Fertilization of Human Eggs in
Vitro: Morals, Ethics and the Law.' Tbe Quarterly
Reyiew of Biology. 49 [March 1974]: 3-26.
Elliot, Robert. 1989. 'The Rights of Future People.' Journal
of Applied Philosophy. Vol. 6, No. 2 [October 1989]:
295-300.
Erik, Enquist et al. 1994. 'Laparoscopic Versus Subinguinal
Varicocelectomy: a ComparativeStudy.' Fertility and
Sterility, Vol. 61, No. 6 [Jun'. 1994] :1092-1096.
Erumevba, Jos.eph Tunde. 1988. "An Ethical Requirement for
Authentic National Development in Africa," in
Philosophy and Culture: Proceedings of the :XVIIth World
Congress of Philosophy, edited by Venant Cauchy,
Montreal: Editions Montmorency.
Fairbairn, Gavin J. 1991. 'Complexity and the Value of Lives
- Some Philosophical Dangers for Mentally Handicapped
People.' Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2
[1991] : 211-217.
Feinberg, Joel, 19 ... lThe Rights of Animals and Unborn
Generations. '
Feleppa, Robert. 1986. 'On Reproducing Social Reality; A
Reply to Harrison.' Philosophy in Social Science. 16
[March 1986]: 89-99.
Fleming, Lorette. 1987. 'The Moral Status of the Foetus: A
Reappraisal.' Bioethics. 1 fJaouar.:y 19871: 15-34.
Fletcher, John c. 1992. 'Fetal Therapy, Ethics and Public
Policies.' Fetal Diagn Ther. 7 [1992]: 158-168.
Francois, Olivennes et al. 1997. 'Follow-up Of a Cohort of
422 Children aged 6 To 13 years conceived By In Vitro
Fertilization.' Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 2
. [Feb. 1997] :284-289.
Gaze, Beth and Karen Dawson. 1989. 'Distinguishing Medical
Practice and Research: The Special Case of IVT.', 3
[November 4, 1989]: 301-319.

311
Gbadegesin, Olusegun. 1988. "Work, Culture and Nature: The
Cultural Betrothal of Nature and the African
Experience," in Philoso.phy and CUlture: Proceedings of
the XVIIth warld Congress of Philosophy. Montreal:
Editions Montmorency.
Glass, Bentley. 1971. 'Science: Endless Horizons or Golden
Age?' Science, Vol. 171, No. 3966 [January 8, 1971]:
21-29.
Goerner, E.A. 1983. 'Thomistic Natural Right: The Good Man's
View of Thomistic Natural Law.' Political Theory. 11
[August 1983]: 393-418.
Goldman, Alan H. 1987. 'Real People: Natural Differences and
the Scope of Justice.' Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
17 [June 1987]: 377-393.
Greta, Verheyan et al. 1997. 'Quality of Frozen-Thawed
testicular Sperm and Its Preclinical Use For
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection Into In Vitro-Matured
Germinal-Vesicle Stage Oocytes.' Fertility and
Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 1 [Jan. 1997] :74-80.
Grobstein, Clifford. 1982. 'The Moral,Use of "Spare"
Embryos.' The Hastings Center Report. [June 1982]: 5-6.
Hall, Pamela. 1990. 'Goerner On Thomistic Natural Law.'
Political Theory. Vol. 8, No. 4 [1990]: 638-649.
Hare, R.M. 1987. 'An Ambiguity in Warnock.' Bioethics. Vol.
1, No. 2 [April 1987]: 175-178.
Herman, Tournaye et al. 1997. 'Microsurgical Epididymal
Sperm Aspiration And Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection:
a New Effective Approach To Infertility As a Result of
Congenital Bilateral Absense of The Vas Deferens.'
Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 61, No. 6 [Jun.
1994] :1045-1051.
------------. 1988. 'When Does Potentiality Count? A Comment
on Lockwood.' Bioethics. Vol. 2, No. 3 ['988]: 214-225.
------------. 1988. 'Possible People.' Bioethics. Vol. 2,
No. 4 [1988]: 279-293.
Harris, John. 1983. 'In Vitro Fertilization:The Ethical
·Issues.' The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 33, No. 132
[July 1983]: 217-237
Hepburn, Ronald W. 1967. 'Philosophical Ideas of Nature,' in
Tbe Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, edited by Paul

312
Edwards. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and
The Free Press.
Husak, Douglas N. 1984. 'Why There Are No Human Rights.'
Social Theory and Practice. 10 [Sununer 1984]: 125-142.
Ian, S. Tununon et al. 1994. 'Transferring More Embryos
Increases Risk of Heterotopic Pregnancy.' Fertility and
Sterility, Vol. 61, No. 6 [Jun. 1994] :10651067.
Jan, Rosest et al. 1997. 'A Triplet<Pregnancy After In Vitro
Fertiliation is a Procedure-Related Complication That
Should Be Prevented By Replacement Of Two Embryos
Only.' Fertility And Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 2 [Feb.
1997]: 290-295.
Jakie, Aleksander. 1993. 'Why Potentiality Cannot Matter.'
Journal of social Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 3 [1993]:
·117-193.
Kass, Leon R. 1990. 'Practicing Ethics: Where's the Action.'
The Hastings Center Report, (January/February 1990]: 512.
Kekes, John. 1988. 'Human Worth and Moral Merit.' Public
Affairs Quarterly, 2 [January 1988]: 53-68.
Kelly, Mathew J. 1987. 'St Thomas and the Nature of Moral
Precepts.' New Scholas, 61 [Autumn 1987]: 427-439.
Kukathas, Chandran. 1992. 'Are There Any CUltural Rights?'
Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1 [February 1992]: 105139.

..

Kymlicka, Will. 1992. 'The Right of'Minority CUlture Reply
to Kukathas.' Political Tbeory. Vol. 201, No. 1
[February 1992]: 140-146.
Lamport, Ann T, 1988. lThe Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption,
Artificial Insemination, and In Vitro Fertilization.'
American Journal of Law and Medicine. Vol. XIV, No.
[1988]: 109-124.
Landers, Ann. 1996. 'The Struggle of Infertility.'
Alexandria Daily Town Talk , [February 23, 1996]: c-4.
Lappe, Marc. 1975. 'The Moral Claims of the Wanted Fetus.'
· The Hastings Center Report. [April 1975]: 11-13.
-----------. 1978.
'Ethics at the Center of Life.' The
Hastings Center Report, 8 [October 1978]: 11-13.

313

Laurel, Stadtmauer et al. 1994. 'High Dosages Of
Gondotropins Are Associated With Poor Pregnancy Outcome
After In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer.'
Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 61, No. 6, [Jun.
1994] :158-1064.

Lockwood, Michael. 1988. 'Warnock Versus Powell (and
Harradine): When Does Potentiality Count?' Bioethics,
Vol. 2, No. 3 [November 3, 1988]: 187-213.
Lowe, E.J. 1980 'Sortal Terms and Natural Laws - An Essay On
The Ontological Status of The Laws of Nature.' American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 [October 1980]:
253-260.

Maccormack, Geoffrey. 1987. 'Stair on Natural Law and
Promises.' Vera Lex, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1987): 13-14, 18.
)

Macer, Darrly R.J. 1994. 'Perception of Risks and Benefits
of In Vitro Fertilization, Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology.' Sociology. Science and Medicine, Vol.
38, No. 1 [1994]: 23-33.
Maclean, Anne. 1985. 'Right and Good: False Dicholomy?'
Philosophy, 60 [January 1985]: 129-132.
Margolis, Joseph. 1990. 'Moral Realism and the Meaning of
Life.• The Philosophical Forum, Vol. XXII, No. 1 [Fall
1990]: 19-47.

Marsh, Frank H. and Donnie J. Self. 1980. 'In Vitro
Fertilization: Moving from Theory to Therapy.' The
Hastings Center Report, [June 1980]: 5-6.
Mcintyre, Alasdair. 1992. 'Plain Persons and Moral
Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods.' American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVI, No. 1
[1992]: 3-19.

Myers, Greg. 1992. 'Clean Talk in Genetics.' S;ocial
Epistemology, Vol. 6, No. 2 [April-June 1992]: 193-202.
Narayan, Uma. 1993. 'What Do Rights' Have to Do with It?:
Reflections on What Distinguishes "Traditional NonWestern" Frameworks From Contemporary Right-based
Systems.' Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 2
[Fall 1993]: 186-197.
Neumann, Peter J. et al. 1994. 'The Cost of a Successful
Delivery with In Vitro Fertilization.' The New England
Journal of Medicine. Vol. 331. No. 4 [July 28. 19941:
239-243.

314
Neumann, R. Michael. 1992. 'Needs Not Rights.' Canadian
Journal of Pbilosophy. Vol. 22, No. 3 [September 1992]:
353-364
Nolan, Kathleen and Sara Swenson. 1988. 'New Tools, New
Dilenunas.
Genetic Frontiers.' The Hastings Center
Report [October/November 1988]: 40-46.
Noonan, John I. Jr. 1973. ,..An Almost Absolute Value in
History," in The Problem of Abortion, edited by Jeel
Feinberg. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc.
Oshita, Oshita o. 1993. 'some Aspects of Person in an
African Traditional Thought System: An Analytical
Exposition of Boki Experience.' Journal of Social
Philoso.phy, Vol. 24, No. 2 [Fa~l 1993]: 235-242
Ozar, David T. 1985. 'The Case Against Thawing Unused Frozen
Embryos.' The Hastings Center Report, [August 1985]: 712.
Perrett, Roy W. 1992. 'Valuing Lives.' Bioethics, Vol. 6,
No. 3 [July 1992]: 185-200.
Powledge, Tabitha M. 1975. 'Fetal Experimentation: Trying to
Sort Out the Issues.' The Hastings Center Report,
[April 1975]: 8-10.
Punzo, Vincent C. 1983. 'Natural Law Ethics: Immediate Or
Mediated Naturalism.' New Scholas, 57[Winter 1983]: 2241.
Ramsey, Paul. 1972. 'Shall We "Reproduce"?' - I. The Medical
Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization.' JAMA, Vol. 220, No.
10 [June 5, 1972]: 1346-1350.
------------. 1972. 'Shall We "Reproduce"?' - II. Rejoinders
and Future Forecast.' JAMA, Vol. 220, No. 11 [June 12,
1972]: 1480-1485.
------------. 1978. 'Manufacturing Our Offspring: Weighing
the Risks.' The Hastings Center Report, [October 1978]:
7-9.
Reed, T.M. 1984 'On The Rational Rejection of Utilitarianism
and the Limitations of Moral Principles.' Journal of
Yalue InQJJ,i:r:y, 18 [1984]: 227-232.

315
Reiman, Jeffrey H. 1993. 'The Impotency of the Potentiality
Argument For Fetal Rights: Reply to Wilkins.' Journal
of social Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 3 [1993]: 170-176.
Risjord, Mark. 1993. 'Relativism and Social Scientific Study
of Medicine.' The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,
18 [1993]: 195-212.
Robertson, John A. 1989. 'Resolving Disputes Over Frozen
Embryos.' The Hastings Center Report,
[November/December 1989]: 7-12.
Roy, Pushwant K. 1988. "Philosophical Foundations of
Nigerian Traditional Culture," in Philosophy and
Culture: Proceedings of the :XVIIth warld Congress of
Philosophy. Montreal: Editions Montmorency.
Sass, Hans-Martin. 1988. 'A Critique of the Enquete
Commission's Report on Gene Technology.' Bioethics,
Vol. 2, No. 3 [1988]: 264-275.
Sauer, Mark V. et al. 1992. 'Reversing the Natural Decline
in Human Fertility: An Extended Clinical Trial of Ocyte
Donation to Women of Advanced Reproductive Age.' .JAMA,
Vol. 268, No. 10 [September 9, 1992]: 1275-1279.
Schall, James v. 1987. 'On Natural Law - Aristotle.' Ye.ra.
Lex, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1987]: 11-12, 26.
Scoccia, Danny. 1990. 'Utilitarianism, Sociobiology, and the
Limits of Benevolence.' Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87,
No. 7 [July 1990]: 329-345
Shanner, Laura. 1995. 'Power-Over and Power-To: Human
Reproduction and Insights from Taoism.' Second Opinion,
Vol. 20, No. 3 [January 1995]: 11-21.
Simpson, Peter and Robert McKim. 1992. 'Consequentialism,
Incoherence and Choice.' American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVI, No. 1 [Winter
1992]: 93-98.
Sleigh, Nicholas. 1992. 'Objective Goodness and Aristotle's
Dilemma.' The Journal of Value Inquir::y, 26 [1992]: 341351.
Smith, George P. 1990. 'Assisted Noncoital Reproduction: A
·Comparative Analysis.' Boston University International
Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 21 [1990]: 21-52.

316
Smolkin, Doran. 1994. 'The Non-Identity Problem and the
Appeal to Future People's Rights.' Sourthern Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 32 No. 3 [1994]: 315-329.
State, Stanley. 'The Hierarchy of Values Revisted.'
Contem,porax:y Philosophy, Vol. XIII, No. 3 [May-June
1990]: 15-18.
Steinfels, Margaret O'Brien. 1979. 'In Vitro Fertilization:
"Ethically Acceptable" Research.' The Hastings Center
Report, 9 [June 1979]: 5-8.
Thompson, Paul B. 1985. 'Risking or Being Willing: Hamlet
and DC-10.' Journal of Value Inguix.:y, 19 [1985]: 301310
Thomson, Colin J.H. 1984. 'Australia: In Vitro Fertilization
and More.' The Hastings Center Report, [December 1984]:
14-22.
Toulmin, Stephen. 1978. 'In Vitro Fertilization: Answering
the Ethical Objections.' The Hastings Center Report,
[October 1978]: 9-14.
Tuomela, Raimo. 1984. 'Social Action-Functions.' Philosophy.
Sociology. Science, 14 [June 1984]: 133-148.
Unger, Peter. 1992. 'Causing and Preventing Serious Harm.'
Philosophical studies. 65 [1992]: 227-255.
Uniacke, Suzanne. 1987. 'In Vitro Fertilization and the
Right to Reproduce.' Bioethics, Vol. 1, No. 3 !1987]:
241-254.
Vacek, Collins Edward. 1992. The Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 3, June 1992.
Wallace, William A. 1988. "The Intelligibility of Nature: A
Nee-Aristotelian View." in Philosophy and Culture:
Proceedings of the XVII th World Congress of
Philosophy, edited by Vanant Cauchy. Montreal: Editions
Montmorency.
Walters, Leroy. 1975. 'Fetal Researcb and Ethical Issues.'
Tbe Hastings Center Report, [June 1975]: 13-18.
--------------. 1977. 'Some Ethical Issues in Research
·Involving Human Subjects.' Perspectiyes in Biology and
Medicine, [Winter 1977] : .....

317
-------------- 1979. 'Human In Vitro Fertilization: A
Review of the Ethical Literature.' The Hastings Center
Report, 9 [August 1979]: 23-43.
Warnock, Mary. 1983. 'In Vitro Fertilization: The Ethical
Issues II.' The Philosophical Quarterly. [July 1983]:
238-249.
-------------. 1987. 'Do Human Cells Have Rights?'
Bioethics, Vol. 1, No. 1 [1987]: 1-14.
Warren, Mary Anne. 1987. 'A Reply To Holmes on Gendercide.'
Bioethics, 1 [November 2, 1987]: 179-187.
Wasserstrom, Richard. 1975. 'The Status of the Fetus.'
Hastings Center Report, [June 1975]: 18-22.

The

Wein, Sheldon. 1987. 'Rights and Needs.' Dialogue (Canada)
Wierenga, Edward. 1984. 'Utilitarianism and the Divine
Command Theory.' Affierican Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.
21, No. 4 [October 1984]: 311-318.
Wilkins, Burleigh T. 1993. 'Does the Fetus Have a Right To
Life?' Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, No. 1
[Spring 1993]: 123-137.
Willard, Duane. 1987. 'Needs and Rights.' Dialogue (Canada),
26 [Spring 1987]: 43-53.
Williams, Ieuan. 1992. 'Faith and Skepticism: Newman and the
Naturalist Tradition.' Philosophical Inyestigations, 15
[January 1992]: 51-66.
William, Schoolcraft et al. 1997. 'Improved Controlled
Ovarian Hyperstimulation in Poor Responder In Vitro
Fertilization Patients With a Microdose Folliclestimulating Hormone Flare, Growth Hormone Protocol.'
Fertility and Sterility, Vol. 67, No. 1 [Jan.
1997] :93-96.
Winston, Robert M-L and Ahan H. Handyside. 1993. 'New
Challenges in Human In Vitro Fertilization.' Science,
Vol. 260, [May 14, 1993]: 932-936.
Wollheim, Richard. 1967. "Naturalism", in The Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Vol. 5, edited by Paul Edwards. New
·York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press.

_.,,

I

VITA

The author, Joseph Ibegbulem Ekweariri, is a native of
Umuemeri-Ogwu-Nguru in Ahiara local government area of Imo
State, Nigeria.
Ekweariri obtained the degree of Bachelor of Divinity at
St. Augustine's Major Seminary (Affiliate of Urban
University, Rome, Italy) Jos, Nigeria, in 1977; Master's
degree in Religious Studies and Philosophy in 1986 and 1987
respectively at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium.
Ekweariri was the dean of Formation and director of
sports at St. John Vianny Seminary, Barakin Ladi, Plateau
State (Nigeria} and at his alma matter, St. Augustine's
Major Seminary, Jos (Nigeria) from 1978-1980 and from 1980
through 1981 respectively. He was a pooled Chaplain to
various US military and Air force Stations in Germany from
1983-1986. From 1987 to present, he has been working as a
Hospital Chaplain and health care ethicist.

318

DISSERTATION APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation submitted by Fr. Joseph Ibegbulem Ekweariri
has been read and approved by the following committee:
David T. Ozar, Ph.D., Director
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago
Richard Westley, Ph.D.,
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago
John Langan S.J., Ph.D.,
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the
committee with reference to content and form.
The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

Date

